Feldman, Burke Examine GPX Case and NME Subsidies

中文请点击这里

The China-U.S. Trade Law Blog has not posted a new article in a while, but mostly because Elliot Feldman and John Burke have been working on a major article - Testing The Limits Of Trade Law Rationality: The GPX Case and Subsidies in Non-Market Economies for the American University Law Review.  It will be published this week and we are pleased to provide a link here.

Introduction

Chinese merchandise has been the subject of most international trade disputes, all over the world, for several years. All of China’s principal trading partners, including the United States, Japan, and the European Union, treat China as a non-market economy (NME), applying special methodologies for determining whether Chinese enterprises are exporting merchandise at less than fair value. However, until 2006 the recognition of China as an NME meant that unfair trade allegations were based on pricing theories for antidumping, never government programs or actions unfairly subsidizing exported merchandise. The general rule was that government subsidies are countervailable only when they distort markets, and NMEs have no markets to distort.

The United States began launching simultaneous antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) investigations of Chinese merchandise after the November 2006 congressional elections. This change in practice inevitably triggered legal disputes that collectivized under the banner of GPX, an American importer of off the- road tires (OTR Tires) from China. The U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) were asked to decide whether CVD investigations into merchandise from NMEs were in accordance with law and, if they were, whether they could be conducted simultaneously with antidumping investigations. The United States Congress, unhappy with the decisions of the appellate court, swiftly rewrote the law. The constitutionality of the revised statute then was challenged in the same courts.

        多年来,中国产品在世界各国都是贸易救济调查的首选目标。中国的主要贸易伙伴——美国、日本、欧盟都将中国视为非市场经济,用特殊计算方法计算中国产品面临的反倾销税率。然而在2006年之前,非市场经济计算方法只适用于反倾销案件,对反补贴案件并不适用。当时的准则为:只有当政府补贴扰乱市场时才适用反补贴措施,而非市场经济体中不存在市场。

 
        从2006年11月国会中期选举开始,美国开始针对中国产品同时展开反倾销、反补贴(“双反”)调查。这一转变引发了GPX为代表的一系列案件,GPX是从中国进口轮胎的美国进口商。美国国际贸易法庭以及美国联邦巡回区上诉庭双双面临需判定对非市场经济体出口展开反补贴调查是否合法的难题。同时,如果可对非市场经济体展开反补贴调查,可否同时展开反倾销调查?美国国会对上诉庭判决不满,立即迅速修改法律。随即,两个法庭又需回答修改后的贸易法是否符合美国宪法这一新难题。
 

       英文全文请点击这里

China's Status As A Non-Market Economy 中国的非市场经济体地位

China’s goals of international recognition during the last decade, in addition to accession to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), include most prominently acceptance by the United States as a market economy. There have been at least two motivations: to have its creation of a market, “with Chinese characteristics,” recognized and approved around the world; and to be liberated from the trade remedy methodology tailored specifically for non-market economies. The former is more psychic; the latter is pragmatic.

Non-Market Economy Status

World trade rules are built around principles of free trade. Free trade as an ideal type refers to unimpeded private market transactions where governments, monopolies, and state enterprises do not have enough influence to distort the conduct or outcomes of private enterprise competition. The free private enterprise system assumes, as did Adam Smith, that the selfish private acts of individuals and their organizations will yield, out of their competition and interaction, a greater public good. The market, not government, defines and produces the public good. It also assumes that governments and monopolies, when regulating or controlling private transactions, distort markets and thus are harmful to the public good.

The role of government in the ideal free private enterprise system is limited, mostly to regulating anticompetitive behavior and breaking up excessively large conglomerates and monopolies that prevent free competition. Of course, such limited government is a fiction. Governments have many roles in civil society, and all impact the economy.

All governments raise revenue through taxes. They make judgments about who most can afford to pay. Despite the periodic calls in the United States for a “flat tax” imposed on everyone equally, taxes everywhere are “progressive,” graduated according to the perceptions of what can be afforded and by whom, including business enterprises as well as individuals. Taxes on transactions – sales taxes or value added taxes – are also common. The form of taxation, the extent to which taxes are graduated, and the taxpayers (corporate or individual) all express public policies favoring some over others. A core public policy in the United States favors private home ownership, which has produced special tax provisions affecting everything from bank loans to construction materials. All such government interventions and taxes distort markets in one way or another. Yet, like death, taxes are inevitable and are the most obvious form of government intervention in markets.

Governments play additional roles. Every free market system assigns governments a role in forbidding the formation and operation of anticompetitive monopolies and trusts. Governments may regulate to protect the health, safety, and welfare of citizens. Such regulations typically raise costs of production for private enterprise, and impose certain manufacturing methods and ways of doing business. Hence, despite the ideal type, governments everywhere intervene in the free market.

Corporations rhetorically champion free enterprise, but in practice they seek competitive advantages that inevitably translate into limitations on competition. Governments regulate to limit or eliminate such corporate behavior. The nature of competition is to seek an advantage and a superiority over others. Such advantages are defined by reducing the competitive abilities and positions of others. Individuals and corporations idealize competition only to the extent that competition can improve their situations, which by definition requires the degrading of the competitive positions of others. Consequently, free private enterprise systems foster competitors whose objective is always to reduce competition. Governments overseeing such systems endeavor to maximize competition, while protecting against the release into the stream of commerce of products and practices inimical to the health and safety of individuals and society.
This ideal type of free enterprise system is the theoretical antithesis of a state-controlled or command economy. In the ideal type, government intervenes only as required, reluctantly, and while trying to guarantee free competition. In a command economy, government seeks to direct all economic activity, deciding what needs to be manufactured, to whom it should be distributed, and at what price. Government extracts rents from this production and, therefore, in control of the entire economy, can raise revenues anyway it likes. Markets function only to the extent that governments permit, in any particular sector, the interaction of willing buyers and willing sellers. Mostly, demand is regulated by supply, the latter controlled entirely by the government.

The United States, since the ascension to power of Mao Tse-Tung, has treated China, dominated by state-owned enterprises and with a tax system dictated by government (rather than negotiated among competing interests), as a non-market economy. However, China, since the “opening” of Deng Xiaoping, no longer regards itself as a non-market economy. Instead, China thinks of itself as a capitalist, market economy, albeit with “Chinese characteristics.”

There are many indicia supporting China’s self-image because substantial competition has grown up in China. Capitalist goods are everywhere and are sold competitively throughout the country. There are advertisements promoting different prices for the same or comparable goods. People decide what to buy, from food to cars, such that supply does not control demand, and the government does not control supplies. Labor has become mobile, with people moving from one part of the country to another, from one kind of job to another, from one corporate entity to another making or selling the same product. Prices vary with supply and demand, not dictated by government.

There are many indicia that China remains a command economy. The government owns and controls the supply and prices of natural resources and public utilities. The government controls banks and insurance, lends money through the banks according to government policy and rates, controls the currency and its value. The most important economic sectors, such as steel production, are dominated, when not exclusively captured, by state-owned enterprises. Through the control of money and loans and prices, the government dictates the supply and demand for the most important products and services.

The global economic meltdown with the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 made the United States look more like China than the other way around. The U.S. government took effective control of major banks and insurance companies, bought out one of the leading economic sectors – automobile manufacturing – and shaped subsidy programs throughout the economy designed to assure the success or survival of enterprises chosen by the government. Yet, while insisting that it is the world’s leading capitalist economy, the United States denied China’s claim to be recognized as a market economy.
 

Symbolism Of Market Recognition


China, as a matter of national pride and self-respect, has resented the American insistence that massive American subsidies and market intervention preserved a capitalist, market, free enterprise system, while identical conduct in China guaranteed that China would be considered outside the mainstream, along with Cuba and Vietnam and North Korea, as a non-market economy. The more China has insisted that the United States should recognize it as a market economy, the more the United States has resisted. Excuses have become cumulative, most prominently in the American complaint over China’s refusal to float fully the value of its currency, notwithstanding that U.S. currency did not float freely until 1971, and the United States certainly was not considered a non-market economy before then.

Recognition as a market economy has come to mean, for China, fulfillment of a promise it perceives was made in 2001 when China acceded to the WTO. Even though the WTO agreement projected recognition as a market economy by 2016, and then only upon the satisfaction of various criteria, China’s Commerce Minister now insists that the United States agreed to recognize China’s market economy status by 2010 and offers a sense of betrayal that recognition has not happened.

The Practicalities Of Market Economy Status

In only one significant respect does recognition as a market economy matter: when complaints are brought that Chinese goods are dumped in the United States, the methodology for determining whether there is dumping, and if so, how much, is different for non-market economies. This distinct methodology gives the United States Department of Commerce more discretion and flexibility to find dumping, and to inflate the dumping “margin,” the measure of how much dumping and consequently how much duty will be owed for the merchandise to be imported into the United States.

Dumping is determined in one of two ways: either a good is sold abroad for a price lower than the price at home, or the costs to produce the good exceed the price at which the good is sold abroad. When Chinese goods are subjected to this second measurement, the cost of production, the non-market economy methodology becomes critical.

Non-market economy status presumes that, in the absence of markets, there are no market prices. It is then theoretically impossible to determine the cost of production because it is impossible to determine the costs of any of the inputs. There are no market wages; no market rents; no market utilities. Raw materials have no market prices, nor do any component parts.
When the inputs are imported from a market economy, dumping analysts use the price the Chinese manufacturer has paid for those inputs. But when the inputs are domestic products, analysts assume there is no market price for them. The analysts then seek and apply “surrogate” prices – prices of the same input in a “market” economy that, supposedly, is at a similar level of development as China. Surrogate values may come from many different countries, but American official analysts have favored (for China) India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and occasionally other countries.

The selection of surrogate values is highly contentious and is decided, in the end, by U.S. government officials. They have decided that freight costs, for example, could not be used if derived from a Chinese-flag ship. They have chosen, instead, some of the highest shipping rates in the world.

Subsidies And Market Economy Status

Until November 2006, treatment of China as a non-market economy did have advantages for China. A “subsidy” in international trade is a financial contribution from a government that is market-distorting. Where there is no market, there is nothing to distort. Therefore, until November 2006, the United States had never brought a subsidies (countervailing duty) case against China. Subsidies could not be alleged; they had to be treated as costs of production susceptible to the application of surrogate values.

It was always thought that China could not and would not be exposed to countervailing duty allegations unless and until it might be recognized as a market economy. The Chinese Government, consequently, stayed out of trade remedy disputes, as dumping is the business of business, not government. Dumping is determined by prices, and companies, not governments, set prices. Moreover, it was exceedingly difficult to address some of the “inputs” this way for a cost-of-production analysis.

The 2006 mid-term elections delivered a significant Democratic majority pressuring the Administration to get tough on China, especially as to alleged subsidies. A petition alleging subsidies to coated free sheet paper was pending. The Department of Commerce, soon after the elections, decided to initiate a countervailing duty investigation, while refusing, still, to recognize China as a market economy.

China protested the apparent anomaly – a non-market economy subjected to a countervailing duty investigation – but to no avail. Various legal issues emerged and several are still the subject of WTO proceedings initiated by China. None has been resolved by the WTO, and meanwhile the United States has found subsidies and imposed countervailing duties in 12 cases already. All of these cases were accompanied by antidumping petitions, and a cumulation of dumping and subsidies duties have been imposed in 26 cases since 2007. Petitioners complaining about unfair competition from China now routinely file simultaneously antidumping and countervailing duty petitions.

Why Non-Market Economy Status No Longer Has Practical Meaning

The decision to investigate subsidy allegations and impose countervailing duties while still treating China as a non-market economy rendered the non-market economy status practically meaningless. It is not as if, were China tomorrow to be recognized as a market economy, anything of practical value would change.

The United States has been applying surrogate values for subsidy allegations against China throughout the economy. For the allegation that China was not charging enough money for the commercial use of land in rural Shandong Province, the Department of Commerce used land values from suburban Bangkok. The Commerce Department ignored entirely expert testimony that the use of such values was nonsensical from the perspective of economics and land use.  And Commerce treated any input supplied by a state-owned enterprise as a subsidy, the value of which was to be determined by selection of a surrogate value in a market economy. 

The rationale for the application of surrogate values is based on Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada.  Even though a WTO panel found the use of such values improper in the case of Canada and a NAFTA panel found it illegal, the Commerce Department dismissed the NAFTA panel as having no precedential authority and the WTO panel as ambiguous. Beginning with coated free sheet paper, the Commerce Department has cited its own administrative determination in the softwood lumber case as the basis for its treatment of China.

