John W. Clayton, Jr., Joins Baker Hostetler as Director of Trade Analysis 约翰•克来顿任本所贸易分析主任

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The U.S. law firm of Baker & Hostetler LLP is pleased to announce that John W. Clayton, Jr., has joined the firm as the Director of Trade Analysis in its Washington, D.C. office. Mr. Clayton, a Certified Public Accountant, is widely recognized as the leading expert in providing cost accounting services to non-market economy industries involved in U.S. antidumping proceedings. Mr. Clayton has represented clients in more than one hundred antidumping proceedings and has achieved more victories than any other person in the antidumping field.

Over a span of more than 20 years, Mr. Clayton has assisted a wide variety of industries involved in U.S. dumping cases, including foodstuffs, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, minerals and metals, and consumer products. Mr. Clayton focuses on assisting non-market economy producers, especially in China and Vietnam, in providing the detailed production cost data that U.S. authorities demand from foreign producers subject to U.S. antidumping proceedings.

Prior to joining Baker Hostetler, Mr. Clayton served as the Chief Accountant of Grunfeld Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman and Klestadt LLP. He previously was employed as a cost accounting specialist with Trade Resources, a Washington, D.C., trade consulting company, and as a cost accountant with the U.S. Department of Commerce.

“The addition of John Clayton enhances Baker Hostetler’s ability to provide superior service to industries in China and Vietnam involved in U.S. antidumping proceedings,” said Elliot Feldman, head of the firm’s International Trade practice. “Before John went in-house to another law firm, he worked successfully with us. Now, John will devote his extraordinary experience, expertise and skills entirely to matters handled by Baker Hostetler.”

Baker Hostetler represents foreign and domestic companies, associations and governments from every continent in all manner of international trade, customs and immigration proceedings before U.S. and foreign regulatory agencies, courts, and international dispute resolution panels. The firm and its attorneys also enjoy close working relationships with trade lawyers in other countries throughout the world.

Attorneys in the Washington office represent clients in antidumping, countervailing duty and other investigative proceedings before the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission; Section 201 safeguard actions involving many different federal agencies and the White House; and Section 301 actions before the U.S. Trade Representative. They also represent clients in customs, immigration, export controls and economic sanctions matters before the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, State and Defense.
 

        贝克豪思律师事务所(Baker & Hostetler LLP)欣喜地宣布约翰•克来顿(John W. Clayton, Jr.)加盟本所华盛顿办公室担任贸易分析主任一职。克来顿拥有会计师资格证,是美国反倾销领域内公认的、为非市场经济国家提供成本核算服务的专家。他为客户在上百个反倾销案件中取得胜利,是这一领域取得胜利最多的专家。

        在长达二十多年的时间里,克来顿主任的工作领域涉及多个产业:食品、化学、医药、矿产及消费品。他专注于帮助中国、越南等非市场经济国家的生产商应对反倾销调查,为他们提供详尽的生产成本数据分析。美国调查机构要求面临反倾销调查的国外生产企业提供这些数据。

        在加入贝克豪思律师事务所之前,克来顿先生担任格德莱西克法律事务所的首席会计。此前他在美国商务部及一家+国际贸易咨询公司任职。

        本所国际贸易部负责人费德门评论道:“克来顿先生的加盟将进一步增强贝克豪思律师事务所为中国、越南企业提供优异服务的能力,更好地帮助它们应对反倾销调查。在克来顿先生加盟另一律师事务所之前,他曾为我们提供出色的服务。现在,克来顿先生将充分发挥他的经验和专长为本所客户服务。”

        贝克豪思律师事务所国际贸易部的客户包括各大洲的政府和行业协会、美国及国外企业,为它们处理国际贸易、海关及移民事务,帮助它们在各政府、法院以及国际仲裁委员会处理各类事务。本所律师与世界各国的贸易律师建立了良好合作伙伴关系。

        本所华盛顿办公室的律师帮助客户在美国商务部、美国国际贸易委员会处理反倾销、反补贴及其他调查;在白宫及多个政府机构处理201款贸易保障调查;还在美国贸易委员代表办公室处理301款调查。他们还帮助客户处理受美国财政部、商务部、国土安全部、国务院和国防部管辖的海关、出口控制、移民及贸易制裁事项。 

(翻译:朱晶)

Retrospective Versus Prospective Antidumping And Countervailing Duty Systems 追溯式和前瞻式反倾销、反补贴税制度比较

Editor's Note: Baker & Hostetler LLP recently submitted the following comments in response to the Department of Commerce’s request for comments on Retrospective Versus Prospective Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Systems.  中文请点击这里

Introduction: The American Way Compared To The Method Used By Almost Everyone Else            

        Remedies for disputes heard by panels of the World Trade Organization are prospective.' There are no penalties for past misdeeds. Procedural delay is rewarded. A country is not expected to change its ways before the absolute completion of proceedings and definitive adverse decisions. While it continues conduct ultimately found inconsistent with its international obligations, a country faces no penalty. Only when the decision requires change and a country refuses is the country subject to penalty, and then only indirectly.

        Article 9 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "Antidumping Agreement") provides for the imposition and collection of anti-dumping duties, and authorizes either prospective or retrospective assessment of duties. The prospective system governs international trade remedy systems in almost every country. It also governs the conduct of original antidumping and countervailing duty investigations in the United States. Except for the very limited exception of critical circumstances, which is almost never used, a company will not be liable for antidumping or countervailing duties on imports before there is at least a preliminary determination of dumping or countervailable subsidies. The United States may be unique in its application of a retrospective review system governing the assessment of duties after an order is imposed, and is certainly the only major WTO member that uses a retrospective system.

        The Request for Comment asks for a comparison of prospective and retrospective systems with respect to six criteria. The first criterion refers to "remedying injurious dumping or subsidized exports to the United States." This language carries at least two assumptions, that the result of an investigation will be to find dumping or subsidization, and that the dumping or subsidization will be found to be injurious. The language, thus, fails to recognize a key problem with the American system: the mere filing of a petition disrupts trade because it distorts markets.

          Exporters to the United States, as a matter of prudence and precaution, invariably raise prices when an investigation is initiated. Importers and downstream customers start scrambling for alternative suppliers because of uncertainty about how imports from the country subject to the petition may be treated later on. Consequently, petitioners in the American system are rewarded for the filing of a petition, no matter whether the petition is frivolous or bound, ultimately, to fail. The main cause of that problem is the very low standard in the United States for accepting petitions, but retrospective duty assessment exacerbates the problem because importers know that, were an order to be imposed, their liability would be unlimited and would not be determined until well after the subject merchandise had been imported.

        Where dumping or subsidization and injury are found, remedies are important. A system that imposes an implicit remedy where there may be no need, however, that imposes an in terrorem effect on trading partners, is defective, and may explain why other countries have thought better of this system. The United States ought to be asking itself, when comparing prospective and retrospective systems, why almost everyone else does things differently.

         The American retrospective system begins collecting bonds for prospective duties as soon as there is a preliminary determination estimating antidumping or countervailing duty margins. The negative effects of this initial bonding period are muted because the bonding rate acts as a cap on the duties that can be collected for imports entering between the Commerce Department's preliminary determination and the International Trade Commission's final determination. The actual duties assessed can go down for imports entering during this period, but they cannot go up.

        The bonding cap is lifted and replaced by a cash deposit requirement when the antidumping or countervailing duty order goes into effect. Thereafter, the actual duties assessed can be increased or decreased drastically, based on the results of administrative reviews that may not be completed until more than two years after the affected merchandise was imported. Should the results of those administrative reviews be appealed, the actual determination of duties owed could be delayed many years further.

         Importers, who are held accountable for the duties, operate in an environment of substantial uncertainty for many years because of this system of assessment. It is impossible to know in advance of the Commerce Department's analysis what a final antidumping or countervailing duty tariff rate may be because there are so many variables that can affect the calculations, including methodological changes the Commerce Department may introduce between reviews, following importation. So, too, the U.S. Treasury cannot know how much money it will actually collect in duties during this extended period.

        The prospective system in most other countries removes most of the uncertainty characteristic of a retrospective system. As in the United States, the investigation in a prospective system produces duty rates, updated regularly through administrative reviews.  However, reviews do not change rates retrospectively. The duties collected are the duties owed, without the possibilities of increased duties or money returned according to the results of an administrative review. The rates set in the investigation apply to all imports going forward until the first review; the rates set in administrative reviews also apply going forward only.

        Not every prospective system is the same, but the principles are consistent and have similar market effects. In Canada, for example, the original investigation determines "normal values," which are minimum acceptable prices. As long as goods are imported above those prices, no duties are collected. Goods imported below normal values, however, are taxed the difference in price. The system is designed not for the purpose of revenue collection, but for the purpose of fair trade: the normal values define prices above which goods are not determined to be dumped or subsidized, leaving no reason to be collecting duties on them. The purpose of the law is to assure fair competition for domestic products, not to disrupt the market or create uncertainty for importers.

