Feldman, Burke Examine GPX Case and NME Subsidies

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The China-U.S. Trade Law Blog has not posted a new article in a while, but mostly because Elliot Feldman and John Burke have been working on a major article - Testing The Limits Of Trade Law Rationality: The GPX Case and Subsidies in Non-Market Economies for the American University Law Review.  It will be published this week and we are pleased to provide a link here.

Introduction

Chinese merchandise has been the subject of most international trade disputes, all over the world, for several years. All of China’s principal trading partners, including the United States, Japan, and the European Union, treat China as a non-market economy (NME), applying special methodologies for determining whether Chinese enterprises are exporting merchandise at less than fair value. However, until 2006 the recognition of China as an NME meant that unfair trade allegations were based on pricing theories for antidumping, never government programs or actions unfairly subsidizing exported merchandise. The general rule was that government subsidies are countervailable only when they distort markets, and NMEs have no markets to distort.

The United States began launching simultaneous antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) investigations of Chinese merchandise after the November 2006 congressional elections. This change in practice inevitably triggered legal disputes that collectivized under the banner of GPX, an American importer of off the- road tires (OTR Tires) from China. The U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) were asked to decide whether CVD investigations into merchandise from NMEs were in accordance with law and, if they were, whether they could be conducted simultaneously with antidumping investigations. The United States Congress, unhappy with the decisions of the appellate court, swiftly rewrote the law. The constitutionality of the revised statute then was challenged in the same courts.

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Hong Kong Seeks to Strengthen Trade, Investment Ties with U.S. 香港加强对美贸易投资关系

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The largest-ever Hong Kong promotion in the United States will be held this summer to showcase Hong Kong's advantages for American companies looking to tap new business opportunities in Asia, particularly on the Chinese mainland.

"Think Asia, Think Hong Kong," will feature two major symposia in New York and Los Angeles on June 11 and 14 respectively. Speakers include The Honourable C Y Leung, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and over 60 prominent senior executives from global companies will participate. The event is organized by the Hong Kong Trade Development Council, (HKTDC) with support from 14 Hong Kong partners and nearly 100 U.S. supporting organizations.

USA-Hong Kong Ties

"As the global economic balance continues to shift to Asia, Hong Kong is the ideal business platform from which to access the myriad regional business opportunities now available in the growing ASEAN area and Chinese mainland," said HKTDC Chairman Jack So. "Our low taxes, free economy, rule of law, English-speaking environment and world-class business services make us the preferred partner for any overseas businesses wishing to tap these growing possibilities."

There are approximately 1,400 U.S. firms in Hong Kong, concentrated in trading, banking and finance, and transport. As of October 2012, there were 333 regional headquarters and 536 regional offices of US companies in Hong Kong, ranking first among other regions.

U.S. exports to Hong Kong in 2012 grew by 41 percent from 2010 to over $37 billion. Over the past decade (2003-2012), U.S. exports to Hong Kong have surged by 177%. In response to the U.S.'s National Export Initiative, HKTDC launched the Pacific Bridge Initiative (PBI) to further encourage American companies to use the Hong Kong platform. Since its implementation, the number of "new-to-market export successes" increased by 124 percent year-over-year in 2011, while the dollar value of export successes was up by 161.4 percent.

Symposia Will Highlight Advice and Opportunities for Entering Asian Markets

The sessions will feature information on why U.S. companies should consider using Hong Kong's business advantages. These sessions also will consider how mainland enterprises have been expanding their international presence through Hong Kong, and what they are looking for when seeking global partners. In addition, there will be approximately 10 industry sessions to provide practical tips on selling consumer brands to China and throughout Asia, explore technology partnership opportunities, discuss finance-related topics, and learn about the latest trends of Chinese outbound investment and collaborations on film and digital entertainment.

Extended Networking Opportunities

More than 100 Hong Kong government officials and business leaders from a wide spectrum of sectors including lifestyle products, fashion, food and wine, technology, finance, accounting, legal, logistics and marketing will take part in the June program, and participate in business matching with U.S. companies onsite. The TATHK campaign is expected to attract more than 2,000 American corporate leaders, government representatives, heads of SME's and opinion leaders with a special interest in Asia.

 

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Feldman Says Trade Law Impedes Renewable Energy Development

        Elliot Feldman delivered the Distinguished Alumni Lecture at the University of Chicago’s Center in Paris on February 5, 2013.  He explained how international trade law is impeding the development of renewable energy such as solar, wind, and electric cars, focusing on relations between China and the United States. 