The Commerce Department argues that, even though Canada is indisputably a market economy, Canadian provincial governments own so much of the forests that any price for standing timber cannot be a market price. It did not matter that nearly twenty-five percent of the standing timber sold in Quebec is private, as is more than fifteen percent in Ontario. It did not matter that the pricing scheme for public forests in Quebec was based entirely on the prices in the private forest. The Commerce Department reasoned that the public sector was so large compared to the private sector that the private sector prices were driven by the public sector and therefore could not be used. It reasoned that the residual value methodology applied by Ontario, whereby the market price of manufactured lumber required certain pricing of the raw material, could not be used because most of the natural resource was in public hands. It did not matter that the NAFTA and WTO panels disagreed, as did a number of notable experts.

China, over the course of three years, has failed to successfully challenge any of the Commerce Department surrogate value applications in U.S. courts. [confirm] Consequently, the Commerce Department has been laying a foundation of subsidy findings as “administrative practice,” upon which it can rely for virtually anything that may arise in the Chinese economy. Bank loans, even from commercial banks, can be treated as non-market rates because of the alleged dominance of state-owned banks setting the market rates; prices for inputs from private companies can be set aside as long as there are state-owned enterprises in the same business. It will be very difficult for China to prove that the state is not dominant in one sector or another, and the burden of proof will fall on China.

The United States can recognize China as a market economy and continue to apply surrogate values and non-market economy methodologies in trade remedy disputes because China has focused on the issue of market economy status instead of on the methodology the United States developed in the softwood lumber dispute with Canada. The core issue remains not the nomenclature, but the predominance of state-owned enterprises.

The Strategic And Economic Dialogue

The Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing in May 2010 seemed to produce only one Chinese headline: that the United States was going to recognize China as a market economy. The expectation was variously seen as fulfillment of a promise and as an essential American concession, a Chinese victory of sorts. The United States, as it happens, did not provide such recognition, only promising to continue a discussion about it. Consequently, the United States now knows it is holding something that China values highly, and yet is not worth very much, an enviable negotiating position. China, for its part, needs to recognize how little such recognition means, and move on to more meaningful discussions.
 

       过去十年里,中国积极努力希望获得世界认可:除历经艰辛终于加入世贸组织外,还包括要求美国授予中国市场经济地位。这一努力背后有两大动力:希望“具有中国特色” 的市场经济制度得到世界认可,同时免受只针对非市场经济体的贸易补偿方法。前者出于心理因素,后者处于实际考量。

       请阅读英文全文。

US Court Tells Commerce Department It Cannot Impose Countervailing Duties When It Uses The Non-Market Economy Methodology In A Companion Antidumping Case 美国法庭否决美国商务部双重征税计算方法

中文请点击这里

Chief Judge Jane A. Restani of the United States Court of International Trade (“CIT”) on August 4, 2010 ordered the United States Department of Commerce (“DOC”) to forego the imposition of countervailing duties on pneumatic off-the-road tires from the People’s Republic of China. Her decision, in GPX International Tire Corporation v. United States, was based on her ruling that US law prohibited DOC from imposing duties higher than the amount needed to offset subsidies on imported products.

The problem for DOC, inherent in the case and as posed by Judge Restani, is that DOC uses surrogate values presumed to be unsubsidized, rather than a company’s actual production costs, to calculate Normal Values. DOC compares these Normal Values in its non-market economy antidumping methodology to the export price, a methodology that should, at least in theory, offset any subsidies on the production of the merchandise (because the comparison has been taken against unsubsidized inputs through surrogate values). If DOC were to impose countervailing duties to offset subsidies that benefit the production of the merchandise, then it would be offsetting the same subsidies twice.

Double counting of subsidies does not occur with DOC’s market economy dumping methodologies (19 C.F.R. §§ 351.405 & 351.406) because, in those cases, Normal Value is calculated based on actual prices in the foreign market and actual costs incurred in that market. Thus, if there were any subsidies imbedded in those prices or costs, they would not be offset by the antidumping methodology and would need to be addressed separately in a countervailing duty investigation.

Judge Restani’s August 4, 2010 decision followed an earlier decision in the GPX case where she sent the matter back to DOC to find a way to avoid the double counting problem. In the earlier case, Judge Restani found that, while DOC had discretion to impose countervailing duties on Chinese merchandise while still considering China to be a non-market economy (the central issue in dispute), DOC had to avoid double counting of subsidies when it applied the countervailing duty law and the antidumping non-market economy methodology to the same products at the same time.

DOC interpreted Judge Restani’s earlier decision as giving it three options: (a) not apply the countervailing duty law; (b) apply the market economy antidumping methodology in that case; or (c) lower the cash deposits imposed in the antidumping case by the amount of cash deposits imposed in the countervailing duty case. DOC decided to lower the antidumping deposits by the amount of the countervailing duty deposits. Judge Restani found that option contrary to US law because there is no provision in the antidumping statute to lower duties by the amount of countervailing duties and because that option is unreasonable as it requires the parties to go through the expense of countervailing duty proceedings that are essentially useless.

Judge Restani ordered DOC to forego imposing countervailing duties on off-the-road tires from China because DOC demonstrated in that case that it did not have the ability to determine the degree to which double counting was occurring in its non-market economy language and offset it directly within that methodology. Thus, the CIT has left open the option in future cases for DOC to try new methodologies to eliminate the double counting within the antidumping nonmarket economy methodology. DOC continues to have the option of imposing countervailing duties to products from China in cases without a companion antidumping case on the same products, or in cases in which it uses its discretion to recognize a market-oriented industry (“MOI”). In that latter instance, considering MOI status, it could continue its general policy of not recognizing China as a market economy while using a market economy methodology for a particular industry. DOC has never recognized an industry in China as “market-oriented,” but it does have the statutory authority to decide to apply market economy methodologies on a case-by-case basis.

DOC, or the petitioners in the GPX case, have the right to appeal Judge Restani’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”). Should they do so, that higher court could overturn Judge Restani’s decision, affirm it, or modify it. Were the CAFC to overturn the decision, DOC would be free to apply countervailing duties to the same products on which it used the non-market economy antidumping methodology. In deciding whether to appeal, however, DOC must consider the risk of appealing and losing. Right now Judge Restani’s decision is binding on DOC only in the GPX case: it does not set precedent that DOC would be forced to follow in all future cases. Were DOC to appeal and have the CAFC affirm Judge Restani’s decision, that affirmation would be binding precedent, prohibiting DOC from applying both the CVD law and the non-market economy methodology to the same merchandise.

Judge Restani’s decision was based solely upon US law. However, China has challenged at the World Trade Organization, on the same grounds of double-counting, the application to China of the countervailing duty law while DOC refuses to recognize China as a market economy. Judge Restani’s decision in GPX demonstrates the value, at least to the companies involved, of appealing to the US court, rather than relying solely on WTO challenges. As we noted in earlier articles on this blog (US Court Decision Ought to Change Chinese Thinking and WTO Challenges Not Always a Panacea for Respondents in Trade Litigation), the WTO process is designed to vindicate governmental interests, but does not often provide much comfort or relief for commercial interests. Appeals in the US courts, by contrast, are a right belonging to the companies themselves that have been hurt by the agency’s challenged actions and, when those companies win in U.S. courts,, the remedy can provide immediate retroactive relief.
 

        美国国际贸易法庭首席法官Jane A. Restani于2010年8月4日做出裁决,下令美国商务部停止向中国轮胎征收反补贴税。她在GPX国际轮胎有限公司诉美国一案中指出美国法律禁止美国商务部征收高于实际补贴的惩罚性关税。

        美国商务部面临的难题是在针对非市场经济体展开的反倾销调查中,它并非使用某一企业的实际生产价格,而是使用比较价格以计算正常价格。然后,美国商务部比较比较正常价格和出口价格之间的差价。单纯从理论层面看,这一非市场经济反倾销税计算方法可抵消为生产这一产品提供的补贴(因为比较价格中不包括享受补贴的产品)。因此,如果美国商务部再征收反补贴税,它则两次征收反补贴税。

        在美国商务部针对市场经济体展开的反倾销调查中,双重征税并不存在。因为在这些案件中,正常价格建立在国外市场的实际售价和本国实际生产成本基础之上。因此即使这些售价和成本包括补贴,反倾销调查已经排除这些补贴,反补贴调查将负责计算反补贴税。
 

 

                                                                                           翻译:朱晶

John W. Clayton, Jr., Joins Baker Hostetler as Director of Trade Analysis 约翰•克来顿任本所贸易分析主任

中文请点击这里

The U.S. law firm of Baker & Hostetler LLP is pleased to announce that John W. Clayton, Jr., has joined the firm as the Director of Trade Analysis in its Washington, D.C. office. Mr. Clayton, a Certified Public Accountant, is widely recognized as the leading expert in providing cost accounting services to non-market economy industries involved in U.S. antidumping proceedings. Mr. Clayton has represented clients in more than one hundred antidumping proceedings and has achieved more victories than any other person in the antidumping field.

Over a span of more than 20 years, Mr. Clayton has assisted a wide variety of industries involved in U.S. dumping cases, including foodstuffs, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, minerals and metals, and consumer products. Mr. Clayton focuses on assisting non-market economy producers, especially in China and Vietnam, in providing the detailed production cost data that U.S. authorities demand from foreign producers subject to U.S. antidumping proceedings.

Prior to joining Baker Hostetler, Mr. Clayton served as the Chief Accountant of Grunfeld Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman and Klestadt LLP. He previously was employed as a cost accounting specialist with Trade Resources, a Washington, D.C., trade consulting company, and as a cost accountant with the U.S. Department of Commerce.

“The addition of John Clayton enhances Baker Hostetler’s ability to provide superior service to industries in China and Vietnam involved in U.S. antidumping proceedings,” said Elliot Feldman, head of the firm’s International Trade practice. “Before John went in-house to another law firm, he worked successfully with us. Now, John will devote his extraordinary experience, expertise and skills entirely to matters handled by Baker Hostetler.”

Baker Hostetler represents foreign and domestic companies, associations and governments from every continent in all manner of international trade, customs and immigration proceedings before U.S. and foreign regulatory agencies, courts, and international dispute resolution panels. The firm and its attorneys also enjoy close working relationships with trade lawyers in other countries throughout the world.

Attorneys in the Washington office represent clients in antidumping, countervailing duty and other investigative proceedings before the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission; Section 201 safeguard actions involving many different federal agencies and the White House; and Section 301 actions before the U.S. Trade Representative. They also represent clients in customs, immigration, export controls and economic sanctions matters before the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, State and Defense.
 

        贝克豪思律师事务所(Baker & Hostetler LLP)欣喜地宣布约翰•克来顿(John W. Clayton, Jr.)加盟本所华盛顿办公室担任贸易分析主任一职。克来顿拥有会计师资格证,是美国反倾销领域内公认的、为非市场经济国家提供成本核算服务的专家。他为客户在上百个反倾销案件中取得胜利,是这一领域取得胜利最多的专家。

        在长达二十多年的时间里,克来顿主任的工作领域涉及多个产业:食品、化学、医药、矿产及消费品。他专注于帮助中国、越南等非市场经济国家的生产商应对反倾销调查,为他们提供详尽的生产成本数据分析。美国调查机构要求面临反倾销调查的国外生产企业提供这些数据。

        在加入贝克豪思律师事务所之前,克来顿先生担任格德莱西克法律事务所的首席会计。此前他在美国商务部及一家+国际贸易咨询公司任职。

        本所国际贸易部负责人费德门评论道:“克来顿先生的加盟将进一步增强贝克豪思律师事务所为中国、越南企业提供优异服务的能力,更好地帮助它们应对反倾销调查。在克来顿先生加盟另一律师事务所之前,他曾为我们提供出色的服务。现在,克来顿先生将充分发挥他的经验和专长为本所客户服务。”

        贝克豪思律师事务所国际贸易部的客户包括各大洲的政府和行业协会、美国及国外企业,为它们处理国际贸易、海关及移民事务,帮助它们在各政府、法院以及国际仲裁委员会处理各类事务。本所律师与世界各国的贸易律师建立了良好合作伙伴关系。

        本所华盛顿办公室的律师帮助客户在美国商务部、美国国际贸易委员会处理反倾销、反补贴及其他调查;在白宫及多个政府机构处理201款贸易保障调查;还在美国贸易委员代表办公室处理301款调查。他们还帮助客户处理受美国财政部、商务部、国土安全部、国务院和国防部管辖的海关、出口控制、移民及贸易制裁事项。 

(翻译:朱晶)

China-U.S. Relations And International Trade 美中关系和国际贸易

Note: Dr. Elliot Feldman on April 15, 2010 presented the following speech at AmCham-China’s Conference of the Asia-Pacific Council of American Chambers of Commerce (APCAC).