         The European Union also has adopted a prospective system. EU officials establish the normal value for a product in an investigation and then compare the normal value to the export price. The percentage difference between these two is fixed as the duty rate, which applies to all future imports of the product unless superseded on a prospective basis in a subsequent review.

        Most systems are neither purely prospective or retrospective. In the United States, for example, parties must request administrative reviews. When none is requested, the previously found duty rates continue to apply between administrative review periods, and the cash deposit rate from the investigation becomes the duty rate when no first administrative review is conducted.' A European Union importer may be able to recover previously collected duties, provided he can prove that dumping or subsidization has ended or that goods are being imported at rates below those that had applied when the goods had been imported.

Relative Merits Of Prospective And Retrospective Systems

        The American retrospective system is more accurate in assessing duties than the prospective system used in the European Union because it is based on the actual prices of imported sales compared to domestic prices (or contemporaneous costs) of like products sold at or near the same time. The American system is not necessarily more accurate, however, than the prospective normal value system used in Canada and several other countries. Although the Canadian system uses normal values calculated during a prior period, both systems use current import data. Because the Canadian prospective normal value system performs the necessary calculations at the time of importation, the risk of inaccuracy caused by lost data is reduced. Moreover, collection of total, accurate duties in a retrospective system requires assessment against importers well after the goods have been imported. It is not unusual for importers to be out of business by the time the final rates are supposed to be collected, leaving only deposits in the Treasury.

        Early estimated rates usually are much higher than rates to be finally assessed. These estimated rates distort the market, often dramatically, but when an importer can survive the initial impact, he can also recover monies paid that exceeded what ultimately was due.

         The American system is administratively very expensive because customs entries must be kept open, sometimes for years (subject to legal appeals and challenge), before final duties can be assessed. In the interval, the possibility of actual collection diminishes, while importers do not know whether they will be getting money back, or will owe more.

        In the prospective system where normal values are fixed in advance, importers can know what their prices have to be to avoid duties. In other prospective systems where duty rates, rather than normal values, are fixed in advance, importers can know what prices they need to charge their customers in order to recover the costs of the duties and still make a profit. There is more certainty and stability in the market than in a retrospective system. Duties are collected at the time of importation. Consequently, there is much more certainty that they, in fact, will be collected, and as the amount to be collected is known at the time of importation, the administrative system is much less cumbersome and expensive.

The Goals Of The Comparison

        Congress asked the Department of Commerce to compare prospective and retrospective antidumping and countervailing duty systems according to six goals. The current American retrospective system appears superior to a European style prospective system, but not a Canadian style prospective system, with respect to the first goal. All types of prospective systems appear preferable for the remaining five.

• The retrospective system may appear in theory to be superior for remedying injurious exports to the United States because it calculates duty rates based on a comparison of the actual import prices to normal values or subsidies calculated for a contemporaneous period. However, because the prospective system allows the importer to account fully for the antidumping or countervailing duties in its own pricing decisions (i.e., where the imports compete with the domestic product), it is arguable whether, even under this criterion, a retrospective system is superior.
• Prospective systems are better at collecting duties because they collect upon importation and do not have to wait through administrative and legal reviews and proceedings that can take years.
• Prospective systems are more likely to reduce incentives and opportunities for the evasion of duties because they are clearer in their expectations: normal values or fixed duty rates advise importers in advance of the prices they should apply to goods, information known to authorities with certainty at the time of importation.
• The retrospective system has no reliable way to "target high-risk importers," as it is focused on the prices of goods after they are imported. The prospective system, focused on the price of the goods when they arrive at port, makes the relative "risk" of the importer less relevant.
• The American retrospective system, by creating much more uncertainty in the marketplace, creates competitive advantages for U.S. petitioners (through the advantages of market disruption), but the costs and consequences are visited upon importers, their employees, downstream businesses and their employees, and ultimately U.S. consumers.
• The retrospective system is by far more administratively cumbersome and expensive than the prospective system adopted by almost every other country and reflected in the principles governing the remedy system of the WTO.

         The United States has maintained an expensive and inefficient system unlike any other country's. The systematic analysis Congress has invited has been overdue, and ought to lead to change.
 

介绍:美国方式与他国方式比较

        世贸组织裁定的惩罚针对未来,具有前瞻式。在裁决发布前的错误行为不受惩罚。程序性拖延因此受奖励。因此,某国不会在不利裁决发布前采取行动。即使该国继续违反国际承诺,该国也不会面临惩罚。只有当裁决要求该国改变行为,且该国拒绝执行时,该国才会面临间接惩罚。

        世贸组织《反倾销条约》第九款规定如何确定、征收反倾销税,并允许前瞻式和追溯式征收反倾销税。大多数国家采取前瞻式征税。美国的反倾销、反补贴调查也采取这一方式。大多数情况下,至少在初裁结果发布前某一公司不会被征收反倾销、反补贴税,特例几乎从未发生。在反倾销、反补贴令发布后,美国开始追溯式征收惩罚性关税,这非常特殊——美国是唯一采取这一方法的主要世贸组织成员。

        美国商务部征求公众意见,根据六个条件比较这两种不同的惩罚性关税征收方式。第一个条件是“惩罚出口至美国、造成产业损害的倾销、补贴产品”。这一条款包括两大假设:首先,调查结果将为裁定倾销、补贴存在;其次,补贴或倾销造成产业损害。因此,这一条款忽视了美国方式的主要问题:递交申请将影响市场正常运行。

        每一调查都将促使对美出口的出口商谨慎地提高售价。进口商以及下游客户则将着急地寻找其他供货途径,因为调查将带来种种不确定性。因此,美国体系下的调查申请人仅仅通过递交申请就可享受既得利益,即使调查注定失败。导致这一弊病的原因是美国政府接受调查申请的标准极低,但是追溯式征税强化了这一弊病:进口商知道当一旦反倾销、反补贴令下达,他们面临无穷负担,而且商品进口后很久都将前途叵测。

        一旦裁定倾销或补贴以及损害存在,贸易补偿非常重要。但是导致隐蔽但却可能不必要的补偿的体系是恐吓性贸易体系,也可以解释为什么其他国家曾经看好这一贸易体系。美国应当扪心自问,为什么其他国家都使用前瞻式征税方式。

        在美国追溯式征税方式下,一旦初裁宣布反倾销、反补贴税率,美国就向进口品征收保证金。在这一阶段,初始保证金的负面影响不大,因为保证金税率的作用是为在美国商务部宣布初裁结果至美国国际贸易委员会宣布终裁结果之间征收的惩罚性关税设定上限。实际征收的税率可以下调,但不能向上波动。

        当反倾销或反补贴令生效后,保证金就被现金储蓄所取代。此后,实际征收的惩罚性关税可远远高于或低于已征收的现金,这完全取决于一年一度的复审结果,但是这一结果距离商品进口日期可达两年之久。如果上诉复审结果,惩罚性关税的确定日期将拖延更久。

        进口商支付惩罚性关税,因此他们将在极度不确定中运营多年。因为多种因素将影响美国商务部最后确定的反倾销、反补贴税率,包括计算方法等,因此不可能预测最后税率。同时,美国财政部在很长一段时间内也不知道最后征收的惩罚性关税的具体数目。

        其他国家采用的前瞻式税收方式排除了不确定性。与美国方式相同,前瞻式征税方式在调查中确定税率,在复审中不断更新。但是复审不改变先前确定的税率。征收的税率与拖欠税率相等,复审不影响最终征收的税率。调查确定的税率只影响第一次复审结果宣布前进口的商品;历次复审也只影响未来进口的商品。

        各国前瞻式征税方式并不完全相同,但是原则一致,市场效果相同。以加拿大为例,调查确定“正常价值”,也就是最低可接受的价值。只要商品以高于此价值的价格进口,就不会面临惩罚性关税。以低于正常价值进口的商品将面临惩罚性关税,进口价格和正常价值间的差价即为惩罚性关税。这一体系不是为了增加财政收入而是为了促进公平贸易:如果商品以高于正常价值的价格进口,就无须向这一商品征收反补贴或反倾销税。这一法律的目的是为了确保国内产品的公平竞争环境,而不是为了阻碍市场正常发展或是造成不确定性。

        欧盟也使用前瞻式征收方式。欧盟官员在调查中确定正常价值,然后与出口价格相比。两者间的差价将折算成百分比,即惩罚性关税税率,这一方法适用于此后进口的所有商品,直至下一轮复审。

        很多体系既不完全属于前瞻式也不完全属于追溯式。在美国,涉案方必须申请复审。如果没有接到申请,则先前确定的税率适用于复审阶段。即,如果没有第一次复审,调查中确定的现金储蓄率就成为惩罚性关税税率。欧盟进口商可能可以取回部分已经被征收的惩罚性关税,只要他能证明倾销或补贴已经终止,或是进口价格与正常价格间的差价已经缩小。