         费德门博士于2013年2月5日在巴黎举办的芝加哥大学杰出校友论坛上发表演讲,详细分析国际贸易法如何影响中美关系以及可再生能源发展,例如太阳能、风能以及电动汽车等。

Feldman Lecture on U.S. Elections and China-U.S. Relations

After the November elections, Elliot Feldman lectured on their implications for China-U.S. relations at the University of Chicago Center in Beijing. The link to the lecture is here. It features video of the remarks by candidates Obama and Romney on China during the presidential debates.

总统大选结束后,费德门博士在芝加哥大学北京中心发表演讲,分析大选如何影响中美关系发展。他的讲座深入浅出、赢得听众阵阵掌声,他为讲座精心准备的短片也异常精彩。

So What's The Big Idea?

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The discovery and development of economically efficient means to extract shale oil and gas, “fracking,” is undermining efforts to reduce the use of hydrocarbons because alternative energy production, especially through solar cells and wind turbines, is more expensive than natural gas for producing electricity, particularly in North America. Many governments, demonstrating a priority for clean energy production, have been subsidizing solar and wind power to produce electricity (and batteries to power automobiles), but their own international trade laws confound their efforts: they cannot export the subsidized clean technology without encountering countervailing duty complaints.

This problem is particularly acute among China, the United States, and the European Union. The United States and the European Union’s trade laws are blocking the export of Chinese-made solar cells and wind towers; China’s trade laws have been gearing up to block American battery-powered cars and have applied “Buy China” rules excluding foreign imports, especially of higher technology solar cells and wind turbines. We previously described some of these issues on this blog in our article The Sun Does Not Shine on Trade Policy: Hypocrisy in Technological Green. There is a critical and accelerating need to reconcile unavoidable subsidies for alternative energy (enabling it to catch up to a century or more of subsidies for “conventional” energy) with fair trade, and to dismantle other protectionism.

Our “big idea” is a proposal to move forward alternative energy through a Chinese initiative. The reasoning, in summary, is:

1. Climate change is a critical issue;
2. Climate change is caused, at least in significant part, by human dependence on and burning of hydrocarbons;
3. Dependence on hydrocarbons cannot be arrested without alternatives;
4. The United States and China are the world’s leading consumers of hydrocarbons;
5. The world often looks to the United States for global leadership, but on this subject the President of the United States is stymied by domestic politics, competing priorities, and a growing perception that the matter is not urgent because of a bonanza in shale oil and gas that will make the United States the world’s leading producer of oil and gas by 2017;
6. China’s new leaders, at the National Party Congress, already have claimed a clean environment to be a top priority; they also called for raising living standards for all Chinese, maintaining economic growth, encouraging innovation and expanding imports, all objectives that would be served by this proposal;
7. The development and deployment of green technologies, such as solar and wind, can enable reductions in dependence and use of hydrocarbons;
8. Trade laws impede the development and deployment of green technologies by challenging subsidies when products are exported;
9. China is in an ideal position to assume leadership: it is the exporting power most impacted negatively by the application of the trade laws; it has the greatest potential for deploying green technologies; most dependent on coal, it has the greatest need to find and deploy alternatives to hydrocarbons; it has the clearest commitment of its political leaders;
10. There are two specific ways in which China can assert leadership now:
a. Commit to a specific number of gigawatts to be produced in China by solar and wind by 2020 that that would equal 50 percent of projected Chinese electricity consumption;
b. Use this commitment as a challenge to other countries to convene a global conference on climate change in Beijing in May 2014.
11. Challenge and commitment are good for China: China would export less and consume more at home of rapidly developing and improving solar and wind technology, thereby saving jobs that might have been lost in trade wars impeding Chinese exports, while cleaning up China’s air and environment;
12. Challenge and commitment are good for the United States: President Obama has championed efforts to arrest climate change; he would be helped by an irresistible challenge from China defined as a commitment to reduce Chinese exports, increase domestic consumption, and clean up the environment, all in one bold policy;
13. The global conference should lead to an international agreement that subsidies for the development of green technologies would be excluded from trade remedy actions so that the public policies developing these technologies would not be victims of traditional international trade disciplines. The Marrakesh Round established precedent for such an agreement, making subsidies for the adaptation of existing facilities to meet new environmental standards non-actionable subsidies under Article 8.2 of the WTO’s Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement.