中文请点击这里

Difficulties with China are now on Page One of The New York Times and The Washington Post almost every day. There is consensus in Washington that relations between China and the United States will get worse before they get better. There are many issues, most related only marginally, if at all, to trade. As examples, there is frustration in Washington that China does not share a western view of the nuclear threat from Iran, nor the urgency of the nuclear threat from North Korea. There is disappointment and chagrin over Copenhagen, and obvious disagreement over Taiwan and over the Dalai Lama. These issues are mostly strategic, sometimes cultural. Cooperation on them would go a long way toward calming concerns in other areas. There is no sign, however, of mutual understanding.

There are many additional issues dividing China and the United States that are economic. The most obvious is that China, as of January, held $2.4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, of which nearly $900 billion was in U.S. Treasury bonds and securities. The reserves had grown $453 billion in 2009, and economists predict similar growth again in 2010.

No less important to the United States and other countries is the valuation of the RMB. After the end of the dollar peg in July 2005, the RMB appreciated over 20 percent against the dollar. With the global economic crisis, however, China froze the RMB and let its value relative to other world currencies drift down with the dollar. Premier Wen Jiabao dashed American hopes last month that China would permit some adjustment any time soon.

Within the U.S. administration it is said that the word “currency” is not to be spoken, but the characterization of the associated issues as “mercantilism” seems more than tolerated. Meetings between Chinese and American leadership since September 15, 2008 frequently have invoked references to “rebalancing,” the idea that Americans should save more, Chinese should spend more, and Chinese exports to the United States should decline as they find a market at home among consuming Chinese. Such rebalancing, endorsed publicly by both countries, is difficult, however, when an undervalued RMB persistently makes Chinese goods comparatively inexpensive abroad and foreign goods expensive in China.

Both countries, and as important, the governments of both countries, are preoccupied with job creation. Weaker currencies tend to keep jobs at home. Chinese intransigence about currency valuation raises doubts among Americans, however, about the sincerity of Chinese pledges to rebalance. Those doubts are shared, perhaps even more acutely, in Europe. In a form of diplomatic jiu-jitsu, Premier Wen has called the U.S. demand for currency adjustment “a type of trade protectionism,” and Commerce Minister Chen Deming has escalated the rhetoric, threatening that American action on currency would precipitate a trade war that, he insisted ominously, the United States would lose.

Many in Congress, and some in the Administration, want to make currency valuation a trade issue, which perhaps Premier Wen already has done for them by calling it one, confirmed by Minister Chen. Countervailing duty petitions now routinely allege currency valuation as an illegal subsidy (three times in 2009 alone), and many in Congress, and in the business community, want the Treasury Department to label China a currency manipulator. The U.S. Department of Commerce, however, consistently refuses to investigate the allegation, concluding each time that the elements of an export subsidy have not been pleaded sufficiently, particularly as to the subsidy law’s specificity test: the laws and regulations pertaining to valuation of the RMB, Commerce has concluded, are not specific to any industry or group of industries in China, nor is the valuation conditioned on exports.

This legal conclusion has enabled both the Bush and Obama Administrations to avoid a major confrontation with China over the RMB in trade remedy cases, while both Administrations have refused, at least so far, to acquiesce to congressional pressure. The aggressive language adopted by Premier Wen and Minister Chen on this subject, however, could change the dynamic and make it much more difficult for President Obama to hold the line. The postponement of a Treasury Department determination, an apparent trade-off for President Hu’s visit to Washington this week, may only preserve a U.S. card that could be played, in any event, only once.

While China’s exports benefit from an undervalued RMB, China insists that it is contributing to global economic and financial stability, and points to its faster recovery from global recession. China’s friends remind critics of the role of a stable Chinese currency more than a decade ago in halting an Asian financial meltdown. China is not without defenses for its conduct over currency valuation.

In view of the non-trade issues – and the internet dispute over Google is many things, including strategy, technology, human rights, but also trade -- it is arguable whether “pure” trade disputes between China and the United States, trade remedy actions regarding allegations of dumping, subsidies, safeguards, patent and trademark infringements, are all that important. The value of Chinese goods exported to the United States peaked in 2008; less than 2 percent of the value of those goods were subjected in 2009 – the year when U.S. manufacturers were most severely impacted by world trade conditions -- to trade remedy investigations. The official U.S. trade line, in every Administration, reflects such data and has had the following elements:

• The Administration is following the laws as set out by Congress, nothing more;
• There is considerable friction in every significant trade relationship;
• Such friction is normal and indicative of a healthy relationship;
• Trade disputes represent a tiny fraction of overall trade and should be considered nothing more than irritants.

Unfortunately, U.S. trading partners rarely see the disputes this way. While successive Administrations try to minimize them, another branch of the U.S. government, Congress, takes them very seriously and promotes them. Congress, and American trading partners, see trade disputes as economically, politically, even diplomatically important, while Presidents try to ignore them. President Bush, it is said, was amazed at how distressed Canadians were over the treatment of Canada’s softwood lumber exports to the United States. Yet, the trade represented between $7 and $10 billion annually, and there were many U.S. Senators signing letters, testifying at International Trade Commission hearings, and lobbying the Office of the United States Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce. Frequent representations were made by the Canadian Ambassador. For years, no Canadian prime minister failed to raise the issue with the president whenever they met. It probably should have occurred to the president that, since it was apparently important to everyone else, it just might be important.

There is a similar imbalance in trade disputes with China, and to date a similar presidential inclination to minimize them. Although I believe President Obama did what he had to do politically and legally with respect to commercial tires from China in September 2009, and that he acted with as much diplomatic sensitivity as possible within the requirements of the law, I also believe that he underestimated the Chinese reaction just as President Bush misunderstood how the U.S. treatment of softwood lumber was poisoning relations with Canada. The U.S. Department of Commerce, which answers to the President, is, and always has been, systematically deaf to complaints from foreign governments, invoking the mantra that the disputes are minor, normal, even healthy. The apparatus of the Department, meanwhile, and the biases of the laws, are organized and designed to protect the interests of U.S. industry against foreign competition. China, like Japan and Canada before, do not see trade disputes the way Presidents and the Commerce Department see them, and for China, as occasionally for other countries, there are additional, non-economic issues of national pride. Canadians, for example, were furious at the transparent American disrespect for the rule of law in the lumber litigation.

The United States tends to underestimate the Chinese Government’s sensitivity to domestic interests. The Western press has been translating this sensitivity into “hubris” or “triumphalism,” even simple “arrogance,” but whatever it might be called, Chinese concerns for domestic interests reflect a sense of national pride.

The Western press also underestimates internal Chinese debate. The voices of a harder line are heard, notwithstanding the many moderate and engaged voices among elites. Unfortunately, the same is true as to what the Chinese hear from the United States.

Most important to China has been the refusal of the United States to treat China as a market economy. Legally and financially, non-recognition enhances the ability of U.S. industry to succeed in antidumping complaints. Politically and psychologically, however, the issue is far more important. The Communist Party believes it is governing a capitalist state that, economically, should be treated like every other capitalist state. The indicia of a market economy, governed by supply and demand, contracting labor, and competition, are everywhere in China. It is decidedly not a command economy like the Soviet Union.

The United States sees something else. It sees national planning, central control, and a restricted currency. It sees dominant government banks and state-owned enterprises.

When China as a government appears in trade remedy disputes, for example, its counsel sometimes represent the principal Chinese enterprises as well as the Chinese government. This inherent conflict of interest raises doubt about the independence from the government of these enterprises. The counsel for no other foreign governments appear in U.S. proceedings simultaneously representing supposedly private enterprises. It is widely presumed that the Chinese enterprises engage the government’s counsel at the government’s direction. China and the United States are, thus, looking past each other as to China’s very identity.

In November 2006, right after congressional elections produced a Democratic majority, the Bush Administration, while refusing to recognize China as a market economy, nevertheless accepted a petition to investigate Chinese government programs alleged to confer countervailable subsidies on goods exported from China to the United States. A countervailable subsidy, until that time, had been treated in U.S. law as a market-distorting government subsidy. Inasmuch as the United States denied that China had a market, government support would have nothing to distort. The United States Department of Commerce, however, cheered on by Congress and supported by the rest of the Administration, was not deflected by this apparent anomaly. The Chinese Government would now have to answer questions sent to it by the United States Department of Commerce, and would have to receive Commerce Department auditors who would inspect government books and test the veracity of government answers, all the while being treated as a non-market economy.

This recipe for confrontation did not produce a satisfying meal for anyone. Chinese officials were insulted and often adjusted doubtfully to the diplomatic cooperation the new investigations required. U.S. Embassy personnel in Beijing and officials from Washington were not unwilling to make their dissatisfaction with China known. Moreover, U.S. officials began to accuse Chinese officials, in print, that they had not been entirely truthful or accurate in responding to American inquiries. In one published preliminary determination, the Department of Commerce alleged that, “the GOC has withheld the information requested by the Department,” and “the GOC has failed to act to the best of its ability.” The Department declared, “the GOC’s claims of non-use are incorrect as a matter of fact,” and “the GOC’s statements . . . are unreliable and are contradicted by other facts on the record.” I am not aware of comments of this type printed in the Federal Register about other governments.

The multiplying investigations have not enhanced relationships, regardless whether the cases have involved much money or little, or whether the products in dispute have been significant or trivial. The process, and the underlying premises, which the United States insisted was business as usual, have been damaging. In the slow economic recovery we all anticipate in the United States, there will be more cases, more misunderstanding, and more difficulty.

China’s worldwide exports increased from 1999 to 2008 from $195 billion to $1.4 trillion. One of the great surprises accompanying this growth is how few trade complaints, compared to the scale of the growth, that it produced. There were 21 antidumping cases brought against China worldwide in 1999 (often against the same product but in several countries). While China’s exports multiplied seven-fold, in 2008 only 52 new cases were brought against Chinese products (again, often involving the same product but in several different countries). The United States, between July 1, 2007 and June 30, 2008, became China’s leading export destination and China’s leading trade antagonist, with 18 initiated cases. During the previous decade, however, India initiated 120 antidumping cases against Chinese products while becoming China’s leading trade partner in goods; the United States, by contrast, initiated 87, barely more than the European Community, which initiated 84.

Although these numbers for formal disputes are surprisingly small under the circumstances (for the volume and variety of trade), there are at least a couple of notable trends. One is that the number of cases initiated against Chinese products has increased every year except in 2007, albeit in small increments. Another is that more cases are brought against Chinese products around the world than against the products of any other country, by far. Against no other country is so much suspicion expressed about business dealings, honest reporting, and sincere cooperation in the interests of free trade. Since accession to the WTO, China has begun to test trade remedies itself. It initiated 14 antidumping cases against the products of other countries in 2001, more than doubled that number, to 30, in 2002, and through 2008 had initiated 151 antidumping investigations against foreign products. The United States was one of its first targets (along with Japan), and is now its leading target.

When negotiating accession to the WTO, China sought concessions because of its self-characterization as a developing country, a forgiving explanation for a transition from a government-controlled economy. China graduated very quickly from this self-definition, although it still invokes it frequently. It has now initiated three different subsidies investigations, all into products from the United States. In the case against automobiles, initiated on the eve of President Obama’s visit to China last November, the application for duties endorsed by China’s Ministry of Commerce proclaimed a declining United States unfairly trading with an ascendant China. It claimed technical superiority in a pillar industry, what it called the key industry of America’s industrial revolution.

This development, I submit, is of dramatic implication and potential consequence. The United States, since 2006, routinely entertains petitions against China complaining of subsidies due to state-owned banks and state enterprises. China has responded with a complaint about the U.S. bailout of the Big 3 automobile manufacturers and the infusion of capital into U.S. banks. China alleges non-market loan guarantees and special loans to the U.S. steel industry. More jiu-jitsu: China is accusing the United States of government involvement in the economy in programs nearly identical to U.S. allegations against China, and China has begun bringing cases against the United States at the WTO, a forum in which the United States usually wins the cases it initiates, but usually loses the ones brought against it.

The United States is an historic sore loser at the WTO, in one celebrated instance taking more than five years to comply with an adverse decision. China, by contrast, promptly capitulated when the United States brought its first two complaints against it, by requesting consultations, at the WTO; now, the world will watch how the United States responds as China brings more complaints against the United States. To date, China has made a doubtful strategic choice, to appeal its trade disagreements exclusively to the WTO, never seeking recourse in U.S. courts. Between the pattern of American non-compliance at the WTO, for which there are few punitive mechanisms available and all remedies are prospective, and the decision to permit adverse administrative precedents to accumulate without legal challenge, Chinese frustration with the United States as a trading partner is likely to grow, even as the partners can hardly escape one another.