追溯式和前瞻式税收方式比较

        美国的追溯式惩罚性关税征收方式比欧盟的前瞻式征收方式更精确,因为美国方式建立在同一时期实际进口价格和本土价格(当前成本)基础之上。但是美国方式不一定比加拿大方式或是其他国家的方式更为精确。虽然加拿大方式使用前一阶段的正常价值,两国都使用当前进口数据。因为加拿大的正常价值体系在进口时进行计算,数据遗失造成计算错误的可能性减小。此外,在回顾式征收方式下准确征收所有惩罚性关税需要在商品进口很久以后再衡量进口品。进口商在税率确定时已经破产的情况并不罕见,使得美国财政部只得到现金储蓄。

        估算得到的税率往往远远超过实际征收的税率。这些估算税率扭曲市场,常常极度扭曲市场;但只要进口商能够承受初始阶段的冲击,他往往能在最后取回多缴的税金。

        美国方式在实际运作中非常昂贵,因为在最后税率确定之前,商品的海关进出口纪录必须保留,有时甚至应保持多年(根据法律诉讼情况不同时间不等)。在这一阶段,实际征收税率的可能性不大,进口商不知道他们是否可以取回现金或是需要交纳更多税金。

        在前瞻式征收方式中,正常价值早已得以确定,进口商知道哪一价格是不被征收惩罚性关税的底线。在首先确定惩罚性关税税率、而非正常价值的前瞻式征收方式中,进口商可以确定新的价格以抵消损失。因此,前瞻式征收方式更具确定性和稳定性。同时,进口时征收税率确保惩罚性关税一定会被征收,而且实施这一体系的行政成本较低。

比较的目标

        国会让商务部根据六个目标比较这两大惩罚性关税征收方式。根据第一个目标可以得出现行美国追溯式税收方式优于欧盟的前瞻式税收方式,但并不优于加拿大的前瞻式税收方式的结论。根据其他五个目标,前瞻式税收方式更优越。

• 从理论角度着眼,追溯式征税方式更有利于补偿出口至美国的商品带来的损害,因为惩罚性关税的计算方法建立在比较同一时期实际进口价格和正常价值基础之上。但是,因为前瞻式税收方式允许进口商将反补贴、反倾销税率计入价格决策中(当进口商品与国内产品产生竞争时),追溯式征收方式是否更优越仍值得讨论。

• 前瞻式更有利于征收惩罚性关税因为这一方式在进口时征收惩罚性关税,而不必等待复审或是其他法律程序结果,这些结果的等待时间长达几年之久。

• 前瞻式更有利于降低躲避惩罚性关税的动力和可能性,因为进口商的期待值非常清楚:进口商在进口时已经了解正常价值和固定税率,知道应当以何种售价转售商品;政府有关部门也清楚掌握这些信息。

• 追溯式无法单独针对“高危险进口商”,也无法针对进口后商品的价格。前瞻式征收方式着眼于商品抵达进口港时的价格,降低了“进口商危险”。

• 美国的追溯式征收方式导致市场不稳定,为美国申诉方创造了条件(通过扰乱市场),但是美国进口商、其员工、下游生产商、最终美国消费者承担负面影响。

• 追溯式征收方式带来的行政负担远远超过体现世贸组织原则的、其他国家的前瞻式征收方式。

        一直以来,美国使用这一昂贵、低效的系统。国会早应进行系统性研究,希望这一研究带来变革。
 

Calling All Cars 拦截所有车辆

中文请点击这里

The Scope Of The Challenge

China’s Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) initiated officially on November 6, 2009 antidumping and countervailing duty investigations into saloon and cross-country cars imported from the United States and manufactured by General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford Motor companies. Although the scope of the products at issue is described (chassis, engine, etc.) and defined according to tariff codes, the real scope of the petitions has little to do with saloon and cross-country (or sport utility) vehicles. The petitions upon which the investigations have been initiated may be the single most important documents in China-U.S. trade relations since the Chinese Protocol of Accession to the WTO. They are about competing models of economic and industrial development, and constitute a complaint against the American strategy for overcoming the financial crisis that dates from at least 2008. According to the Chinese petition, the United States, and the United States alone, caused the crisis. The Chinese contend that China is ascendant while the United States is declining, a statement as much of Chinese historical perspective as of legal rights and wrongs.

The selection of the Big Three American manufacturers, the timing, and the contents of the petitions, suggest that China, on the eve of President Obama’s first visit there, is going far beyond a trade remedy action concerning automobiles. Automobiles, however, may have been chosen as the target of the sweeping indictment, both because of vulnerability in the economic crisis, and because of their symbolism as the icon of American industrial dominance in the twentieth century. China is calling into question the American economic development model and the entire premise of American trade actions against China, advancing an argument that the U.S. automobile industry is failing and exposing the depth and breadth of American economic support for an exporting industry. Were the petitions to succeed, they would likely be the first of many against other U.S. exports to China.

The Chinese petitions challenge American definitions of market and non-market economies, and turn against the United States the subsidy policies and practices the United States has been applying to China. The Chinese petitions question the legitimacy of much of American trade policy toward China, while exposing great American vulnerability to trade remedy actions against American exports.

The petitions reach beyond trade policy. They question the U.S. Government’s energy and climate change policies by challenging government support for research and development into more energy efficient and less-polluting vehicles. As President Obama has placed research and development at the heart of the American economic recovery (and identified it with American global leadership), so China is now contending that state support for research and development is, according to Chinese law, the WTO, and implicitly American practice, a collection of countervailable subsidies.

There are many ironies in the Chinese decision to initiate a countervailing duty investigation based on the automobile petition, but perhaps the greatest is in the agreement reached a few days after initiation by Presidents Obama and Hu Jintao, in mid-November. They announced a cooperative effort specifically for the development of electric vehicles, and both committed significant R&D funds. Yet, China began investigating, ten days before President Obama’s visit, whether American subsidies for the development of electric vehicles violate WTO obligations. The Chinese petition contends that an American competitor, Tesla, in the nascent electric vehicle market, has been receiving funds (the petition alleges at least $465 million) from the federal government under several programs. The petition also identifies electric vehicle development funds to the Big Three, alleging $5.9 billion to Ford alone.

The excuse for the allegations against electric vehicles is the fungibility of money, which is an argument that has been used in the past by the U.S. Commerce Department that says any funds given to a company, for whatever purpose, may contribute to production and export of subject merchandise by relieving other sources of funds. There is no excuse offered, however, for the discussion of Tesla, which is not one of the Big Three, not a manufacturer of subject merchandise, and therefore not a respondent. Nor is there an explicit acknowledgement that electric cars are a different product not subject to the petition.

Warned But Oblivious

In December 2008, we warned the Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) of a potential Chinese action such as this one. USTR, under the Bush Administration, had solicited comments on how the United States should treat alleged Chinese subsidies. We advised that, since September 15, 2008, it was no longer possible to continue business as usual. The United States, in response to the global financial crisis, was subsidizing banks and encouraging loans to uncreditworthy companies at below market rates. Banks were becoming state-owned, even if temporarily, in all but name. The United States was also acquiring significant equity positions in the automobile industry through massive cash infusions.

Even were the petitions to be taken entirely at face value – that they were prepared by a private industry association and reviewed by MOFCOM for a subsequent government decision whether to initiate investigations in response to a private request – MOFCOM’s notices of initiation imply acceptance of the petitions as to the credibility of most of the allegations. The petitions, therefore, are plausibly statements of MOFCOM’s views on a variety of subjects critical to U.S.-China relations.

The petitions appear to have been used as an opportunity for China to offer a comparative history of economic development, of industry in general and the automobile industry, the American icon, in particular. This Chinese version argues that the American automobile industry had every possible advantage in global markets over the last century, that China’s industry has been developing quickly, first with foreign help but more recently of its own accord, and that the United States’ efforts to save its automobile industry cannot come at the expense of China.

Loosely tied to the petitions’ comparative history of economic development is a contemporary conclusion. The petitions allege that “the U.S. subprime crisis escalated suddenly and ballooned into a global financial crisis.” (Elsewhere, the petition complains, “since the broke out [sic] of economic crisis aroused by the United States sub-loan crisis.”) This critical commentary, like the comparative economic history, is irrelevant to the subsidy and dumping allegations, but appears to be an unvarnished Chinese view of why the United States is today in China’s debt. It is a commentary that unashamedly connects economic and industrial policy to allegations of unfair trade, without hesitating to accuse the United States of pursuing a state-driven “industrial policy,” while implicitly denying its own.

Even the terms of reference equate American policy with Chinese language: the petitioners found President Obama referring to the automobile as a “pillar industry” of the American economy, a favorite Chinese term frequently noted by the U.S. Department of Commerce when, focusing on Chinese central planning, it assumes a link of plans to actions and accuses the state-driven Chinese economy of massive subsidies.