Explaining The Big Idea

Climate Change, International Trade, And Policy Priorities

The United States

The 2012 American elections concluded in the midst of “Superstorm Sandy,” a hurricane that collided with a second storm to yield one of the lowest readings of barometric pressure on record. Although climate change probably did not cause the storm, it arguably did contribute to its intensity and to its devastation. Politicians had avoided the subject of climate change throughout the autumn electoral campaign, but Sandy reminded them that the subject could not forever be avoided.

There is no apparent constituency to address climate change in the Republican Party, but President Barack Obama’s persistent commitment to science and research has energized some of his supporters who are persuaded that climate change may be the single most important issue of the day. Many Democrats want the President to take environmentally protective actions that will arrest the damaging effects of climate change.

President Obama was quick to say after his re-election, and after Sandy had passed, that climate change is not one of his immediate policy priorities. He has promised to address the economy and the “fiscal cliff,” and then to deliver immigration reform, especially to those groups who were instrumental in his electoral victory. He left Washington for Asia within two weeks of his re-election to reinforce his convictions about a “pivot” in American foreign policy, and could not avoid a new military crisis in the Middle East. Climate change appears to be slipping quickly off his agenda.

China

Within days of President Obama’s re-election, the Chinese Communist Party was naming new leadership for the first time in a decade. The new leaders, in turn, like Obama, focused primarily on domestic matters. However, they were also keen to assert China’s expanding role as an emerging world power, and they acknowledged that a clean environment is important to their goal of a better life for all Chinese.

The new Chinese leadership emphasized an openness to new ideas and called for more domestic consumption; more imports; and a commitment to raise living standards. All these goals would be served by a commitment to a radical expansion of alternative energy use and an assertion of global leadership on climate change.

Climate Change And Trade

Trade with China, by contrast with climate change, remains a priority for President Obama and was the subject of his final remarks as he departed Asia for the United States just before Thanksgiving. Yet, the President does not seem to have connected climate change with international trade, even as American trade actions against Chinese products may be impacting climate change profoundly.

President Obama has championed the development of alternative energy sources, specifically solar, wind, and electric cars. During a visit to China in 2009, he and President Hu Jintao entered mutual commitments to promote the development of all three. Yet, since then, all three have been the subjects of dispute and trade protectionism from both sides.

The United States and China urgently need to address together the contradictions in promoting green technologies while invoking trade restrictions. Customarily this blog offers observations and analyses of trade matters arising between China and the United States. This article, by contrast, proposes specific actions to resolve the contradictions.

The Trade Law Impedes Going Green

We have written before that the trade law impedes the development of green technologies. Presidents Obama and Hu agreed to develop wind and solar power and electric cars. Both poured subsidies into their respective industries. However, China had the temerity to out produce the United States and to export product. U.S. industries, very subsidized themselves, employed the trade law to halt Chinese exports, and China retaliated in kind.

The U.S. petition against Chinese solar cells has succeeded, although many believe that petitioners seriously erred in defining scope, resulting in a substantial loophole that will enable Chinese producers, well within the law, to circumvent the antidumping and countervailing duty orders. Chinese solar cells, therefore, may continue to enter the U.S. market in large volumes, despite the orders. Had petitioners been more careful and effective, the analytical results in the Department of Commerce and at the International Trade Commission likely would have achieved their objectives.

China is exporting around 90 percent of the solar cells it is producing. The wave of imports has created thousands of jobs in the United States because there are many more jobs to be had in installation and maintenance than in fabrication. Nonetheless, there are two obvious problems with this situation: China continues to build coal-fired plants to produce electricity instead of expanding substantially its use of solar energy; the United States falls behind in needed research and development in solar energy because its production is sharply curtailed and its R&D capabilities starved for capital by underpriced, unfairly competing Chinese cells.

China’s retaliation was on automobiles. China complained about subsidies to electric cars, even though no electric cars were being exported to China and they were not the subject merchandise. The findings against a class of American saloon cars, consequently, could not be interpreted reasonably as anything but retaliation for American actions against China’s subsidies for green technologies.
 