China, it seems, is responding to the United States by acting like the United States. Whatever the poetic justice, this course is perilous. China, unlike the United States, is still dominated by state-owned enterprises, does provide central direction to important segments of its economy, and is still learning how to conduct business in trade remedy disputes.

At a more policy-based level, the United States appears, at the behest of Asian countries, to be in hot pursuit of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which looks and feels like an economic reincarnation of George Kennan’s cold war approach to the Soviet Union. China, so far, apparently has said nothing, and there is more than enough skepticism, in the United States and abroad, about the trajectory of the TPP despite American enthusiasm. China, nonetheless, cannot be pleased by an even implied encirclement, and an answer to the question of what the United States will gain from this initiative seems to be buried in unexamined assumptions.

These developments, taken together, are unnecessarily ominous. Asian countries are urging the United States to engage more in Asia because, they readily say, they are afraid of China. While China is flexing the muscles of a world power, it is still the fragile developing country it claimed to be only a few short years ago. Tensions in trade are symptomatic of other problems. They are also the essence, because trade and commerce constitute functional interaction more than anything outside armed combat. Trade disputes, it is true, are but a tiny fraction of trade, and there are fewer of them than might be justified given the clash of systems, defiance of rules on all sides, and fundamental underlying political needs, above all for jobs. But they resonate.

Governments in Beijing and in Washington both need to find more jobs for their populations. Both need to promote production and exports. The only possible compromises require consensus about what the rules should be and how they should be obeyed. Those compromises require trade policies.

Trade disputes shape trade policy. The pursuit of trade disputes is determined in U.S. law by the petitions of private enterprise that the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission can rarely avoid investigating. By contrast, Chinese law permits the Ministry of Commerce to keep the existence of petitions secret, and the initiation of investigations to be determined by the Ministry’s private assessment of the “public interest,” a provision that does not exist in U.S. law. Consequently, China can, and does, have a trade policy. The United States can have one only with difficulty, and at present has none. U.S. trade policy, such as it is, inherently is protectionist because it follows the protectionist inclinations of private enterprise in hard times. China’s trade policy, unfortunately, is equally or even more protectionist, and is unquestionably the product of government choice. Today, it is hard to tell the pot from the kettle because they are both black.

The United States needs a policy, and China needs a new one. Like almost every major international issue today, this one dividing the United States and China requires the two countries to work together from first principles. They need to examine together what defines and runs and regulates markets. They need to decide together how to keep markets open and free and how to assure fair treatment of foreign investments. That China is standing up to the United States at the WTO is good – it is about time someone besides the European Community and occasionally Japan or others did. It is also not so good if it means antagonism rather than accommodation.

The United States needs to understand that the lack of democracy in China does not mean government unconscious of its responsibility to its people; China needs to understand that central paralysis of American institutions does not necessarily mean American weakness. Both have to keep reminding themselves, lest every now and again they seem to forget, how much they need each other.

I want to conclude briefly with some practical suggestions about how the private sector might respond in these antagonistic times. There are things you can do to cushion the shocks and protect your interests without necessarily changing government policies. The operating assumptions here are that, on the one hand, there will be more trade disputes, and more orders imposing duties and restricting trade; and on the other hand, that business between the two countries will continue to grow.

Should you be a company exporting goods, you should be sure to monitor dumping and subsidy orders in every country where you are doing business, whether in-house or with outside counsel. Even the most sophisticated companies can run afoul of orders, facing penalties and customs duties, because they have not monitored thoroughly. Chinese companies that are exporting should examine carefully the loans they are taking from Chinese banks. They should consider whether they are receiving better-than-market terms, and whether they are exposed to allegations of benefitting from government subsidies. Exporters should learn everything they can about their foreign competition, especially regarding pricing and costs of production: careful pricing can minimize risks of dumping allegations. Such study could also lead to the acquisition of foreign companies. Ownership can reduce dramatically exposure to trade remedy actions. Exporters should cultivate relations with importers, for it is important to have allies in countries where you are doing business. And Chinese companies should make sure they are perceived as private and independent of government.

There are many practical things American companies doing business in China can do to help themselves. They can enlist in trade associations that lobby the U.S. government, beyond the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. They can participate in, or seek to create, boards or commissions to advise the government. Like Chinese companies, American companies now should be wary of better-than-market bank loans or subsidies, especially in agriculture and steel, and like Chinese companies cultivating relations with importers in the United States, American companies should cultivate relations with importers in China.

The corporate world does not control its own destiny, but it need not be tossed without recourse in a turbulent sea. Every company, and every industry, can make things better for itself and, by so doing, contribute to an overall improvement in a bilateral relationship that sorely needs improvement.
 

注:费德门博士4月15日在中国美国商会在北京举行的Asia-Pacific Council of American Chambers of Commerce (APCAC) 会议上发表以下演讲。 

《纽约时报》和《华盛顿邮报》几乎每天都在头版报道中美间问题。华盛顿各界已经达成共识:美中关系将首先恶化才会有所改善。两国间有许多问题,其中只有少数和贸易有关。例如,中国和西方世界在伊朗核威胁以及朝鲜半岛核问题上存在分歧,这让华盛顿沮丧。哥本哈根会谈亦让人失望,两国对台湾和达赖也有不同认识。这些大都是战略性议题,有时是文化差异。两国在这些问题上的合作将有助于减弱其他领域的担忧。但是,没有迹象表明两国达成共识。

      其他导致美中分歧的议题隶属于经济领域。最引人注目的是截至今年一月底中国持有2.4万亿美元外汇储备,其中9000亿美元为美国国债。中国外汇储备在2009年增长了4530亿美元,同时经济学家预计2010年增幅将于2009年持平。

      对美国和其他国家而言,人民币汇率也令人关注。当中国于2005年7月结束紧跟美元的货币政策之后,人民币币值较美元已经增长超过百分之二十。但是在全球性经济危机面前,中国决定暂时冻结人民币增值、让人民币币值和其他货币币值一样与美元一起跌落。中国总理温家宝上月宣布中国近期不会调整人民币币值,泼了美国一头冷水。

      据传“货币”一词是本届美国政府内禁止使用的词语,但是与此相关的“重商主义”的指责却被纵容。自2008年9月15日以来,美中领导人间的会谈时常引用“重新平衡”这一概念,具体而言美国应该增加储蓄,而中国应该扩大消费;同时中国对美出口应随着国内消费的增长而缩减。这一重新平衡虽然在公开场合得到两国政府的认可,但在实际操作中却很困难,因为人民币币值过低导致中国产品在海外市场价格过低、而国外产品在中国却过于昂贵。

      两国及两国政府都忙于创造就业机会。货币疲软可帮助创造国内就业机会。中国拒绝人民币升值让美国质疑中国是否真的决心重新平衡。欧洲也和美国一样怀疑中国的承诺。在外交柔道中,温家宝总理指责美国要求人民币升值是“贸易保护主义的表现”。中国商务部长陈德明使这一指控进一步升级——威胁美国如果就汇率采取行动将导致贸易战,而且将以美国的失败告终。

       众多美国议员以及美国政府内的部分人士希望把汇率问题转变成贸易议题,温总理的指责、陈部长的强化已经帮助这些美国人士实现了这一转变。反补贴申请书时常把汇率列为不正当补贴(2009年出现三次)。同时许多国会人士以及商业团体希望美国财政部把中国列为汇率操纵者。美国商务部却坚持拒绝调查这一反补贴指控,每次都得出这一出口补贴指控证据不足的结论,尤其不符合反补贴法的特定性(针对性)要求——美国商务部总结道有关人民币币值的法规都不是具体针对某一产业或是某些产业,同时币值也不仅仅和出口相关。

      这一法律结论帮助布什政府和奥巴马政府避免就人民币汇率问题和中国在贸易案中产生激烈冲突,同时两届政府都婉转拒绝了国会压力。但是温家宝总理和陈德明部长使用的强烈词句却改变了这一微妙局势,使奥巴马总统更难坚守阵线。美国财政部推迟做出决定无疑是因为胡锦涛主席本周访问美国,但只能推迟一次。

       虽然中国出口受益于币值偏低的人民币,中国却坚持这一政策有助于国际经济和货币稳定,有助于国际经济复苏。中国的朋友提醒批评家中国货币稳定在十年前为遏制亚洲经济危机的蔓延立下汗马功劳。但是现在中国却没有任何理由可以辩护自己的货币政策。

       当考虑非贸易领域议题时(互联网上关于谷歌,包括战略、科技和人权的争议,同时也涉及贸易),不仅让人产生中美间“纯”贸易纠纷是否重要的疑问。这些“纯”贸易纠纷包括倾销、补贴、保障措施、商标专利侵权。中国出口至美国的商品价值在2008抵达顶峰;在2009年面临贸易纠纷的中国商品的价值仅占出口总值的百分之二;而同一年美国生产商遭受到最严重的贸易打击。每界美国政府的贸易政策都反映这些数据,并包括以下内容:

• 政府遵循国会制定的法律,仅限于此;
• 每一重要贸易关系中都存在重大摩擦;
• 这种摩擦是正常的,证明两国关系健康;
• 贸易摩擦只占贸易总量的一小部分,因此应仅仅被视为小烦恼。

      令人遗憾的是,美国的贸易伙伴却对贸易摩擦有不同看法。当美国政府竭力减弱摩擦,另一重要权力机构——国会却非常重视并极力提升摩擦的重要性。国会和美国的贸易伙伴认为贸易摩擦具有经济、政治、乃至外交重要性,而总统却试图忽视这些重要性。据说布什总统对加拿大人对加拿大软木对美出口的沮丧程度感到惊讶。这一贸易每年的贸易量达到70至100亿美金,许多美国参议员致信并在美国国际贸易委员会听证会上作证、游说美国贸易代表办公室和美国商务部。许多年来,每一任加拿大总理与美国总统会谈时都不忘提及软木贸易。布什总统应当认识到,如果这一贸易对其他人来说都很重要,那么应当给予足够重视。

      美中贸易纠纷中也有这样的不平衡,同时总统也同样不愿缩小贸易纠纷。虽然2009年9月奥巴马总统就中国商业轮胎采取的行动是正确的政治、法律行动,同时他在法律允许的范围内充分重视其政治敏感性,我认为它低估了中国的反应就像布什总统低估了美国对加拿大对软木纠纷的反应。总统直接管辖的美国商务部一直对国外政府的抱怨置若罔闻,哼唱这些摩擦微小、正常乃至健康的高调。同时商务部的有关机构以及运用的法律却是为了在国外竞争面前保护美国产业的利益。与美国总统及商务部不同,中国和日本、加拿大一样,对贸易摩擦持不同看法。中国看到国家尊严受损,其他国家有时也这么看待贸易摩擦。例如,加拿大对美国在软木案件中公开不尊重法律表示愤怒。

      美国常常低估中国政府对国内利益的敏感程度。西方媒体把这种敏感翻译成“傲慢”或是“耀武扬威”,但是无论使用哪个形容词,中国对国内内利益的担忧都反射出民族荣誉感。

      西方媒体同时也低估了中国国内的争论。他们只听到强硬派的声音,然而中国精英层中也有缓和派和提倡加强与美对话的声音。令人遗憾的是,中国也只听到强硬派的声音。

      对中国而言,给予中国市场经济地位是最重大的事件。无论从法律还是金融角度看,拒绝给予中国市场经济地位都有助于美国产业在反倾销申诉中获胜。但从政治和精神角度着眼,这一事件有更重大的意义。中国共产党认为她领导的这一从经济学角度来看已成为资本主义经济的国家应和其他资本主义国家享受同样的地位。市场经济体的主要指标——供需主导、劳工雇佣和竞争都在中国随处可见。她和苏联不同,决不是指导性经济。

      但美国有不同看法。她看到全国性计划、中央控制、以及受限制的货币。她看到国有银行和国有企业占主导地位。

      当中国政府应诉贸易纠纷时,她聘请的律师同时代表政府和中国企业。这一做法让人怀疑这些企业是否不受政府操纵。其他国家政府聘请的美国律师决不会同时代表政府和私营企业参与应诉。外界普遍认为中国聘请政府使用的律师是受政府指导。中美再次擦肩而过。