It is possible that neither President knew the details of the automobile petitions when they met shortly after investigations were initiated and they agreed to cooperate in the development of electric vehicles. There had been bilateral consultations as mandated by the WTO before initiation of a subsidies investigation, and the United States Trade Representative had summoned the Big Three manufacturers to a meeting, but the United States has not exported electric cars to China and the subject of the investigation is saloon cars and sport utility vehicles. There was no reason, therefore, for either President to think that R&D support for the development of electric vehicles was a primary focus of the countervailing duty petition.

The agreement Presidents Obama and Hu reached on this subject is strange in the circumstances. In light of the agreement, there is little logic in pursuing the allegations, but China may have its own reasons for both, nearly simultaneous, actions.

A Petition More And Less Than Meets The Eye

According to the countervailing duty petition, China is second only to the United States worldwide in the purchase of automobiles. In the narrower classes of saloon and cross-country vehicles, the petition claims China imported 33,732 such vehicles from the United States in 2007, and 43,240 in 2008. Chinese total imports of these vehicles, however, grew from 234,493 to 299,132 during the same period. Thus, the Big Three represent, in shipping from the United States, less than 15 percent of China’s imports of the subject merchandise, and less than half of one percent of China’s total consumption.

The petition does not link systematically any injury being caused by these shipments to current Chinese manufacture and sale of these specific categories of vehicles. To the contrary, the petition acknowledges that China’s own production and consumption grew during the period of investigation, even as overall imports grew as well. Nor are the subsidy allegations focused on the subject merchandise, but rather refer to the entire automobile industry, and especially initiatives regarding energy efficiency and green technologies that are unrelated to the subject merchandise. The petition challenges almost every aspect of the economic recovery package, with a particular objection to Buy American provisions. But it does not narrow the subsidies analysis to the scope of the petition, complaining more generally about the automobile industry. In repeated recitations of the legal “specificity” standard, it treats automobiles as a specific industry, not the types of cars about which the petition complains.

The petition details two arguments for upstream subsidy investigations, although it does not expressly call for any, and Chinese regulations may not articulate how one might be done. After all, upstream subsidy investigations in the United States have been rare, with the Commerce Department loathe to do them. In a notable exception to practice, the Commerce Department undertook an upstream subsidy analysis in Hardwood Laminated Trailer Flooring from Canada and in February 1997 found no subsidy. There, the allegation was about Canadian stumpage, possibly the most controversial subsidies issue between Canada and the United States in the last twenty-five years. Here, the allegations focus on steel and on components for electric vehicles. Steel is perhaps the most contentious trade issue between China and the United States and likely will be the subject of more petitions in 2009 and early 2010. In both principal instances – stumpage with Canada, steel with China -- an important motivation for the petition might have been to get at the upstream product. The attack on electric car inputs may reflect the U.S. objections in several subsidies cases brought against China regarding inputs from state-owned enterprises. The United States, however, has not deployed any upstream analyses.

It seems the petition, then, is not so seriously about saloon cars and SUVs. It may be more about preemptive strikes (electric vehicles; R&D) and retaliation on thorny disputes (steel). The petitions seem to contend that there is no material difference between the economic actions of governments in China and the United States, between market and non-market economies.

The petition is a first foray against multiple levels of American government (with four allegations concerning subsidies from the state of Michigan), perhaps a response to the now-frequent American complaints about Chinese regional and local government programs and planning. The petition, thus, is less than meets the eye: it is hard to take it too seriously as to the specific cars in question; and a great deal more than meets the eye: a resetting of the table for the treatment of the role of the state in the economy, for addressing American federalism, and in the future of energy efficiency and green technologies.

Possible Reverberations

There are many possible problems arising from this investigation. The United States has never before defended itself in China. China has never before sent investigators to examine U.S. books. No U.S. state has ever before submitted to a Chinese investigation, or participated in one. Although this petition has precipitated China’s third countervailing duty investigation against the United States, none has yet reached a preliminary determination, none has yet involved a verification with Chinese officials inspecting U.S. government books, and none has involved a state government. The U.S. automobile industry has not been subject to dumping or subsidies allegations before. Conducting the investigation will be new for China; responding to it will be new for Americans. It will require a sorting out of American federalism, and a new diplomacy for China.

Some have said that the investigation is retaliation for the tire safeguard. In its timing, this view seems attractive, but too much about it makes the theory implausible. The petition covers too much ground and is too broad an assault on the U.S., its trade and economic policies, to have been mere retaliation for a safeguard contemplated in the Accession Protocols. The timing is more notable for President Obama’s first visit to China than for the safeguard. It sets an agenda: affirmatively, market economy recognition; negatively, warnings on steel and electric vehicles.

There have been no reports suggesting any U.S.-China dialogue about the petition during President Obama’s visit. The United States may have chosen deliberately to say nothing, or it may not have reached the President’s attention in the planning of the visit. China, however, may take American silence on the subject as a first round of acquiescence to the charges, and the charges, formally lodged in a trade action, are the most serious China has brought against the United States since, at least, China’s accession to the WTO.

Other countries likely will watch this investigation closely. On the last day of his Asian tour, President Obama received from President Lee Myung-Bak of South Korea agreement to reconsider the automobile dispute that is blocking finalization of a free trade agreement, but he did not receive agreement to reopen settled language in the pending treaty as sought by Congress. South Korea likely will be reinforced in its objections to the terms of the pending free trade agreement with the United States, as China intends to demonstrate massive subsidies to the U.S. automobile industry that ought to make South Korea reluctant to lower its barriers to U.S. cars.

Competing automobile industries, especially in Europe, which have been subsidized heavily during the financial crisis, may face future Chinese challenges. China may seek to clear its market, as implied in a petition that sees its industry ascendant.

China may have been anticipating American barriers to electric vehicles. The action brought, however, could now arguably make those barriers more likely. Tesla manufactures a luxury vehicle; China will seek to enter the U.S. with much more modest electric cars. Consequently, it may be difficult for Tesla, or any other U.S. manufacturer of electric vehicles, who may not yet have sold in the market when Chinese imports first arrive, to challenge Chinese electric cars. The Chinese petition, however, provides theories for challenging vehicles not yet in the market, including an attack on suppliers.

In Laminated Woven Sacks from China, the U.S. International Trade Commission found neither injury nor threat of injury to any American industry. Instead, it found that China’s industry was responsible for retarding the development of a U.S. industry. China did not contest this weakest of all possible injury allegations, enabling final affirmative determinations.

Chinese acquiescence could inspire a similar approach to electric vehicles. American petitioners might allege that Chinese imports are designed to kill off a nascent American industry. The petition could assure an American petition against Chinese electric cars that could complicate the efforts of both countries to develop new technologies for energy efficiency and environmental improvement. The petition is uncompromising and unforgiving as to American efforts to develop cleaner, more efficient automobiles.

The Chinese countervailing duty petition on automobiles could do more to change Chinese-U.S. trade relations than summits and presidential visits. Just as President Obama apparently did not pursue the frequent congressional complaint (and constant Bush Administration theme) regarding revaluation of Chinese currency, so China did not, apparently, assail publicly the United States as the source of the global financial crisis. Yet, President Obama was barely home before congressional committees called again for tough trade sanctions against China, including an attack on Chinese currency.

In a public document that forms the basis for a Chinese investigation of the United States, the current form of American capitalism is being put on trial. Consultations already have failed. No negotiations have followed. Unless national leaders contain the impulses of their respective Ministries (Departments) of Commerce, the trade war that the tires safeguard likely did not trigger may become inescapable. Each country will accuse the other of violating international trade rules in their respective pursuit of a cleaner and more energy efficient planet. Cooperation might threaten leadership. Without a swift settlement, China will be obliged to make its subsidies case, and the United States will not like it.