The U.S. petition against wind towers from China will be decided by the International Trade Commission in January. The U.S. wind power industry has survived, making it competitive with conventional energy, only because of a Production Tax Credit, yet the tower industry petitioned against Chinese subsidies. But for the Chinese towers, the development of wind power on the coasts and islands (east and west, Puerto Rico and Hawaii) would not have been possible, and if the U.S. tower industry were to prevail in their complaint, it would jeopardize the future of the U.S. wind turbine industry, which in terms of jobs and advanced manufacture is far more valuable to the American economy. One domestic industry injuring another and more valuable domestic industry, all for the purpose of excluding Chinese products.

American and other international producers are not without their reasonable complaints regarding Chinese protectionism in the development of wind power. China has applied “Buy China” rules effectively keeping out foreign wind power components, while pirating foreign technology. The United States has brought this matter to the WTO.

There is no ultimate solution within the trade law for these problems. The law enables self-defined industries to petition and, when they satisfy a checklist, to pursue measures that would exclude foreign products. The non-market economy methodology employed by the U.S. Department of Commerce against Chinese goods almost guarantees findings of dumping and subsidies. Chinese often imagine that the President could mitigate or moderate these actions, he is powerless to do so. Unlike in China and many other countries, there is no public interest provision in U.S. law. When the Department of Commerce finds dumping or subsidies and the International Trade Commission finds an American industry injured by reason of unfairly traded imports (any petitioning industry), the Department of Commerce must issue a tariff order and Customs and Border Protection must enforce and collect it. There is no role for the President.

Conventional energy has been subsidized in every imaginable way for more than a century. Oil, gas, and coal have benefited from everything including depletion allowances, direct subsidies, special tax provisions, and free land leases. New technologies such as solar and wind cannot compete with them and keep energy costs down for consumers without being subsidized themselves. Dependence only on domestic markets is financially hazardous, but exports are exposed instantly to subsidy complaints. Hence, without subsidies these industries will not develop and compete; without exporting they will not compete successfully; when subsidized and exporting, they will be subject to crippling trade remedy actions.
 

Solving The Problem

The development of green technologies means, as President Obama frequently has claimed, creating new and many jobs. The obverse also is true: shutting down production in these industries costs jobs.
These technologies will not develop without government subsidies because the century of subsidies conferred on their energy competitors leaves them too far behind to compete without help. Yet, the trade law then intervenes to threaten their very survival.

China does not want to reduce solar cell production because its products may now be excluded from the United States and probably, soon, the European Union. It would cost China many thousands of jobs. But China could continue to produce solar cells without worry if it were consuming more of them at home.

Many in China say the difficulty is in connecting solar to the country’s electricity grid. This technical excuse is not credible. China has taken immense pride in conquering virtually all technical obstacles – building roads, high speed rail, new airports -- yet claims it has to export solar energy components, reducing the pace of development at home, for a technical reason. China surely can solve this technical problem and reverse ratios: consuming 90 percent of solar cell production at home, and exporting 10 percent.

Were China to reverse the solar ratio and deploy solar modules throughout the country, it would produce many gigawatts more of electricity from clean, green sources. It would save jobs threatened by trade actions in the United States and Europe. It would cast a glow of leadership throughout the world.

A Proposal For Addressing Climate Change

China has new leaders. There has been much skepticism about what these leaders may do. They are mostly unknown. But they enunciated in the closing days of the National Party Congress commitments to prosperity, peace, a clean environment, and world leadership.

The convergence of climate change (accepted by most scientists as accelerating due, in major part, to the burning of hydrocarbons) and trade law (impeding and retarding the development of clean, green technologies) requires bold leadership. Although President Obama apparently would like to lead, he acknowledges that American politics prevents him from moving forward while other priorities capture his attention. China and the United States are the world’s leading polluters. Improvement in this area will come about only through their leadership.

The new Chinese leaders should call immediately for a global conference on climate change, to be convened in Beijing in May 2014. Eighteen months from the time they ascended to power ought to be sufficient to organize such a conference, and it would guarantee six months of remaining flexibility for President Obama before his mid-term elections.

There is no compelling reason why the world should rally to a conference called by China on climate change. China has shown no leadership to date, exploiting the development of green technologies for export, pirating foreign innovation, without demonstrating significant commitment at home. China, therefore, must base its call for a conference on a promise – that by 2020 half the electricity it generates for domestic consumption will be generated by wind and solar power.