       2006年11月,即民主党在中期选举中获胜、拥有参众两院多数席位后不久,布什政府拒绝承认中国的市场经济地位,同时又受理了一份要求对中国政府给予对美出口品不正当补贴展开调查的申请书。在此之前,美国法律视反补贴为扭曲市场的政府补助。既然美国否认中国的市场经济地位,政府补助与市场扭曲就没有任何关联。美国商务部在国会及其他政府部门的鼓动下,却执意坚持这一反常做法。中国政府现在需要回答美国商务部发布的调查问卷,同时也必需接受美国商务部对中国政府账本和调查问卷的审计,同时还被视为非市场经济国家。

      双方都对此深感不满。中国官员对这类调查需要的外交合作不是深感不满就是深感怀疑。美国使馆人员以及从华盛顿飞往北京的美国官员也毫不掩饰他们的不满。此外,美国官员开始白纸黑字地指责中国官员在回答问卷是不完全诚实或准确。在一份发表的初审裁决中,美国商务部指控“中国政府向美国商务部隐瞒信息”,“中国政府没有竭尽所能”。美国商务部声称:“中国政府声称没有使用这些项目是错误的,事实上中国政府的声明不可信而且自相矛盾。”我从未在Federal Register上看到这样评论其他政府的文字。

      不管这些调查的涉案金额大小,也不管涉案产品的重要程度,多项调查并没有改进双边关系。虽然美国坚持认为这些调查是例行公务,但是这些调查不可避免损害了双边关系。这一调查进程以及其深层含义都损害了双边关系。当美国经济缓慢复苏时,将会有更多的案件、误解和困难。

     中国的全球出口从1999年的1950亿美金上升至2008年的1.4万亿美金。令人惊讶的是,和增幅相比,贸易申诉的增幅却滞后。1999年全球共有21起针对中国的反倾销案件(常常针对同一产品但是却发生于不同国家)。2008年,当中国出口是1999年的七倍时,仅有52起针对中国产品的反倾销调查(同样,多个国家针对同一产品展开调查)。从2007年7月1日至2008年6月30日,作为中国最大的出口市场——美国仅对中国产品展开18项调查。在过去十年里,印度在成长为中国贸易伙伴的同时共对中国产品展开120起反倾销调查,而美国仅展开87起调查,稍稍高于欧盟总数84起调查。

     虽然这些正式纠纷从贸易量及贸易种类来看都令人惊讶的微弱,但是其中有两个令人瞩目的趋势。其一,针对中国产品的案件逐年上升,除2007年之外。其二,与其他国家产品相比,中国产品是全球范围内最容易面临指控的产品。中国的商业方式、诚信、以及自由贸易合作面临最多质疑。自加入世界贸易组织以来,中国开始展开贸易补助调查。2001年中国展开了14起反倾销调查,2002年展开30项调查;至2008年总计展开151项反倾销调查。美国(和日本)是第一起中国对外反倾销调查的对象,迄今是主要目标之一。

     当谈判加入世贸组织时,因为把自己定位为发展中国家的中国寻求让步,也使用了从政府控制经济转型的借口。中国很快超越了发展中国家的定位,虽然这仍引发争议。中国目前已展开三项反补贴调查,都是针对美国产品。在奥巴马总统访华前夕,也就是去年11月,中国对美国汽车展开反补贴调查,调查申请书认为下降中的美国与上升中的中国展开不公平贸易,这一看法得到中国商务部认可。申请书认为中国在这一支柱产业——美国工业革命中的关键产业占技术优势。

     鄙人认为这一进展具有重大含义和后果。自2006年以来美国不断接要求对中国国有银行和企业提供的补助展开调查的申请书。中国的回答是:一份要求对美国政府拯救三大汽车生产商及向美国银行注入资金展开反补助调查的申请书。中国同时主张美国钢铁产业收到非市场化的贷款担保和特殊但款。更多的柔道技术:中国指责美国政府对经济的干预程度和中国政府的行动几乎程度相当,中国同时也在世贸组织递交针对美国的案件。在这一法律论坛中,美国作为申诉方,通常胜诉;但作为应诉方,通常失利。

       美国在历史上是世贸组织酸溜溜的输家,在一著名案件中,美国用了五年时间在履行不利裁决。相反,中国在两个案件中迅速向美国妥协,而美国仅递交了磋商请求,案件尚未正式展开。现在,全世界都在观察美国将怎样回应中国的申诉。迄今为止,中国仅仅利用世贸组织、而不利用美国法庭的战略令人怀疑。美国惯于不履行世贸组织裁决,也没有很多的惩罚手段,而且惩罚都是针对未来的行动;同时中国不对不利的行政裁决采取法律行动。中国对美国这一贸易伙伴的沮丧情绪只会日益剧增。

      看来中国正以以其人之道,还治其人之身的方法回应美国。虽然这一做法诗意般的正义,但方向却是危险的。中国和美国不同,国有企业占主导地位,并向各经济领域提供指导性意见,同时政府在贸易纠纷中还发挥作用。

      在政策领域,美国现正积极推行“跨太平洋伙伴关系”(Trans-Pacific Partnership),这类似于冷战期间布凯南推行的针对苏联的经济遏制。中国现在还未就此发表评论,但是美国国内和海外都对此深表怀疑。中国肯定也这种遏制感到很不开心。美国能从这一政策中获得何种利益仍不可知。

      这些进展的综合意义重大。亚洲国家要求美国加强和亚洲国家的合作,因为他们害怕中国。当中国正跃跃欲试、努力成为世界霸权,她仍是一个脆弱的发展中国家。

       贸易关系进展是其它矛盾的象征。它同时也异常重要,因为商贸是继武力对抗之后最重要的工具型互动。贸易纠纷只占贸易总量的一小部分。但是它们共鸣。

       两国政府都应当创造更多本国就业机会;都需要扩大生产和出口。取得妥协的唯一方法是就法律条规以及如何遵守法律条规达成共识。这些妥协需要贸易政策。

       贸易纠纷改变贸易政策。美国法律制度中贸易纠纷产生机制是私营企业向美国商务部和美国国际贸易委员会递交申请,两大机构必须展开调查。但是中国法律允许中国商务部不公开申请信息,可根据“公众利益”调查裁定决定是否展开调查。美国法律中没有“公众利益”这一条款,因此,中国确有贸易政策。美国可以拥有贸易政策,虽有一定难度,但现在没有。但是中国的贸易政策与美国一样倾向于保护主义,甚至超过美国。五十步笑百步。

      美国需要一项政策,中国需要一项新政策。和其他任何重要国际事务一样,分化两国关系的事件需要两国共同努力。两国需要一起检验确定、操纵、规范市场的规则。两国需要一起决定如何保证市场开放、自由,公平对待外资。中国在世贸组织向美国发起挑战是一件好事,即欧盟和日本之外,应该有第三个国家这样做。但是如果这意味着敌对就不妥了。

        美国应当认识到虽然中国没有民主,但是这并不意味她会忽视对人民的责任;中国也应当认识到美国中央机构的瘫痪并不意味美国脆弱。两国都应不断提醒自己,他们多么需要对方,但她们常常忘记。

       我将以一些针对私营企业的建设性意见结束我的讲话。您们可以采取行动保护自己的利益、减弱政府行动带来的震荡,同时不改变政府政策。这里的假设是:一,将有更多贸易纠纷,并将导致更多遏制贸易的惩罚性关税;二,两国贸易将持续增长。

       如果您的公司对外出口,您应当让公司律师或是聘请的律师密切关注各国针对您公司所在产业的反补贴、反倾销令。即使是最善于经营、机构完备的公司有时也会产生疏漏,错过一些文件,因而面临高额关税和罚款。涉及出口的中国企业应当仔细检查国内银行提供的贷款。他们应当考虑他们享受的待遇是否超过市场待遇,是否会面临反补贴指控。出口商应当了解海外竞争的方方面面,尤其是定价和生产成本。合理定价可避免反倾销指控。认真研究如何并购国外公司。改变所有权可帮助减弱面临贸易行动的可能性。出口商应当加强和进口商的关系,因为盟友的作用很重要。中国公司应当维护自己私营、不受制于政府的形象。

      在中国从事商业活动的美国公司也可采取行动保护自己。加入游说美国政府、除美国商会之外的贸易协会。它们可以加入、尝试成立董事会或是委员会向政府提供意见参考。和中国企业一样,美国企业,尤其是农业和钢铁企业,应当注意优于市场待遇的贷款和补助。同时就像中国出口商应当加强和美国进口商的关系,美国企业也应进一步巩固和中国进口商的关系。

       企业不能完全控制他们的未来,但是不应将自己的资源放入大海,随波逐流。每个公司、每个产业,都可以改善自己的处境,并以此促进双边关系的发展。 
 

(翻译:朱晶)

 

Financial Times: China and the US Must Stop Throwing Stones 《金融时报》评论:中美必须停止向对方扔石头

        Washington, D.C., partner Elliot Feldman, leader of Baker Hostetler's international trade practice and an author of the firm's China-U.S. Trade Law blog, authored a column, "China and the US Must Stop Throwing Stones," which was published in the "Opinion" section of the March 30, 2010, edition of the The Financial Times (中文全文请点击这里).

        According to Feldman, "One of the most troubling features of the growing tension between China and the US is that both countries legitimately have a lot to complain about. It is commonly understood that China and the US have divergent interests. Less understood is that, in the bilateral economic and trade relationship, they usually are complaining about the same things. Both are trying to protect jobs and now seem engaged in a zero-sum game that no one can win. When China and the US criticise each other, each side must realise they are launching their complaints from inside glass houses without regard for their own structural vulnerabilities."

      Feldman continues: "Both China and the US believe the other is attempting to interfere in a free market economy and engage in protectionist practices to the detriment of the other. The US sees too much state direction in the Chinese economy and continues to designate China as a non-market economy, leaving China feeling stigmatised and at an unfair disadvantage in international trade."

        Feldman's article goes on to provide insight into the countries' opposing viewpoints and some of the events/actions which have led to the current situation. He concludes: "China and the US should acknowledge the reciprocal nature and legitimacy of each other's complaints and seek mutual solutions–or such complaints will compound and multiply, and the two countries will grow further apart and more antagonistic. If Beijing and Washington cannot agree to stop throwing stones from inside their glass houses, the great risk to the world is that they will board them up."

The full article, "China and the US Must Stop Throwing Stones," can be viewed on The Financial Times website (free registration required).

        中美间的紧张关系令人担忧,其中一个特点是两国合情合理都有许多可以抱怨的事件。公众都了解中美间存在利益分歧。但是不为人知的一点是,两国在国际贸易和经济领域抱怨相同的内容。两国都试图保护本国就业机会,但现在两国似乎处于零和游戏中,没有一方可以取得胜利。当中美互相指责对方时,他们应当意识到自己站在玻璃房子中向对方发起攻击、忽视自己处于结构性弱势。(美国有句俗语:住在玻璃屋中的人不向邻居扔石头。)

        中美两国都坚信对方试图影响自由市场经济并采取保护性行为使对方处于弱势。美国认为政府指令在中国经济发展中扮演过于重要的角色,因此仍视中国为非市场经济体,使中国感到自己在国际贸易中处于竞争劣势。

         美国认为中国经济是政府指令型经济。她认为中国的省及地方五年计划进一步强化了国家计划。国有企业在中国经济中占主导地位,尤其在钢铁、能源等最重要的经济领域。国有银行控制贷款。税收政策系统性地向某些产业倾斜。同时,向生产商提供能源的也是国有企业。在中国土地亦非私有。最重要的一点是人民币汇率紧跟美元,在国际市场上不能自由兑换。
 

        但中国却不这么认为。国有企业是把利润分配给所有持股人的企业,而这些持股人正是全体中国公民而非少数资本家。董事会掌控这些国有企业,而且这些企业旨在通过竞争获得利润。国家控制的银行旨在确保国家利益,因而避免冲动、不营利且甚至可能威胁国家经济发展的贷款。就业人口是流动的,而且面临竞争。中国认为所有中国公民都是中国经济的股东并不影响他们支持企业间自由竞争。政府发挥董事会的作用。许多观察家认为当前中国和传统资本主义国家一样崇尚金钱。

        从中国的角度来看,美国指责中国为“非市场经济体”或是贸易扭曲型经济是做一套、说一套的伪善表现。美国就像站在玻璃房子中对中国扔石头。2008年雷曼兄弟公司倒闭之后,美国联邦政府在几大银行中拥有很多股权。政府同时掌控了汽车行业。美国国会不断修改税法给予某些行业特别优惠,尤其是较依赖出口的行业。虽然财产私有,但是政府机构决定所有权条款并提供资金。同时美国政府定期干预经济以增加、保证就业机会,管理就业市场,鼓励企业增加就业机会、减少裁员。

        但当中国否认美国的不公平贸易指控时,中国也是从玻璃房子中向对方发起攻击。当中国在美国为自己的行动辩护时,她的行动加强、而非减弱否定其市场经济体地位的指控。中国非但没有表现自己对地方政府及其“计划”和商业行为没有控制,相反北京政府强调所有地方政府、都向其汇报。中国不愿承认在贸易调查中收集美国政府索取的信息有很大难度,但她递交的调查问卷答复却恰恰显示了这一点。北京政府非但没有让私营企业自主选聘律师、捍卫自身利益,反而组织、指挥理应独立的商会参与应诉法律工作。这些行动进一步强化了美国调查者心中中国经济是国有经济、不能被视为市场经济的印象。

       中美两国都不是理想的市场经济体。当130位美国众议员提议因就中国的汇率政策向中国产品征收百分之二十五的附加进口税时;当中国商务部部长警告美国国会行动将引发贸易战时,双方的行动都为世界繁荣带来巨大风险。

(翻译:朱晶)

GLASS HOUSES 玻璃房子

中文请点击这里

One of the most troubling features of the growing tensions between China and the United States is that both countries legitimately have a lot to complain about, and typically they are the same things. Three issues are particularly conspicuous at present and at the core of difficulties in the trade relationship – the definitions and status of “market” and “non-market” economies; the role of governments as owners of strategic economic sectors and retaliation over grievances arising from that role; and cyberattacks. When China and the United States criticize each other, they often are launching their complaints from inside glass houses, fortifications especially vulnerable to retaliation.