挑战的覆盖面

        中国商务部于2009年11月6日宣布立案对原产于美国,由通用、克莱斯勒和福特三大汽车公司生产的轿车和越野车展开反倾销、反补贴调查。虽然受调查产品被界定为包括底盘、发动机等主要部件,且附有关税编号,但真正受调查的产品却与小轿车和越野车没有太大关联。这份调查申请可能是中美贸易关系史上自签订《中国入世协定》以来最重要的文件。这份文件对存在竞争关系的不同经济、工业发展模型进行分析,是对自2008年以来美国走出金融危机的战略的抱怨。这份调查申请指责美国应对这次金融危机负责,而且只应由美国负责。中方认为中国逐渐壮大,同时美国渐趋衰微,这不仅是法律对错的分析,也是历史性回顾。

        选择三大美国汽车生产商、在奥巴马总统第一次访华前夕立案以及调查申请的内容都表明中国的醉翁之意不在于对汽车产品展开贸易救济行动。汽车产品被选为调查对象既因为这一产业在金融危机中异常脆弱,同时它也是20世纪美国工业霸权地位的象征。中国是对美国经济发展模式提出疑问,公开质疑美国针对中国采取的贸易行动;同时进一步证明中方认为美国汽车工业逐渐衰退的观点,揭露美国对这一出口产业资助的深度和广度。这份调查申请对美国提出的市场经济和非市场经济定义提出挑战,并以此攻击美国的补贴政策和对中国采取的贸易行动。中方质疑美国对华贸易政策的合理性,同时指出美国现在极其容易面对他国针对美国产品展开贸易救济行动。

        调查申请不仅仅对贸易政策提出质疑,同时亦对美国政府的能源、气候变化政策提出疑问,质询美国政府对研发能效更高、污染更小的交通工具给予的支持。奥巴马总统把研发视为美国经济复兴的核心,并把这视为美国全球领导地位的一部分;现在中国指出根据中国法律、世贸组织章程和美国实践,美国政府的研发支持其实是一系列不正当补贴。

        中国决定对汽车产品展开反补贴调查这一决定颇带讽刺意味。最具讽刺意义的是就在该案立案后不久,奥巴马总统和胡锦涛主席在11月中旬达成协议。两位国家领导人宣布双方将携手发展电动汽车,双方都将提供科研资金支持。但是,中国在奥巴马总统访华前十天宣布对美国的电动汽车发展补助展开反补贴调查,研究这些补助是否违背了美国的入世承诺。这份调查申请把美国Tesla公司视为成长中的电动汽车市场上的竞争对手,并指出Tesla从联邦政府获得四亿六千五百万美金的支持。这份调查申请同时列出三大汽车生产商从政府获得电动汽车开发资金,仅福特公司就获得59亿美金支持。

        中方指控沿用美国商务部曾使用的论点——给予某一企业的资金,不管初衷如何,都将减轻该企业对其他资金来源的依赖、有助于产品的生产和出口。但是不清楚为什么这份调查申请对Tesla展开讨论,Tesla不是三大汽车生产商之一、也不是受调查产品的生产商,因而也不是应诉企业。 同时调查申请也没有明确承认电动汽车属于另一类别产品,因此不在调查范围之内。

早被提醒但却置若罔闻

        2008年12月,我们提醒美国贸易代表办公室中国将采取类似行动。当时美国贸易代表办公室就应该如何处理面临指控的中国补贴征求公众意见。本所提出自2008年9月15日起,形势发生变化,因此不应照旧行事。面对全球金融危机,美国政府对银行提供补助、鼓励对信用不佳的企业提供低于市场利息的贷款。虽然名字未变,但银行已经变为国有。美国政府同时通过巨额资金输入变成汽车行业的大股东。

        仅从调查申请的表面价值来看,代表私营企业的行业协会准备、递交了这一调查申请,中国商务部审查并就企业要求做出行政决定,商务部的立案调查公告说明中国政府承认大多数指控的可靠性。因此,这份调查申请展示了中国商务部对众多涉案议题的看法。

        调查申请为中国提供了机会,对美国各行业经济发展、尤其是汽车工业发展史(这一标志性美国产业)进行比较研究。中方认为美国汽车工业在过去一个世纪里在国际市场上拥有所有可能拥有的竞争优势。中国的汽车工业首先在国外帮助下、近来主要依靠国内力量迅速发展;美国拯救本国汽车工业也不得不以牺牲中国为代价。

        和经济发展比较史松散地联系在一起的是现代结论。调查申请指控“美国次债危机迅速蔓延发展成全球金融危机。”这一批判性评论与经济发展比较史、反倾销、反补贴指控无关,但却是中国对拖欠中国巨额外债的美国最毫无修饰、最真实的观点。这一评论毫不害羞地把经济和工业政策与不公平贸易指控联系在一起,毫不犹豫地指控美国追求政府驱动的“工业化政策”,同时又间接否认中国采取这类政策。

        调查申请提及这些美国政策时都使用中式语言:奥巴马总统把汽车工业称作美国经济的“支柱行业”。美国商务部在研究中国中央规划时常常指出这是中国最喜欢使用的术语,这一术语显示计划和行动之间的关联、并指责受政府驱动的中国经济享受巨额补贴。

        很可能当两位国家领导人承诺合作发展电动汽车时,这一调查刚刚立案,他们都不了解调查申请细节。 根据世贸组织章程规定,反补贴案立案前必须展开双边磋商,美国贸易代表办公室也紧急会晤了三大汽车生产商。但是美国没有向中国出口电动汽车,调查的对象也仅仅是小轿车和越野车。因此两位领导人都未曾预料为发展电动汽车提供的研发支持竟成为反补贴调查的重点。

        这种情况下,奥巴马总统和胡锦涛主席就这一合作项目达成协议令人惊讶。当两国领导人宣布这一协定的同时,中国却指控美国的研发支持为不正当补助、对这一项目展开反补贴调查,这不符合逻辑。中国可能自有一套逻辑解释为什么几乎同时展开这两项行动。

调查的深层含义

        调查申请中提到中国仅次于美国,是世界第二大汽车消费市场。调查申请指出,在稍狭窄的轿车和越野车市场,2007年从美国共进口三万三千七百三十二辆,2008年进口了四万三千两百四十辆。同期,这两类车的总进口量从2007年的二十三万四千四百九十三辆上升至2008年二十九万九千一百三十二辆。因此三大汽车公司在美国生产、出口至中国的产品仅占这两类产品进口总量的百分之十五、不足这两类车总消费量的百分之零点五。

        调查申请未能系统地把进口和对国内生产、消费造成的损害联系起来。恰恰相反,调查申请虽然承认进口有所增长,却又指出中国国内生产、消费在受调查期间均稳步上升。调查申请中的补贴指控不是针对受调查产品,而是整个汽车行业,尤其是节约能耗和绿色科技项目。调查申请针对经济复兴计划的每个项目的每一方面逐一攻击,尤其是购买美货条款。补贴分析却未能缩小着眼点、集中于调查针对的产品,相反却泛泛攻击整个汽车行业。调查申请反复引用“特定”这一法律术语,但却把汽车工业视为特定产业,而不是将特定一词与受调查产品联系在一起。

        调查申请没有要求对上游产业补助展开调查,中国法规可能也没有规定如何展开调查,但是却对两项上游产业补助展开详尽展述。即使在美国,对上游产业补助展开调查也不多见,美国商务部极其厌恶调查上游产业补助。1996年美国商务部不同寻常地在加拿大复合木地板一案中对上游产业补助展开调查,但并未发现不正当补助。在这一案件中,上游产业补助调查针对加拿大的伐木收费——这大概是美加两国在过去25年里最备受争议的补助指控了。中国调查指控聚焦于钢铁和电动汽车部件。钢铁或许是美中两国最紧张的贸易领域,未来一、两年内将有更多针对这类产品的贸易案件。在这两个案件中——加拿大伐木收费和中国钢铁——调查的重要动机是对上游产品展开行动。对电动汽车部件的控诉可能是针锋相对、对美国在多个反补贴案件中对中国国有企业提供的原料展开调查所采取的行动。但是美国尚未部署上游产业补助分析。

        这份调查申请似乎并非针对小轿车和越野车。相反,它是针对电动汽车、科研投资的防范性攻击,对中国钢铁等产品展开调查的报复行动。这份调查申请似乎认定中美两国政府的经济行动之间并没有本质差别,虽然一个是市场经济国家,另一个是非市场经济国家。

        同时,这也是中方第一次针对不同级别的美国政府进行攻击(其中四项指控针对米歇根州政府),这大概是为还击美方反补贴调查申请对中国的省及地方政府计划和政策提出控诉。所以,不仅应关注这份调查申请传达的表面信息——它并非针对调查申请中提到的汽车产品,同时亦应挖掘视野之外的信息——为重新评估政府在经济活动中的作用提供论坛、为未来针对高能效和绿色科技采取行动准备。

可能引发的反响

        这一调查可能产生许多问题。美国从未在中国应对反补贴调查,中国也从未派调查员前往美国检验原始文件。美国各州从未面临中国的反补贴调查,也未曾参与任何调查。 美国汽车从未面临任何倾销或补贴指控。主持调查对中国而言是全新事务,应对调查对美国而言也是陌生领域。中国将需要深入了解美国联邦体制,采取全新外交政策。

        一些人士提到这一调查是对421轮胎特保案的报复。这一观点难以令人信服。这一调查申请涉及面甚广、全方面攻击美国经贸政策,因此不仅仅是针对中国入世协议框架下的特保案的报复。这一案件的时机十分引人注目,更是针对奥巴马总统第一次访华而不是轮胎特保案。中国旨在设立讨论议题:正面意义,中国希望美国承认中国的市场经济地位;负面意义,对美国钢铁和电动汽车产业的警告。

        媒体报道显示在奥巴马总统访华期间,中美并未讨论这一案件。美国可能故意选择避开这一话题;也许在准备总统访华时,这一案件并未提升至需要引起总统重视的程度。但是,中国可能把美国的沉默视为对这些指控的默认;而这些指控是中国自加入世贸组织以来对美国最严厉的指控。