This promise would yield for China many dividends: solar cell and wind tower production would continue apace through domestic consumption, thus preserving the manufacturing jobs jeopardized by international trade remedy actions; the world would recognize that alternative energy sources can significantly fuel an economy and society; China would reduce substantially its own pollution, thereby fulfilling the promise of new leaders to clean up the environment.

The combination of a call for the world to convene on climate change and the Chinese guarantee of a major conversion to clean technologies for energy ought to be irresistible to world leaders. President Obama should rally to it as a conscientious Chinese contribution to a better world, acting upon the agenda the President feels paralyzed from pursuit at home himself. India could not be idle if China and the United States agreed to meet, and the rest of the world could be expected to follow.

The Proposal’s Objective

The 2014 Global Conference on Climate Change in Beijing should have as its primary objective a treaty that would sideline application of the trade law as to the development and deployment of green technologies. China would have demonstrated a powerful preference for the domestic consumption of such technologies, but should not then be held back from exploiting its achievement through export, especially as the exported product should help arrest climate change. The United States would not face a threat of retaliation or trade action were it to begin exporting electric cars or wind turbines to China, each country thus experiencing the comparative advantage it derives from superiority in different technologies. Like the exclusion in the Marrakesh Round for adapting facilities to new environmental standards, the treaty would bar countries from impeding trade that helps clean up the environment and arrests climate change. The general public good would trump the narrow interests promoted by trade protectionism.
 

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The U.S. Election and China-U.S. Relations

          Dr. Elliot J. Feldman last week led discussions on the U.S. presidential election’s impact on China-U.S. relations at the University of Chicago Center in Beijing, the Beijing Arbitration Commission, and two other fora in Shanghai and Guangzhou. The video clips he prepared from the presidential debates exposed substantial anti-China rhetoric but also more nuanced policy positions. He forecast more bilateral trade disputes, but noted that President Obama’s re-election should contain any escalation in animus toward China that might have been featured in a Romney Administration. 

            Additionally, Dr. Feldman addressed business audiences about the legal and political hurdles Chinese investors may face when they invest in the United States, based on the treatise, Mergers and Acquisitions in the United States: A Practical Guide for Non-U.S. Buyers, that . BakerHostetler LLP has published with Aspen/Wolters Kluwer/CCH. Dr. Feldman is the editor and coauthor of the treatise, which has been published in both English and Chinese.   

Try To See It My Way

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Presidential races in the United States are always characterized by the classic principle connecting domestic to foreign affairs: conjure a foreign foe against whom disparate domestic interests can coalesce. For a very long time, the Cold War provided the Soviet Union. Political campaign disagreement was never about how best to get along. Instead, it was always about which candidate would be tougher on the Soviet Union, which meant asking which one would amass more arms, spend more money on defense, deploy forces to more corners of the globe to combat the Communist threat driven from Moscow. Debates were not about whether to build more missiles, but whether there was a dangerous “missile gap” requiring immediate attention.


The end of the Cold War presented a strategic problem for Americans. Some even imagined it was the “end of history.” Yet, everyone can always find a foreign foe. Even Canada, under Pierre Trudeau, in the early 1980s, thought it could rally domestic unity (meaning committing Québec to Canadian unity) by complaining about the United States. The National Energy Program and the Foreign Investment Review Act were legislative initiatives making the United States Canada’s bogeyman.


During the 1980s, Americans tried out Japan as a potential substitute for the Soviet Union, specifically with regard to Japan’s apparent (and, as it turned out, somewhat illusory) economic rise. Soviet proxies, such as Cuba, remained available, but threatening as instigators, not themselves a danger to Americans. Bitter critics, such as Hugo Chavez, were not taken very seriously. Implacable enemies, such as the Iranian Ayatollahs, were more of a threat to Americans’ friends, such as Israel, than to the United States itself.


September 11, 2001 delivered a new kind of foe and threat, an enemy without a state. Al Qaeda filled a critical gap that President Bush felt impelled to invoke when declaring his war on terrorism as a war with Iraq. But then, the war in Iraq wound down and Osama Bin Laden was eliminated. The United States had gone from the Cold War with the Soviet Union to an economic war with Japan and military conflict with Al Qaeda, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
 

And then came China, the perfect potential foe against whom all political candidates could agree. The decision-making of the Middle Kingdom was inscrutable, and China obliged the American need for a foe by alternating between pleas for understanding as a developing country and bluster as a rising star and emerging global power.