Market Economies

Almost every member of the World Trade Organization, and even countries (such as Russia) that are not, for international trade purposes are considered “market economies.” The designation is important because the rules of fair trade are written to promote markets, rewarding market transactions and penalizing conduct judged to distort markets. The distinctions emerged at the dawn of the Cold War when the rules enabling private enterprise to compete with state-directed economies were written.

State economic interventions, according to world trade rules, distort markets. State-directed economies – “non-market economies” (“NMEs”) – are inherently distorting. World trade rules deal with them through exclusion, denying them entitlement to the benefits of favorable assumptions.

Although China agreed, when it acceded to membership in the WTO in 2001, that it was not yet accepted as a market economy, it did not expect such recognition to be far behind. Now, nearly a decade later, it seems nowhere in sight, and largely because of objections raised by the United States.

The United States sees too much state direction in the Chinese economy. National plans are reinforced by regional and local planning. State-owned enterprises are dominant, particularly in the most important sectors of steel and energy production. State-owned banks control most lending. Tax schemes systematically favor designated sectors. Utilities providing manufacturers with energy are state-owned. There is no private ownership of land. And today, most important of all, currency is tied to the dollar and does not trade freely in international markets.

China does not see its economy this way. State enterprises are enterprises whose profits go to all shareholders, who are the people of China and not small investing bands of capitalists. They are controlled by boards with mandates to operate competitive, profitable businesses. Banks, controlled by the state, protect the state’s interests, and thus avoid reckless and feckless lending that can jeopardize whole economies. Labor is mobile and subject to competition. Land tenures in Britain, and some other Commonwealth countries, are based on the theory that the Crown owns all of the land, but thriving markets in land tenures exist. No one claims that the Crown’s ownership of all of the land in these countries suggests they are not market economies. The dollar began to float freely and trade on international exchanges less than forty years ago, and no one suggests that prior to the collapse of Bretton Woods the United States was not a market economy. In China’s view, all the people of China are the shareholders of the economy at large, but no less capitalistic in their support of competition and free enterprise. Most observers of China today remark on the Chinese worship of money, no less than in traditional capitalist societies.

The American indictment of China as an NME is defended now from inside a glass house. After the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the federal government in the United States took large ownership positions in many key banks. The government took effective ownership of the automobile industry. The Congress of the United States endlessly writes tax laws to favor one industry or another, especially the larger ones dependent on exports. Property is private, but government institutions set the terms of ownership and all of the financing that makes ownership possible. And the government in the United States intervenes in the economy regularly to create and save jobs, regulating the labor market, encouraging companies to hire labor and discouraging dismissals.

Neither China nor the United States is an ideal market economy. The distinctions might not matter practically, representing different paths to the acquisition and distribution of the benefits of commerce, except that they do in the application of trade laws. China thinks itself stigmatized by its designation as an NME, and it is disadvantaged in international trade.

Until 2006 there was at least a trade-off. Trade law, as applied everywhere, recognized that state intervention in the economy could not be market-distorting if there were no market. Consequently, trade remedy actions based on subsidy allegations could not be initiated, both because there was no way to measure a subsidy in the absence of market prices, and because a subsidy by definition must distort a market and in an NME there is no market to distort.

In late 2006, the United States began to have things both ways. It said China was enough of a market economy to justify bringing subsidy cases against its exports, yet not enough to shed its designation as an NME.  Ever since, China has been manifestly subject to a deliberately unfair trade regime. Yet, when China takes exception, it does so from within its own glass house, and not only because of the conditions that shaped American views in the first place.

Even as China began in 2006 to defend its practices in the United States, its conduct tended to reinforce the indictment instead of refuting it. Instead of acknowledging that it had little control over regional and local governments, their “planning” or their commercial practices, the central government, citing to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, asserted that all governments reported to it.  Instead of acknowledging difficulty in amassing information demanded by U.S. authorities in trade investigations, it tried to answer questions without verifiable information. Instead of leaving private enterprises in China to find counsel and defend their own interests, the government convened supposedly independent chambers of commerce and largely directed the management of China’s legal defenses. It relied principally on the advice of Chinese lawyers with very limited knowledge of U.S. law. All these actions tended to convince American investigators that China is state-run and not ready to be considered a market economy.

As a practical matter, this issue has lost most of its importance. U.S. authorities have developed methodologies that would reach the same conclusions about fair trade even were China now recognized as a market economy. But symbolically this issue remains critical.

China’s Retaliation: Mutual Accusations Of Subsidies

Exhausted, perhaps, by the apparent futility in its claim that it should be recognized as a market economy, China has adopted an alternative strategy, accusing the United States of similar market deficiencies. China now formally accuses American exports of being subsidized in an economic system marked by substantial state involvement.

China does not deny that the development of its automobile industry has been heavily subsidized. Instead, China argues that it has graduated from subsidization. This view, however, neglects the history of international trade disputes centered on the privatization of state enterprises that followed on the collapse of Communist regimes. The United States accused all such enterprises, especially in the steel industry, of continuing long-term benefits, arguing that privatization could not extinguish the value of subsidies unless the sale of the state enterprise took place at a full market price. The United States placed the burden of proof that no subsidies passed through from the state to the private enterprise on the foreign private enterprise, a burden virtually impossible to bear because of inadequate documentation.

China, perhaps preemptively, has accused the U.S. automobile industry of exporting subsidized vehicles to China. As we discussed on December 1, 2009 on this blog, the countervailing duty investigation launched in November 2009 arises from a petition that argues the American automobile industry is in historic decline and survives only due to massive government subsidization. The central problem of these accusations, however, is that they are hurled from a glass house. The United States will now almost certainly accuse China of subsidizing the automobiles China is gearing up to sell to the United States. Hence, while the industries in both countries are trying to develop fuel efficient automobiles that will eliminate carbon emissions, thereby serving mutual objectives related to saving the planet, trade laws in both countries already are impeding direct competition based on the quality of the product.

China’s action, contending that the United States does not produce automobiles through free market enterprise, is a transparent retaliation for the American insistence that China is a non-market economy. However, this action carries the disagreement forward into the terrain of the future, where China and the United States need most to cooperate.

Cyberattacks

The United States has complained for a long time that China has subjected American defense and security establishments to incessant and invasive cyberattacks. These complaints took on a new character and dimension when Google complained that a coordinated Chinese assault on Google customers included an invasion of the accounts of Chinese dissidents. Google, already criticized for accepting Chinese government censorship that affects the internet in no other country, found the latest attacks intolerable. Google threatened to leave China.

The Google-China confrontation led Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to deliver a major speech on “internet freedom” that called for international condemnation of China.  Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law School professor and former senior Justice Department official in the Bush Administration, responded quickly in The Washington Post: “[T]he problem with Clinton’s call for accountability and norms on the global network,” Goldsmith wrote, “is the enormous array of cyberattacks originating from the United States. Until we acknowledge these attacks and signal how we might control them, we cannot make progress on preventing cyberattacks emanating from other countries.”

The cyberattacks from China are presumed to be state-directed because of the state control and censorship of the internet imposed on companies such as Google. Attacks from the United States are presumed, at least by Americans, to be the work of private individuals, free-lancers, the sort of people who fill e-mail boxes incessantly with spam. Goldsmith accepts this orthodoxy, noting that “Scores of individuals and groups in the United States design or employ computer payloads to attack government Web sites, computer systems and censoring tools in Iran and China. These efforts are often supported by U.S. foundations and universities, and by the federal government. Clinton boasted about this support seven paragraphs after complaining about cyberattacks.”

Boarding Up The Glass Houses

China surely knows at least as much about what is happening in its cyber sphere as Professor Goldsmith. The American complaint about Chinese interference with the internet appears well-founded, as is the American complaint about China’s control of its economy and China’s subsidization of industry. But each of these complaints is launched from a glass house. Until China and the United States acknowledge mutually the problem – that their legitimate reciprocal complaints need more solution than aggravation – such complaints will compound and multiply, and the two countries will grow further apart and more antagonistic. They must either appreciate the view that glass houses uniquely afford – a place from which one can see out very well, but others can also see in -- stop throwing things at each other from inside the glass houses, or board them up. The last choice, which may define the direction in which things are going, is probably the worst of all.

        中美间的紧张关系令人担忧,其中一个特点是合情合理两国都有许多可以抱怨的事件,虽然这些事件大同小异。其中三大事件最引人注目,也是贸易关系的重点——“市场”和“非市场经济”的定义以及地位;政府作为所有者在战略经济领域扮演的角色,以及针对这一角色采取的报复行动;网络骇客。当中美互相指责对方时,他们都是站在玻璃房子中向对方发起攻击,使得自己在报复措施面前显得软弱无力。(美国有句俗语:住在玻璃房子里的人不向邻居扔石头。)

市场经济体

        几乎所有的世贸组织成员,包括俄罗斯等非市场经济国家,都在国际贸易领域被授予“市场经济”地位。这一地位很重要因为公平贸易法则旨在促进市场经济、奖励市场经济转型、惩罚扭曲市场的行为。市场经济、非市场经济的区分在冷战初期形成,这些法则旨在帮助私营经济和政府指令经济竞争。

        根据国际贸易法则,政府经济干预扭曲市场。政府指令经济——“非市场经济”生来就具有扭曲市场的特性。国际贸易法规将它们排除在外,拒绝给予它们有利的假设条件

        虽然当中国在2001年加入世贸组织时同意暂时不被认可为市场经济体,但她没有料到将迟迟得不到认可。迄今为止,将近十年过去了,这一地位仍不着边际,这主要是因为美国反对。

        美国认为政府指令在中国经济发展中扮演过于重要的角色。省及地方五年计划进一步强化了国家计划。国有企业占主导地位,尤其在钢铁、能源等最重要的领域。税收政策向某些产业倾斜。向生产商提供能源的是国有企业。土地亦非私有。最重要的是人民币汇率紧跟美元,在国际市场上不能自由兑换。

        但中国却不这么认为。国有企业是把利润分配给所有持股人的企业,而这些持股人正是所有中国公民而不是少数资本家。董事会掌控这些国有企业,而且这些企业旨在竞争、获得利润。国家控制的银行旨在确保国家利益,因而避免冲动、不营利且甚至可能威胁国家经济发展的贷款。就业人口是流动的,而且面临竞争。在英国等英联邦国家,皇室拥有土地,但是土地使用权市场仍蓬勃发展。美元直至四十年前才开始自由兑换,然而在布莱顿森林体系倒塌前,并没有人否认美国的市场经济地位。在中国眼里,所有中国公民都是中国经济的股东,这并不影响他们支持企业间自由竞争。许多观察家认为当前中国和传统资本主义国家一样崇尚金钱。

        美国像站在玻璃房子中辩护针对中国非市场经济运营的指控。2008年雷曼兄弟公司倒闭之后,美国联邦政府在几大银行中拥有很多股权。政府同时掌控了汽车行业。美国国会不断修改税法给予某些行业特别优惠,尤其是较依赖出口的行业。虽然财产私有,但是政府机构决定所有权条款并提供资金。同时美国政府定期干预经济以增加、保证就业机会,管理就业市场,鼓励企业增加就业机会、减少裁员。