        其他国家将会密切关注这一调查。在奥巴马总统亚洲之行的最后一站,南韩总统李明博允诺奥巴马总统他将重新考虑阻碍两国签订自由贸易协定的汽车纠纷,但他并未答应重新商定协定包含的汽车条款、实现美国国会的愿望。 当中国展示美国对汽车产业提供巨额补助时,韩国肯定也不愿意降低针对美国汽车设置的贸易障碍,这样中国进一步巩固了韩国在美韩自由贸易协定中的立场。

        竞争激烈的汽车产业在金融危机中获得巨额补助,尤其在欧洲,它们可能将面临中国盘问。就像调查申请暗示的那样,当本国产业逐渐成长时,中国可能开始清理汽车市场。

        中国可能预见美国将对电动汽车出口至美国设置障碍。但是中方现在采取的行动增强了贸易障碍产生的可能性。Tesla 生产豪华车,中国则希望向美国出口稍低档次的电动汽车。Tesla以及其他生产电动汽车的美国生产商看到现在自己尚未向中国出口电动汽车,但是中国电动汽车却首先抵达美国市场,因此他们很可能采取行动刁难中国电动汽车。中国的调查申请为盘问尚未投入市场的汽车提供了理论依据,包括攻击供货商。

        在针对中国产复合编织袋展开的反补贴调查中,美国国际贸易委员会既没有发现美国产业受损,也没有发现损害威胁。该委员会只发现中国复合编织袋将阻碍美国产业发展。中国未对这一初裁提出异议,最终导致不利终审裁决。

        中国的默认可能促使美方对中国电动汽车采取类似行动。美国申请调查的企业可能指控中国产品将摧毁初生的美国电动汽车工业。同时,这一调查申请一定会促发美方对中国电动汽车采取贸易行动,这将使中美共同发展高能效、环保技术的合作变得复杂。这一调查申请对美国发展清洁能源、高能效汽车持敌对态度。

        中国对美国汽车展开反补贴调查将比双边首脑会议更深刻地影响中美贸易关系。和布什总统一样,奥巴马总统此次没有听从国会意见就人民币汇率向中国施压,中国也没有攻击美国是此次世界金融危机的根源。但是,奥巴马总统还未返回华盛顿,国会小组已经要求对中国采取更严厉的贸易制裁,包括针对人民币采取行动。

        作为中国对美国采取反补贴调查的基础,这份公开文件审判了美国资本主义。双边磋商失败了,也没有进一步磋商。除非两国领导人遏制两国商务部长的冲动,轮胎特保案没有激发的贸易战变得不可避免。两国将在追求更清洁、更节能的地球的同时互相指责对方违背世界贸易法。如果不立即解决这一纠纷,中国将不得不做出反补贴裁决,美国当然将不悦。

(翻译:朱晶)

U.S. Court Decision Ought To Change Chinese Thinking (Revised and Expanded) 美国法庭裁决应将改变中国思维

中文请点击这里

This article is co-authored by Elliot J. Feldman and John J. Burke.

 Until now, China has preferred the WTO to resolve trade disputes. Of a dozen countervailing duty cases brought against Chinese products, all but one (the coated free sheet paper case failed at the International Trade Commission) went adversely before U.S. agencies and the Government of China challenged none of these final agency determinations in U.S. courts. Instead, China consolidated four of them and complained at the WTO.

We have indicated before our doubts about the wisdom of this choice (see our blog article titled WTO Challenges: Not Always A Panacea For Respondents In Trade Litigation). Now, there is new evidence. In GPX International Tire Corporation v. United States, a case brought before the United States Court of International Trade (“CIT”) by private parties (not the Government of China), Chief Judge Jane Restani found an important flaw in the procedures of the United States Department of Commerce that could return substantial sums of money to importers of Chinese goods and alter the way trade remedy actions are brought and analyzed against China. Although this victory for Chinese interests is less than suggested by its advocates and some in the trade press, it is significant nonetheless and comes at an important time. The Chinese Government has achieved nothing comparable in its efforts at the WTO.

Judge Restani’s decision does not preclude the Department of Commerce from initiating countervailing duty investigations against China or any other non-market economy. In fact, its impact is more likely to be seen in the conduct of antidumping cases against China. Judge Restani held that, when Commerce chooses to apply the countervailing duty law to China with respect to the same products for which it also is calculating antidumping duties, using the non-market economy methodology, Commerce must alter its antidumping calculations to avoid counting the same subsidy twice. She noted that Commerce would have to accomplish this task within the confines of the non-market economy provisions of the antidumping law. She remanded to Commerce to find some way to resolve this problem.

The easiest way for Commerce to resolve the double counting problem, as strongly hinted by Judge Restani, would be to resume its old practice of more than twenty years of not applying the countervailing duty laws to non-market economies. She noted that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the 1986 case, Georgetown Steel, held that Commerce was not required to apply the countervailing duty laws to non-market economies. Many legal commentators had interpreted the Georgetown Steel case as prohibiting the use of countervailing duty laws to non-market economies. Judge Restani acknowledged that interpretation, but held that Georgetown Steel was ambiguous and she herself found the statute ambiguous. Therefore, she deferred to Commerce’s interpretation as "not unreasonable."

Judge Restani implicitly urged Commerce to abandon its adventure in applying the countervailing duty law to non-market economies, but nonetheless gave Commerce the option of altering its antidumping methodologies to prevent double counting. Given all of the political capital the Commerce Department has now invested in applying the countervailing duty laws to China, we expect Commerce will work hard to find a way to resolve this issue through changes in its antidumping calculations, without returning to the conventional interpretation of Georgetown Steel.

Commerce could separate antidumping from countervailing duty cases. It could decline to initiate them together against the same product. The cost of filing may go up for petitioners, but they might be able to preserve the ability to claim both subsidies and dumping. They could, alternatively, not include alleged subsidies in the calculation of cost of production for dumping, and instead allege all subsidies together in the separate countervailing duty petition. There would be no double-counting, but alleged subsidies would not escape scrutiny.

Judge Restani does not exclude these possibilities. To the contrary, she expressly authorizes as “reasonable” petitions alleging subsidies in non-market economies. She denies overturning Georgetown Steel, but she certainly overturns the popular understanding of it for the last two decades.

Judge Restani also overturned Commerce’s automatic use of December 11, 2000, the date China joined the WTO, as the cut-off date for determining whether a subsidy could be calculated in China. Commerce had been countervailing alleged subsidies conferred after that date, but refusing to investigate any allegations of subsidies conferred before that date. Some of the Chinese companies argued that Commerce could not go back any earlier than the date in 1997 when it announced it would apply the CVD law to China. The U.S. producers argued that there should be no cut-off date. Judge Restani ruled that Commerce must decide how far back to go based on the facts of each subsidy allegation. The bottom line for the Chinese Government and Chinese companies is that they now have to be prepared to defend against subsidy allegations reaching back into the 1990s, a serious setback from core arguments advanced by some counsel for China in the CVD cases.

Judge Restani, Chief Judge of the CIT, has long been a rigorous, thoughtful judge willing to reject the arguments of the United States Government and prepared to interpret the law and international agreements as favoring free trade. However, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit historically has not been unwilling to overturn her. Occasionally, when she thinks a legal issue especially important and perhaps difficult, she assembles a three-judge panel of the court to hear a case. Three-judge panels have not been overturned in the last twenty years. Consequently, this decision is vulnerable to appeal.

Despite the celebration of a Chinese victory, assuming an unsuccessful appeal, there may be many ways around the rejection of double-counting, leaving China with less of a legal victory than it seems now to think. Nonetheless, although China lost the key legal principle at issue in the case – whether subsidy actions can be brought against non-market economies – it won a point that should mean the return of monies to importers of record in the United States and should complicate life for petitioners who were making the simultaneous filing of antidumping and countervailing duty petitions routine. As narrow as that victory may be, it is substantially more than anything gained to date at the WTO, and more than anything likely to be possible at the WTO as to Chinese exposure to CVD petitions.  It ought  to convey several lessons one of which is that U.S. courts are not necessarily inhospitable to Chinese appeals.  Another ought  to be, like the Chinese proverb, that the road is long, and requires many steps.  This appeal should be the first, not the last, on a journey to justify the practices of the Chinese economy.
 