It has not been enough to conjure China as an economic challenge. Americans have made much of growing Chinese military might, even though China remains decades behind American military capability. Unlike the Soviet Union, there is no talk of missile gaps, but like the Soviet Union, China champions a centrally-controlled economy and a suppression of individual freedoms and free speech. If not a threat to American military security, China is seen by many as somehow a long-term threat to the American way of life.


China bashing has become as commonplace in American presidential campaigns as pledges of fidelity to Israel and hosannahs for the capacities of the American armed forces.  It is assumed, within American politics, that post-election the rhetoric and apparent hostility will fade, with the brickbats of campaign promises shaved into chopsticks for shared culinary celebrations.


These assumptions require Chinese to absorb the insults, recognizing them as little more than populist appeals for votes in a democratic society that may exaggerate respect for the ignorant and willfully ill-informed. Yet, now and again diplomacy ought to require a response to the Beatles’ refrain, pleading, “Try to see it my way,” and “We can work it out.”  Were Americans to hear comparable criticism from China—if they routinely were called cheaters and pirates, refusing to play by the rules, stealing Chinese jobs, stacking the legal deck—they might not respond with the equanimity and good humor they seem to expect of the Chinese. There may come a point where, as the rhetoric translates into consequential acts, the electoral benefits of escalating attacks on China may be more far-reaching and damaging than the politicians begging for understanding may ever have foreseen.


Giving Substance To Chatter


Prior to the presidential debate of October 16, Republican candidate Mitt Romney thundered that, “on Day One” of his presidential term he would declare China a currency manipulator. His action would be insulting, and probably inaccurate (tying one’s currency to the U.S. dollar is hardly manipulative, especially as the ties do not bind and the RMB has floated cautiously upward, as much as eleven percent in the last twenty-four months). And the threat is oblivious to the Brazilian allegation that the United States is a currency manipulator, printing dollars to drive down their value and enhance American exports. Yet, Romney decided to add lightning to the percussion, and whereas the sound might be harmless, the electric bolt of trade sanctions based on the currency manipulation tag could do palpable harm to Chinese trade. During the debate, Romney not only repeated the promise, but added that he would use the new label to impose tariffs unilaterally on Chinese exports to the United States. His amended promise ignored the trade laws, but then the trade laws have not much informed presidential debates.

Just prior to the first presidential debate (October 3), on September 28, President Obama exercised powers granted pursuant to the Defense Production Act of 1950 to order a Chinese wind power industry out of Oregon.  It seemed not to matter that he and President Hu Jintao had agreed in 2009 to cooperate in the promotion of wind power.It seemed not to matter that the Chinese enterprise apparently had reached accommodation directly with a neighboring naval facility and had express clearance from the Federal Aviation Administration (which had included Department of Defense review). Instead, the order was swift and abrupt, demanding that the Chinese abandon immediately, without compensation, this investment in the United States. Coinciding with final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations against Chinese solar cells, it seemed that multiple branches of the United States Government were acting in concert against Chinese economic interests.


President Obama persistently has boasted throughout the campaign that he saved 1000 jobs by exercising presidential powers against imports of low-cost tires, largely manufactured by American companies relocated in China. Because the consequence of his action was not to restore the production of these tires in the United States, the claim of saved jobs is doubtful (and no one seems to care where those jobs may be). But imagining them to be real, the Peterson Institute for International Economics has calculated them to have cost consumers, in higher prices caused by the presidentially-imposed tariffs, $1.1 billion, or more than $1 million per job.


There is no debate over any of these developments. Candidate Romney would hardly question an anti-China presidential action, any more than President Obama would denigrate directly the Romney promise on the currency – even though for four years Obama has resisted prudently calls to classify China the way Romney now promises he will, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury has postponed until after the election its statutorily required biannual pronouncement on China’s currency. Instead, there is a soft arms race of anti-China actions and promises. Obama claims to have been tougher on China than any of his predecessors, claims which, in the implementation of Section 421 of the Trade Act of 1974 (the safeguard against tires); the invocation of Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (to order abandonment of the Oregon windfarms); and the number of complaints brought to the WTO, are undeniable. Romney, however, promises to be even tougher, particularly as he declares impatience with international organizations and would prefer to act unilaterally.