        中美两国都不是理想的市场经济体。在实际操作中这些区别并不重要,仅代表获得所有权的不同途径、以及利益分配的不同方式,但是在贸易法中却有重要意义。中国认为她因非市场经济地位在国际贸易中处于劣势。

         2006年以前,中国至少获得些补偿。世界各国贸易法都认定如果市场不存在,那么政府对经济的干预也不能扭曲市场。也不能对非市场经济体展开反补贴调查,因为如果没有市场价格就没有办法衡量补贴;同时根据定义,补贴必须扭曲市场,而在非市场经济体中没有市场可以扭曲。

         2006年下半年,美国对中国采取了双重措施。美国认为中国的市场经济发展到一定地位,因此可对中国展开反补贴调查,但还不足以摆脱非市场经济地位。从此,中国明显受制于不公平贸易体系。然而当中国采取特例时,她也在玻璃房中采取行动。

         当中国从2006年开始在美国为自己辩护时,她采取的行动非但没有削弱,反而加强指控。中国应当指出中央对地方政府的“计划”和商业行为没有太多控制,但是中国中央政府引用宪法坚持声称地方政府都向其汇报。中国不愿承认收集美国政府在贸易调查中索取的信息有很大难度,相反在没有确切信息的情况下仍试图回答问题。她不是让私营企业寻找律师捍卫自己的利益,相反中央政府集合了应当是独立的进出口商会、主导法律抗争行动。她主要依赖那些对美国法律仅有局限了解的中国律师的建议。这些行动都是美国调查机构认为中国是政府主导的经济体,还不应被授予市场经济地位。

        在实际操作领域,这一问题已经失去了它的重要性。即使中国获得市场经济地位,美国政府已经建立的计算方法仍将使中国面临同样不利的情况。但形式上,这一问题仍很重要。

中国的报复:相互指责不正当补贴

        也许中国看到争取市场经济地位无果而深感失望,她采取了另一战略——指责美国同样缺少市场机制。中国现在指控美国出口品也享受补助,且政府在美国经济中扮演重要角色。

        中国并不否认她为汽车工业的发展提供很多补助。相反,她认为自己已经走出这一阶段了。但是这一观点忽略了历史上国际贸易关注共产主义国家解体国有企业私有化进程。美国指控这些企业,尤其是钢铁企业,长期受益于补助。如果在私有化进程中国有企业不是完全按市场价格出售,那么这一进程不能消除补贴带来的利益。美国把提供证据证明政府没有向私营企业提供补助的重任落在外国企业肩上;但是国外企业因无法搜集足够证据,所以无法承担这一重任。

        中国在时机尚未成熟的情况下,指控美国汽车产业向中国出口享受补助的车辆。在我们2009年12月10日刊登的搏客中,2009年11月中国展开的这一反补贴调查起源于一份认定美国汽车工业正在走下坡路、完全依靠强大政府补助支撑的调查申请书。这些指控的核心弊病是它们都是玻璃房子的产品。美国一定会指控中国出口到美国的汽车享受政府补助。因此,当两国汽车生产商都在努力发展节能汽车以减少二氧化碳排放的同时,两国贸易法却阻碍建立在产品质量上的竞争。

        中国指控美国汽车不是由自由市场企业生产的行动显然是对美国拒绝授予中国市场经济地位的报复。但是,这一行动将对未来造成负面影响,虽然两国将需要互相帮助。

网络攻击

         长期以来,美国指责中国不断对美国国防、安全设施发起进攻性网络袭击。当谷歌公司声称它的客户受到有组织的中国袭击时,包括中国籍持不同政见者的账户,这些指责又蒙上新含义。虽然谷歌已经同意接受中国政府的审查(这并不影响谷歌在其他国家的运营),但是最近的这些袭击让谷歌忍无可忍。谷歌威胁将离开中国。

         谷歌和中国的冲突引发了国务卿克林顿的介入,她在“网络自由”的演讲中呼吁全世界谴责中国。哈佛法学院教授、布什总统任期内的司法部官员Jack Goldsmith迅速在《华盛顿邮报》做出回应:“克林顿呼吁网络世界的诚信和法规面临挑战,因为美国是众多网络袭击的发源地。在我们承认这些袭击并以实际行动控制这些袭击之前,我们不能在阻止发源于其他国家的网络袭击方面实现重大突破。”

        因为中国政府的控制和审查,舆论认为中国政府操纵着针对谷歌等起源于中国的网络袭击。而起源美国的袭击却被认为是个人、自由职业者发动的袭击,至少美国人这样认为。Goldsmith接受这一传统观点,并进一步指出:“美国的个人及有组织的网络袭击对象是中国和伊朗政府网站、电脑系统以及审查机器。这些袭击得到美国大学、基金会以及联邦政府的支持。仅在克林顿抱怨中国的骇客行为后七个段落,她又开始称赞美国骇客的行动。”

掩护玻璃房子

        中国显然比Goldsmith教授更清楚她的网络世界运行情况。美国对中国骇客袭击的控诉看起来振振有词,就像她对中国政府操纵经济运行、补贴企业的指控一样。但是这些指控都来自玻璃房子内。只有当中美双方都承认弊病——她们正当合理的抱怨需要解决途径,而不是使局势紧张化——这些抱怨只会使两国间的距离越来越远。她们或是应当理解对方在玻璃房子中发表的观点——发表观点的人可以清楚地看到外界,外界也可清楚地看到发表观点的人——停止向对方扔东西,或是掩护各自的玻璃房子。后者可能是两国关系发展的趋势,但却是下下策。
 

U.S. Court Decision Ought To Change Chinese Thinking (Revised and Expanded) 美国法庭裁决应将改变中国思维

中文请点击这里

This article is co-authored by Elliot J. Feldman and John J. Burke.

 Until now, China has preferred the WTO to resolve trade disputes. Of a dozen countervailing duty cases brought against Chinese products, all but one (the coated free sheet paper case failed at the International Trade Commission) went adversely before U.S. agencies and the Government of China challenged none of these final agency determinations in U.S. courts. Instead, China consolidated four of them and complained at the WTO.

We have indicated before our doubts about the wisdom of this choice (see our blog article titled WTO Challenges: Not Always A Panacea For Respondents In Trade Litigation). Now, there is new evidence. In GPX International Tire Corporation v. United States, a case brought before the United States Court of International Trade (“CIT”) by private parties (not the Government of China), Chief Judge Jane Restani found an important flaw in the procedures of the United States Department of Commerce that could return substantial sums of money to importers of Chinese goods and alter the way trade remedy actions are brought and analyzed against China. Although this victory for Chinese interests is less than suggested by its advocates and some in the trade press, it is significant nonetheless and comes at an important time. The Chinese Government has achieved nothing comparable in its efforts at the WTO.

Judge Restani’s decision does not preclude the Department of Commerce from initiating countervailing duty investigations against China or any other non-market economy. In fact, its impact is more likely to be seen in the conduct of antidumping cases against China. Judge Restani held that, when Commerce chooses to apply the countervailing duty law to China with respect to the same products for which it also is calculating antidumping duties, using the non-market economy methodology, Commerce must alter its antidumping calculations to avoid counting the same subsidy twice. She noted that Commerce would have to accomplish this task within the confines of the non-market economy provisions of the antidumping law. She remanded to Commerce to find some way to resolve this problem.

The easiest way for Commerce to resolve the double counting problem, as strongly hinted by Judge Restani, would be to resume its old practice of more than twenty years of not applying the countervailing duty laws to non-market economies. She noted that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the 1986 case, Georgetown Steel, held that Commerce was not required to apply the countervailing duty laws to non-market economies. Many legal commentators had interpreted the Georgetown Steel case as prohibiting the use of countervailing duty laws to non-market economies. Judge Restani acknowledged that interpretation, but held that Georgetown Steel was ambiguous and she herself found the statute ambiguous. Therefore, she deferred to Commerce’s interpretation as "not unreasonable."

Judge Restani implicitly urged Commerce to abandon its adventure in applying the countervailing duty law to non-market economies, but nonetheless gave Commerce the option of altering its antidumping methodologies to prevent double counting. Given all of the political capital the Commerce Department has now invested in applying the countervailing duty laws to China, we expect Commerce will work hard to find a way to resolve this issue through changes in its antidumping calculations, without returning to the conventional interpretation of Georgetown Steel.

Commerce could separate antidumping from countervailing duty cases. It could decline to initiate them together against the same product. The cost of filing may go up for petitioners, but they might be able to preserve the ability to claim both subsidies and dumping. They could, alternatively, not include alleged subsidies in the calculation of cost of production for dumping, and instead allege all subsidies together in the separate countervailing duty petition. There would be no double-counting, but alleged subsidies would not escape scrutiny.

Judge Restani does not exclude these possibilities. To the contrary, she expressly authorizes as “reasonable” petitions alleging subsidies in non-market economies. She denies overturning Georgetown Steel, but she certainly overturns the popular understanding of it for the last two decades.

Judge Restani also overturned Commerce’s automatic use of December 11, 2000, the date China joined the WTO, as the cut-off date for determining whether a subsidy could be calculated in China. Commerce had been countervailing alleged subsidies conferred after that date, but refusing to investigate any allegations of subsidies conferred before that date. Some of the Chinese companies argued that Commerce could not go back any earlier than the date in 1997 when it announced it would apply the CVD law to China. The U.S. producers argued that there should be no cut-off date. Judge Restani ruled that Commerce must decide how far back to go based on the facts of each subsidy allegation. The bottom line for the Chinese Government and Chinese companies is that they now have to be prepared to defend against subsidy allegations reaching back into the 1990s, a serious setback from core arguments advanced by some counsel for China in the CVD cases.

Judge Restani, Chief Judge of the CIT, has long been a rigorous, thoughtful judge willing to reject the arguments of the United States Government and prepared to interpret the law and international agreements as favoring free trade. However, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit historically has not been unwilling to overturn her. Occasionally, when she thinks a legal issue especially important and perhaps difficult, she assembles a three-judge panel of the court to hear a case. Three-judge panels have not been overturned in the last twenty years. Consequently, this decision is vulnerable to appeal.

Despite the celebration of a Chinese victory, assuming an unsuccessful appeal, there may be many ways around the rejection of double-counting, leaving China with less of a legal victory than it seems now to think. Nonetheless, although China lost the key legal principle at issue in the case – whether subsidy actions can be brought against non-market economies – it won a point that should mean the return of monies to importers of record in the United States and should complicate life for petitioners who were making the simultaneous filing of antidumping and countervailing duty petitions routine. As narrow as that victory may be, it is substantially more than anything gained to date at the WTO, and more than anything likely to be possible at the WTO as to Chinese exposure to CVD petitions.  It ought  to convey several lessons one of which is that U.S. courts are not necessarily inhospitable to Chinese appeals.  Another ought  to be, like the Chinese proverb, that the road is long, and requires many steps.  This appeal should be the first, not the last, on a journey to justify the practices of the Chinese economy.
 