本文由 Elliot J. Feldman 和 John J. Burke 合著。

        迄今为止,中国仍偏爱通过世贸组织解决贸易争端。在十二个针对中国产品展开的反补贴案中,中方只在一个案件中赢得调查胜利(美国国际贸易委员会否决了铜版纸一案),但是中国政府放弃了在美国法庭上诉这些终审裁决的机会。相反,中国把四个案件整合在一起,向世贸组织递交了申诉

        在先前的文章中,我们已经对这种做法表示怀疑(见博文《世贸组织争端解决机制 ----不是贸易纠纷应诉方的万能药》)。现在,又有新证据证明我们的论点。在美国国际贸易法庭受理的GPX International Tire Corporation v. United States 一案中,中国企业(而非中国政府)提出上诉,首席法官Jane Restani裁定美国商务部在调查过程有重大疏漏,这一裁定可帮助进口商拿回多缴的惩罚性关税,同时将改变针对中国的贸易补偿行动。虽然中方这一胜利的意义略小于媒体以及中方律师强调的意义,但仍然是关键时刻取得的显著胜利。中国政府至今尚未在世贸组织取得可以和这一案件相媲美的成就。

        Restani法官的裁决并未禁止美国商务部针对中国及其他非市场经济体展开反补贴调查。事实上,这一案件的意义将主要表现在针对中国产品展开的反倾销调查中。Restani法官裁定:如果美国商务部决定针对面临反倾销调查、且美国商务部在计算反倾销税率时使用非市场经济体计算方法的中国产品展开反补贴调查时,美国商务部必须改变计算反倾销税率的方法以避免在反补贴调查中双重征税。她指出美国商务部应在反补贴法非市场经济体条款管辖范围内完成这一任务。她要求美国商务部找到解决这一问题的途径。

        对于美国商务而言,就如Restani法官建议,解决双重征税最简单的方法是重新采用二十多年来沿用的老方法:不向非市场经济体展开反补贴调查。她指出联邦法院上诉庭在1986年乔治城钢铁案中裁定美国商务部无需针对非市场经济体使用反补贴税。许多法律评论家将乔治城钢铁案解释为禁止向非市场经济体使用反补贴法。Restani法官提到这一解释,但是她认为乔治城钢铁案裁决在这一点上模棱两可,她自己也认为这一法律条文模棱两可。因此,她并不认为美国商务部的诠释“毫无依据”。

        Restani法官并未明确要求美国商务部放弃向非市场经济体采用反补贴法,而是给予美国商务部修改反倾销税率计算方法的选择以避免双重征税。目前美国商务部在针对中国展开的反补贴调查领域投入巨大政治资本,我们预计商务部会极具创意地、非常辛苦地寻找途径修改反倾销税率计算方法、以此解决这一法律挑战,而不必重新回到对乔治城钢铁案的传统解释

        美国商务部也可以将反倾销调查和反补贴调查分开处理。它可放弃针对同一产品同时展开反补贴和反倾销调查。这可能增加申诉方的费用,但同时申诉方也可以保留申请展开反补贴、反倾销调查的权利。或者,他们可选择将受指控的补贴排除在反倾销调查中的成本计算之外。这样,重复计算不存在,但是受指控的补贴项目仍将面临调查。

        Restani法官并没有排除这些可能性。恰恰相反,她明确允许“合理的”针对非市场经济国家的反补贴申诉书。她拒绝否决乔治城钢铁案,但是她否定了过去二十年里对这一案件最流行的理解。 

         Restani法官同时否决了美国商务部使用2000年12月11日——中国加入世贸组织这一天作为计算反补贴税率的起始日期。美国商务部对这一日期之后的补贴都展开调查并征收反补贴税率,但是拒绝调查这一日期前给予的补贴。一些中国企业提出美国商务部在1997年宣布将对中国使用反补贴法,因此此前的反补贴项目不必担心面临反补贴调查。但是美国生产商认为应该没有最早截止日期。Restani法官裁定美国商务部应根据每一反补贴指控的实际情况决定最早截止日期。这说明中国政府和中国企业现在应开始准备应对针对1990年代补贴项目的指控。对于代表中国参与反补贴应诉的律师来说,这是关于核心争端的严重倒退。

        作为美国国际贸易法庭的首席法官,Restani法官一直以来是一位严厉、思想深刻、愿意拒绝美国政府论点、准备从倾向自由贸易的角度诠释法律、国际协定的法官。但是从历史纪录来看,联邦上诉庭也曾驳回她的裁决。偶尔,当她认为一法律问题尤其重要、可能还颇有难度,她就与其他两位法官一起审理案件。三位法官的联合裁决在过去二十年里从未被驳回。所以,Restani法官的这一裁决可能面临上诉、且比较脆弱。

        在庆祝中国取得胜利之余,否决双重征税也带来其他许多问题使得中国取得的法律胜利显得并不辉煌。有关本案最关键的法律原则——是否可对非市场经济体展开反补贴调查,中国几乎全盘皆输,只有涉案美国进口商可拿回部分惩罚性关税,让同时递交反补贴、反倾销申诉的美国申诉方面临更多难题。虽然胜利并不显赫,但是这比在世贸组织取得的任何胜利都更具实际意义,而且比未来可能取的胜利更辉煌。 这一案件带来许多启示,其中之一就是美国法庭并非对中国上诉不友善。另一经验是,用中国典故; 路漫漫其修远兮,需要分步走。这一上诉是证明中国经济运作合理性的第一步,而不是最后一步。
 

(翻译:朱晶)

The United States Is Vigilant When It Comes To China's WTO Compliance, Less So When It Comes To Its Own 美国对中国如何履行入世承诺总是异常警觉,那么她自己呢?

中文请点击这里

The United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) published a notice in the Federal Register on September 1, 2009 requesting comments and announcing a public hearing on China’s compliance with its WTO commitments. This notice is part of an institutional mechanism the United States created to monitor and enforce other countries’ compliance with their WTO obligations. That mechanism is deployed with particular vigilance when it comes to China.

USTR is requesting these particular comments and holding a public hearing because Section 421 of the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 requires USTR to submit annually a report to Congress on China’s compliance with commitments made in connection with its accession to the WTO. Thus, the Obama Administration is following the law as written by Congress, where there is continuous skepticism about China’s fidelity to international trade rules.

The United States is not nearly so vigilant, unfortunately, when it comes to its own WTO obligations. The most glaring example of this double standard is the United States Commerce Department’s continuing refusal to give up its “zeroing” practice, notwithstanding more than seven WTO Appellate Body decisions over the last five years finding the practice inconsistent with WTO obligations. “Zeroing” is a technique used in antidumping cases that increases the likelihood of finding dumping, and inflates the “margins” – the amount of duties to be charged on imports – once dumping has been found. In the most recent WTO decision, United States – Measures Relating To Zeroing And Sunset Reviews - Recourse To Article 21.5 Of The DSU By Japan, issued August 18, 2009, the WTO Appellate Body found that the United States had failed to comply with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruling, dated January 23, 2007, that the U.S. practice of zeroing in administrative reviews is contrary to the WTO Antidumping Agreement. The WTO Appellate Body has ruled, repeatedly, that zeroing is not permissible, whether for original investigations or for administrative reviews.

In the Japanese case, the United States Commerce Department made new determinations for the specific administrative reviews without zeroing, but subsequently assessed antidumping duties on certain of the affected customs entries at the rates found in the original determinations using zeroing. It also refused to implement the results going forward, claiming that the reviews at issue had been superseded by subsequent administrative reviews in which the Commerce Department again used zeroing. The Appellate Body found that, because of these actions, the United States had failed to implement the 2007 ruling and remains in continuing violation of its obligations under the WTO Antidumping Agreement.

In our view, China should comply faithfully with its WTO obligations and the scrutiny of its actions required by U.S. law should give it no problems. However, China, and other WTO members, should hold the United States to the same high standard the United States expects of China and all other countries. It is important for the rule of law to apply to everyone equally.

 

            美国贸易代表办公室9月1日在Federal Register上刊登通知,征求各方对中国履行入世承诺的意见,并通知将举行公开听证会。这一通知是美国监督、督促他国履行入世承诺制度的一部分。当涉及中国时,这一制度异常敏感。

        美国贸易代表办公室征求意见并举行公开听证会是因为《2000年中美关系法》第421款要求贸易代表办公室每年向国会递交一份报告,陈述中国是否及如何履行在加入世贸组织时做出的承诺。奥巴马政府只是遵循对中国是否忠于国际贸易规则依然持怀疑态度的国会制定的法律而已。

         但令人遗憾的是,当轮到自己履行世贸组织承诺时,美国却变得不那么警觉。证明这一双重标准最典型的例子是虽然世贸组织上诉机构在过去五年里七次裁定美国商务部“零和法”违背世贸组织章程,但是美国商务部一直拒绝放弃这一计算方法。“归零法”是在反倾销案中使用的、增强发现反倾销存在可能性、并提高反倾销税率的技巧。在最新的世贸组织裁决中——8月18日发布的美日——归零法及日落复审——世贸组织争端第21.5条裁决中,世贸组织上诉机构裁定美国没有执行世贸组织争端解决机构2007年1月23日的裁决。世贸组织在2007年裁定美国在行政审查中使用归零法这一做法违背了世贸组织反补贴协定。世贸组织上诉机构多次裁定无论是在调查还是在年审中,都不允许使用归零法。