本文由 Elliot J. Feldman 和 John J. Burke 合著。

        迄今为止,中国仍偏爱通过世贸组织解决贸易争端。在十二个针对中国产品展开的反补贴案中,中方只在一个案件中赢得调查胜利(美国国际贸易委员会否决了铜版纸一案),但是中国政府放弃了在美国法庭上诉这些终审裁决的机会。相反,中国把四个案件整合在一起,向世贸组织递交了申诉

        在先前的文章中,我们已经对这种做法表示怀疑(见博文《世贸组织争端解决机制 ----不是贸易纠纷应诉方的万能药》)。现在,又有新证据证明我们的论点。在美国国际贸易法庭受理的GPX International Tire Corporation v. United States 一案中,中国企业(而非中国政府)提出上诉,首席法官Jane Restani裁定美国商务部在调查过程有重大疏漏,这一裁定可帮助进口商拿回多缴的惩罚性关税,同时将改变针对中国的贸易补偿行动。虽然中方这一胜利的意义略小于媒体以及中方律师强调的意义,但仍然是关键时刻取得的显著胜利。中国政府至今尚未在世贸组织取得可以和这一案件相媲美的成就。

        Restani法官的裁决并未禁止美国商务部针对中国及其他非市场经济体展开反补贴调查。事实上,这一案件的意义将主要表现在针对中国产品展开的反倾销调查中。Restani法官裁定:如果美国商务部决定针对面临反倾销调查、且美国商务部在计算反倾销税率时使用非市场经济体计算方法的中国产品展开反补贴调查时,美国商务部必须改变计算反倾销税率的方法以避免在反补贴调查中双重征税。她指出美国商务部应在反补贴法非市场经济体条款管辖范围内完成这一任务。她要求美国商务部找到解决这一问题的途径。

        对于美国商务而言,就如Restani法官建议,解决双重征税最简单的方法是重新采用二十多年来沿用的老方法:不向非市场经济体展开反补贴调查。她指出联邦法院上诉庭在1986年乔治城钢铁案中裁定美国商务部无需针对非市场经济体使用反补贴税。许多法律评论家将乔治城钢铁案解释为禁止向非市场经济体使用反补贴法。Restani法官提到这一解释,但是她认为乔治城钢铁案裁决在这一点上模棱两可,她自己也认为这一法律条文模棱两可。因此,她并不认为美国商务部的诠释“毫无依据”。

        Restani法官并未明确要求美国商务部放弃向非市场经济体采用反补贴法,而是给予美国商务部修改反倾销税率计算方法的选择以避免双重征税。目前美国商务部在针对中国展开的反补贴调查领域投入巨大政治资本,我们预计商务部会极具创意地、非常辛苦地寻找途径修改反倾销税率计算方法、以此解决这一法律挑战,而不必重新回到对乔治城钢铁案的传统解释

        美国商务部也可以将反倾销调查和反补贴调查分开处理。它可放弃针对同一产品同时展开反补贴和反倾销调查。这可能增加申诉方的费用,但同时申诉方也可以保留申请展开反补贴、反倾销调查的权利。或者,他们可选择将受指控的补贴排除在反倾销调查中的成本计算之外。这样,重复计算不存在,但是受指控的补贴项目仍将面临调查。

        Restani法官并没有排除这些可能性。恰恰相反,她明确允许“合理的”针对非市场经济国家的反补贴申诉书。她拒绝否决乔治城钢铁案,但是她否定了过去二十年里对这一案件最流行的理解。 

         Restani法官同时否决了美国商务部使用2000年12月11日——中国加入世贸组织这一天作为计算反补贴税率的起始日期。美国商务部对这一日期之后的补贴都展开调查并征收反补贴税率,但是拒绝调查这一日期前给予的补贴。一些中国企业提出美国商务部在1997年宣布将对中国使用反补贴法,因此此前的反补贴项目不必担心面临反补贴调查。但是美国生产商认为应该没有最早截止日期。Restani法官裁定美国商务部应根据每一反补贴指控的实际情况决定最早截止日期。这说明中国政府和中国企业现在应开始准备应对针对1990年代补贴项目的指控。对于代表中国参与反补贴应诉的律师来说,这是关于核心争端的严重倒退。

        作为美国国际贸易法庭的首席法官,Restani法官一直以来是一位严厉、思想深刻、愿意拒绝美国政府论点、准备从倾向自由贸易的角度诠释法律、国际协定的法官。但是从历史纪录来看,联邦上诉庭也曾驳回她的裁决。偶尔,当她认为一法律问题尤其重要、可能还颇有难度,她就与其他两位法官一起审理案件。三位法官的联合裁决在过去二十年里从未被驳回。所以,Restani法官的这一裁决可能面临上诉、且比较脆弱。

        在庆祝中国取得胜利之余,否决双重征税也带来其他许多问题使得中国取得的法律胜利显得并不辉煌。有关本案最关键的法律原则——是否可对非市场经济体展开反补贴调查,中国几乎全盘皆输,只有涉案美国进口商可拿回部分惩罚性关税,让同时递交反补贴、反倾销申诉的美国申诉方面临更多难题。虽然胜利并不显赫,但是这比在世贸组织取得的任何胜利都更具实际意义,而且比未来可能取的胜利更辉煌。 这一案件带来许多启示,其中之一就是美国法庭并非对中国上诉不友善。另一经验是,用中国典故; 路漫漫其修远兮,需要分步走。这一上诉是证明中国经济运作合理性的第一步,而不是最后一步。
 

(翻译:朱晶)

United States Countervailing Duty Investigations Against China A Question Of Attitude 针对中国的反补贴调查:美方"态度问题"

中文点击这里

Political pressures have led the U.S. Department of Commerce to launch countervailing duty investigations against China while insisting that it cannot use market information from within China to measure the alleged subsidies because China is a non-market economy. That political reality contravenes the principles embodied in U.S. law. Subsidies are found and measured according to the market distortion they cause. Where there is no market, there can be no market distortion. It is not possible for China to have developed markets sufficiently to be subject to subsidies allegations and investigations, yet have no markets by which to ascertain and measure the subsidies.

The problem that pervades the United States’ countervailing duty investigations of China is an attitude, which has at least three manifestations.

  1. There is the Department’s confusion of methodologies used in dumping and countervailing duty investigations. In dumping cases involving non-market economies, the law expressly allows the Department to seek out surrogate values from other countries. In theory, at least, this exercise is fairly precise: the cost of a nail in India might substitute for the cost of the same nail in China. The Department, however, has taken to utilizing this methodology in countervailing duty cases where the law does not authorize it and the measurements are not remotely so precise.The consequence is that the Department ignores prevailing market conditions within China in favor of data from hand-selected countries to determine the existence and amount of a countervailable subsidy in China. The Department is having the market issue both ways: China is enough of a market economy for government subsidies to cause distortions, but not enough of one – in any sector – to resort to prices in China that are less likely to show the existence of a subsidy.
  2. There is a lack of recognition and appreciation of China’s radical transition to a market economy. The People’s Republic is privatizing, and creating competition, at a feverish pace. Its central planning is indicative and no longer directive; its collectives are giving way to individual entrepreneurs and its controls are yielding to markets. The Department verified that state-owned enterprises are operating autonomously, for profit, without government direction. They are seen as benefiting the people collectively instead of a small group of private owners, but contrary to the Department’s preconceived notions, that collective benefit makes them no less market-driven than privately-owned entities. Many of the changes in China’s economy are taking place in weeks and months, not years or decades. Countervailable subsidy allegations of a practice in June quickly become outdated as the practice disappears in September. The United States’ failure to recognize and appreciate these changes is a bad policy toward China because it carries all the wrong incentives: offsetting programs that have been abolished or expired creates liabilities that discourage abandoning the programs, or beg for replacements. It teaches all the wrong lessons about opening markets, because what it really communicates is that the United States is closing its own.
  3. There is the allegation that officials of the People’s Republic of China do not always cooperate with the Department or do all they could to answer questions and assist with the Department in its investigation. The allegation is worse than undiplomatic. It violates the comity of nations by refusing to respect the acts of foreign sovereigns within their own jurisdictions. By presuming that China must collect and have information that, within its own jurisdiction it says it does not collect and does not have the Department violates a principle respected formally by the United States since the Supreme Court first pronounced on it in 1797. This third manifestation of attitude – the willingness to deny the veracity of official testimony without contrary information or evidence – tarnishes the Department’s investigations. As a matter of comity, the Department owes good faith respect to Chinese officials as it would expect them to respect officials of the Department.

Comity is not merely an element of diplomacy. It is an obligation of international practice and a legitimate expectation of our friendly trading partners. Chinese officials are entitled to be believed absent strong evidence to the contrary. The Department breaches its trust when it makes decisions based on nothing more than hostile beliefs. Insisting something must exist when told it doesn’t, and having no evidence to the contrary, is nothing more than a hostile belief. What is at stake is much more than the fate of any particular exported product. What is at stake is the good faith of American trade relations with China.

Hostile attitudes ought not to interfere with respect for the law and sound policy. In this instance, there is an additional concern. Much of the American objection to alleged Chinese subsidies could now be said, at least since September 15, 2008, about the United States. It probably has been necessary to combat global rececession with massive government economic interventions, but it has made much more of the American economy dependent on government support. We analyzed those troubling contradictions in formal comments filed with the United States Trade Representative in January 2008 on Applying the CVD Laws to China.
 

 

 

虽然美国尚未承认中国的市场经济地位,但是美国国内巨大的政治压力迫使美国商务部针对中国产品展开了一系列反补贴调查。美国商务部的做法违背了规范世界贸易体系的原则——世贸组织章程。只有当政府补助对市场健康发展造成负面影响时,才能证明不正当政府补助的存在;同时政府补助对市场发展的影响程度也是衡量反补贴的标准。 所以美国政府这种一方面说中国的市场程度已经发展到一定程度因而成为反补贴调查的对象,另一方面又说中国国内不存在可以用来判断、衡量不正当补助的市场指标的做法是完全站不住脚的。

在针对中国产品展开的反补贴调查中,美国政府的立场问题影响了所有反补贴调查的顺利进行。在一些案件中这一问题比较突出,在另一些案件中要稍许好一些。我们暂且把这一立场问题称为“态度问题”。美国商务部的“态度问题”可以简单概括为三个层面。

首先,美国商务部将反补贴和反倾销调查的调查方法混为一谈。在针对非市场经济体展开的反倾销调查中,美国法律允许美国商务部采用第三国经济数据来计算反倾销税税率。至少从理论上来讲这种计算方法是比较精确的:在印度生产一个铁钉的成本应当和在中国生产一个铁钉的成本相当。但是美国商务部居然在反补贴调查中也使用这种计算方式,这是美国法律所不允许的,同时也是非常不精确的。

美国商务部采取这一做法的结果是它对中国的市场行情视而不见,却用精心挑选的第三替代国的数据来裁定中国政府是否提供了不正当补助、及反补贴税率。由此可见美国商务部充分利用市场经济这一议题对中国采取双重歧视:一方面认为中国已存在市场经济体系,因而政府补助影响了市场健康发展;另一方面又认为无论在哪一领域,中国的市场经济体系都不够发达,所以要用第三替代国的数据来计算反补贴税率。

“态度问题”的第二个层面是不承认、不充分肯定中国从政府主导向市场经济转变过程中取得的巨大成绩。中国正以极快的步伐从计划经济向市场经济转变,这同时刺激了市场竞争。原有的中央计划不再具有指令性特征,而是转变成为远景方向和目标;中国私营企业取代了公有性企业,在经济生活中扮演更重要的角色;政府逐渐让位于市场,让市场在经济生活中扮演更重要的角色。美国商务部承认,在核查中他们看到中国的国有企业是独立运作的、把追求经济效益放在首位、不再接受政府指令。国有企业的存在和运作是为了能让大多数人、而不是少数私营企业所有者受益。与美国商务部固有的印象完全相反,代表公众利益的企业能和私营企业一样对市场信号迅速做出反应。

腾飞的中国经济往往在短短几个星期、几个月时间内就会发生显著变化,而不是用几年或几十年的时间。所以六月提出的反补贴指控可能在九月就会变得过时,因为这项政府补助可能已经不存在了。美国政府往往忽视、或是没有充分认可中国的这些变化,仍一意孤行、针对这些稍纵即逝的项目采取贸易限制和保护措施。 这种针对中国的错误政策只会带来负面效应:鼓励中国维持这些补助,或用其他政府项目来取代这些已取消、或是即将失效的项目。同时,美国政府的这一做法非但没有起到开放市场的示范作用,反而告诉她的贸易伙伴:美国正在关闭市场。

美国商务部的“态度问题”的第三个层面是指责中国政府官员不与调查官员合作、不尽全力回答调查问卷、不协助美国商务部调查。这种指控不仅仅是不懂外交艺术的表现,同时还带来更严重的后果。这种指控违背了国家间应相互尊重的原则,因为指控方没有做到尊重一个主权国家在自己领土内决策的权力。美国商务部假定中国政府应当收集、而且一定拥有国内的某些信息,全然不顾事实上中国政府并未收集也没有这些信息。这种做法违背了美国政府理应遵守的、美国最高法院早在1797年就宣布的国家间相互尊重的原则。 因此,“态度问题”的第三个层面——在没有相左信息或证据的情况下,拒绝中国政府官员参与核查并作证的行为——给美国商务的核查工作蒙上了阴影。根据国家间相互尊重的原则,既然美国商务部官员期待得到中国官员的尊重,那么他们也应给予中国政府官员相应的尊重。

相互尊重不仅仅是外交要素之一,同时也是国际交往中各个国家都应承担的义务,是友好贸易伙伴之间最基本的期待之一。中国官员理应被信任。当美国商务部官员从敌视的、没有根据的信念出发采取某一行动的时候,他们就破坏了这种信任。当被告知某一事物并不存在,且没有证据的情况下,仍然坚持己见、认为这一事物一定存在,这就是敌视。这时,面临危机的就不仅仅是某一出口产品,而是中美两大贸易伙伴间的诚信了。

 

(翻译:朱晶)