         在与日本的纠纷中,美国商务部取消使用归零法、发布了新的行政年审结果,但是在向某些受影响的海关进口征收反倾销税时依旧依据原先发布的调查结果。同时,美国商务部拒绝继续使用新发布的行政年审结果,声称这些调查已经被新展开的行政年审取代,而在这些新展开的年审中美国商务部继续使用归零法。世贸组织上诉机构认定,因为这些举动,美国没有执行2007年裁决、依旧违背世贸组织反倾销协定。

         在我们看来,中国应当诚实履行入世承诺,美国政府依照美国法律对中国的监督也就不成问题。但是,中国以及其他世贸组织成员应当和美国一样高标准、严要求地监督他们那样监督美国。法治面前人人平等非常重要。 

 (翻译:朱晶)

Commerce Vacancies Leave Trade Policy Decisions Without Political Oversight 美商务部高管空缺 贸易政策缺乏决策层监管

中文请点击这里

Despite what people might think, and notwithstanding an election eight months ago that turned out the Republican Party from both Congress and the White House, the Bush Administration still effectively is governing U.S. trade policy toward China, at least with respect to countervailing duty and antidumping cases. The key offices that make policy decisions on these cases are occupied by temporary placeholders without the political authority or policy knowledge to alter policies left over from President Bush; the Obama replacements either have not been named or have not been confirmed by the Senate to take over. Consequently, the Commerce Department continues to make critical decisions on issues important to China in several antidumping and countervailing duty cases without political guidance from the new Obama Administration.

The Obama Administration, after six months in office, has yet to fill most of the political appointee level positions in the Commerce Department. Instead, lower level career bureaucrats are filling in as “Acting” senior officials on a temporary basis. Obama Administration appointees are particularly absent in the International Trade Administration (“ITA”), which is responsible for enforcing the antidumping and countervailing duty laws and for developing and implementing other policies to counter alleged unfair trading practices. ITA is operating without Obama appointees for the Under Secretary for International Trade; Assistant Secretary for Import Administration; Deputy Assistant Secretary for Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Operations; Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and Negotiations; and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Textiles and Apparel. 

Until these positions are filled with permanent political appointees, companies involved in antidumping or countervailing duty proceedings should expect continued paralysis in Commerce’s ability to make policy decisions. Companies should expect the “Acting” officials to avoid policy decisions and therefore to delay cases and decisions as much as possible.

Decisions that must be made due to statutory deadlines are likely to result in a de facto continuation of Bush Administration policy choices. Foreign observers may think this situation to be a positive development based on the perceived notion, reinforced by the recent U.S. presidential campaign, that Democrats are more protectionist than Republicans. However, when it has come to case-by-case enforcement of trade remedies, the Bush Administration Commerce Department was more protectionist than any recent Democratic administration and, effectively remaining now in power, can be expected to continue this way.

It was the Bush Administration that first imposed countervailing duties on China in the Coated Free Sheet Paper case, while still treating it as a non-market economy for antidumping purposes. The Obama Administration is unlikely to reverse that decision, but there is a reasonable chance that it would make changes on the margins to blunt the Bush policy’s overtly protectionist impact.

There is little doubt that President Obama and new Commerce Secretary Gary Locke, are more committed to the rule of law than their predecessors, and consequently are more likely to respect legal interpretations that reasonably cannot be particularly protectionist. For example, Obama may decide to make modifications to the non-market economy dumping methodology to avoid the double counting problem in which the use of third country surrogate values results in dumping duties that already offset the impact of any subsidies to production. He may also decide to comply with the legal requirement that Commerce use in-country benchmarks to measure subsidies in countervailing duty cases.

There have been several antidumping and countervailing cases initiated in recent months. Should those cases reach critical decision stages before the Obama political appointees are fully in place, it will become more difficult for Obama and his appointees to ameliorate the worst protectionist impacts of the Bush Administration polices. It may become strategically wise for Chinese respondents to seek extensions and delays in cases so as to increase the possibility that key policy decisions ultimately will be taken by the new Administration.

Commerce also is now faced with the decision of whether to apply the countervailing duty law to Vietnam in the Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags case, while still treating it as a non-market economy. There are important differences between Vietnam and China that could lead the Obama Administration to treat it differently than China. However, with the absence of political appointees who could make such a policy decision, it is likely that Commerce would assume, without thorough analysis, that Vietnam and China should be treated in the same way.

Commerce Secretary Gary Locke has a strong export-oriented trade background with a particular emphasis on promoting trade with China. His appointment as Commerce Secretary is a hopeful sign that, once President Obama has a full team of his own appointees, the Commerce Department would be more likely to resist protectionist pressures to disregard the rule of law. And it may be more likely to take into account a broader range of trade considerations, such as the impact on U.S. exports should trade partners copy U.S. protectionist measures, when making policy decisions in trade remedies cases. There probably has never been a Commerce Secretary with greater potential for productive commercial relations between China and the United States 

 

          不管人们如何认为,尽管美国总统大选和国会选举早在八个月前就已经宣告共和党大败,但是布什政府仍掌控美国对华贸易政策,至少在反补贴、反倾销(“双反”)领域。目前,美国商务部负责制定双反案件政策的部门仍由商务部工作人员暂时主管,他们既没有政治背景、也没有决策知识以改变布什政府遗留下来的政策。奥巴马政府或是尚未提名、或是被提名的候选人正等待参议院审核。因此,美国商务部在缺乏奥巴马政府政治指引的情况下,对几起针对中国产品的双反案件作出重要裁决。

            距离奥巴马就职已经整整六个月了,但奥巴马政府还有待填补商务部所有政治任命级的空缺。因此,级别更低的职业政府官员目前暂时填补空缺、“代理”商务部高层职位。在负责实施反倾销、反补贴法,制订及执行应对其他不正当竞争政策的International Trade Administration (“ITA”),这一现象更为明显。目前ITA空缺的职位包括:负责该机构的副部长、负责Import Administration 的助理部长,负责反补贴、反倾销调查的执行助理部长,政策及国际谈判部的执行助理部长一职,以及负责纺织服装的执行助理部长。

 

            只有当政治任命官员正式填补空缺后,反倾销、反补贴案涉案企业才会看到美国商务部告别瘫痪状态、制定政策性决定。那些“代理”官员一般都会回避政策性决定、推迟案件裁决。

 

            若因法规中最后截止日期的限制而不得不宣布裁决的案件,裁决大都延续布什政府的政策。国外观察家可能认为这种情况是正面讯息,因为人们大都认为民主党人比共和党人更倾向于贸易保护,最近的总统大选更加深了这一印象。但是就贸易救济案件个案而言,布什政府任期内的美国商务部比近代任何一届民主党政府都更倾向贸易保护主义。仍继续掌权的美国商务部官员仍将延续布什政府的这一政策。

 

            虽然中国仍被视为非市场经济国家,布什政府在铜版纸案一案中率先向中国征收反倾销税。奥巴马政府不太可能扭转这一决定,但是完全有理由相信新政府将改变惩罚性关税税率从而减轻布什过激的贸易保护政策带来的影响。

 

            毫无疑问,奥巴马总统以及新就任的商务部部长骆家辉比他们的前任更相信法治,因此有理由相信他们将更尊重那些不倾向于贸易保护的法律解释。举例而言,奥巴马政府可能会修改非市场经济体反倾销税率的计算方法以避免双重征税的问题,因为选用第三比较国数据计算反倾销税率的方法其实已经抵消生产过程中补助带来的利益。此外,奥巴马可能决定在反补贴案件中,美国商务部必须依照法律规定使用被调查国国内的指标计算税率。

 

            最近几个月,美国又针对中国产品展开数项双反调查。如果这些案件进入最后关键时期,而奥巴马任命的政治官员尚未全部就职,这将使得奥巴马总统及其任命的官员很难改善布什政府保护主义政策带来的最恶劣的危害。因此,受调查的中国企业应从战略着眼,要求延期裁决,增加让新政府就自己的案件制定政策性决定的可能性。

 

            目前,美国商务部面临需要在零售用塑料袋案中做出是否对越南实施反补贴法的决策,虽然越南仍被视为非市场经济体。越南和中国的国情有许多显著不同之处,因此奥巴马政府可能区别对待两国。但是如果缺少政治任命官员做出这些政策性决定,在尚未深入分析的情况下,美国商务部很可能同等对待两国。

 

            美国商务部部长骆家辉长期以来支持出口,尤其重视促进对华贸易。他就任商务部部长是一个积极的信号,当奥巴马总统任命的官员全部就任以后,美国商务部更有可能抵制保护主义置法治于不顾的压力。同时,美国商务部就贸易救济案件制定政策性决定时也将更全面地考虑贸易,如如果美国的贸易伙伴模仿美国贸易保护政策将对美国出口带来什么影响。没有哪位商务部部长比骆家辉更具有促进中美商务关系发展的潜力了。