These economic confrontations are particularly important because both Chinese and Americans identify trade as the single greatest interest they have in common (a majority of the Chinese public, according to the Committee of 100’s recently published Opinion Survey of 2012, and a plurality of Americans). American protectionism threatens Chinese jobs, just as Americans believe unfair Chinese trade practices threaten American jobs. Asked, “What are the two most likely sources of conflict between the U.S. and China in the near future?” a plurality of all American respondent groups (general public, opinion leaders, business leaders, and policymakers) said “trade” first. For every Chinese group, the plurality’s first answer was Taiwan.
 

Tempering The Rhetoric


By the third and final presidential debate of 2012, on October 22, Romney was retreating from the stridency of his earlier statements. He still insisted upon declaring China a currency manipulator “on Day One,” but he no longer threatened to act further, and his surrogates told the press that the declaration would have little meaning or impact. Perhaps someone had advised him that the President does not have the power to impose trade sanctions unilaterally based upon a presidential declaration of currency manipulation. Or perhaps, as he began believing he might be President on January 20, 2013, he was reflecting on exactly what he was promising.


Romney’s retreat ran deeper. He talked of China as an economic partner, even as he again characterized China as a competitor and adversary.


Obama was not retreating. China continued to test him, not only in trade but in strategic issues. He dispatched his Secretary of State to the Asia Pacific region in September, in the midst of the campaign, reassuring putative allies even as he was not characterizing China as a foe. And he emphasized his WTO complaint over autoparts while reinforcing the actions of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States against the Ralls Corporation’s Oregon windfarm (a subsidiary of China’s Sany Corporation).


Both candidates continued, on and after October 22, to campaign against China almost as much as against each other, but with a new tone and direction. In the October 22 debate, Romney recast his pronouncements on foreign policy to become more an echo of the Obama Administration than a choice. He concurred generally with Obama on the Arab Spring, on Israel and Iran, on North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan. And, in the end, on China.

What It May Mean


According to the Committee of 100 survey, Chinese and Americans admire one another, profess to like one another, but do not trust each other. Americans and Chinese see themselves as trading partners, to each other’s advantage, but as competitors with different long-term visions of their place in the world. Chinese generally accept the United States as a lone superpower for many years to come, but also expect one day to surpass the United States.


These views may be more enlightened than those of leaders in both countries. The leaders tend to see the competition as more intense and immediate. They see as much threat as friendship. They perceive a need to speak regularly to what divides China from the United States, perhaps more than what may unite them. The general public in both countries appears more favorable toward one another than their elites, and less ambitious for superiority.


Fortunately for the health and well-being of Chinese-U.S. relations, Chinese leaders are preoccupied with their own imminent leadership change. They respond publicly and vigorously to American slights, of which there have been many, especially during the presidential campaign. But they are likely sensitive to nuance. They will have detected the change in tone in the October 22 debate and the rhetoric thereafter.


By the end of the second presidential debate there was reason to believe that a Romney presidency would cast China as a cold war adversary, changing course from the sophistication of the Obama Administration balancing many Asian and global interests. In the final weeks of the presidential campaign, the Romney strategy has been to seem more experienced by seeming to endorse Obama’s foreign policies. The strategy is designed to reassure Americans that a change in the White House would not mean a radical change in foreign policy.


Romney, despite this strategy, is burdened by advisers who populated the most prominent positions in the Bush Administration. It is difficult to imagine a President appointing advisers with whom he is known to disagree, yet the Romney positions on and after October 22 sound a lot more like Obama, and a lot less like Bush. Should Romney win, the first test will be in whom he appoints, not what he has said. What he was saying before October 22 was consistent generally with the views of his advisers. What he has said since seems closer to what he must believe Americans want to hear. Whether he would govern as he imagines Americans would want, or as his more experienced advisers would tell him, is a question that ought to be of grave concern to China.


If there be a change in course in the Obama view of China during the campaign, it has been to harden positions, but then the 2008 campaign was full of rhetoric about NAFTA that never meant anything for the Obama presidency. China is an almost inevitable target, both because of the international relations principle of identifying a foreign foe, and because China is a soft target in what Americans see as the zero-sum game of jobs. For Obama, protecting the U.S. economy against China – using whatever legal weapons may be in the arsenal – is foremost a campaign necessity designed to reassure Americans that the economy, and employment in particular, are the President’s leading priorities.


Obama must hope that China hears the rhetoric of the campaign – and policy actions during the campaign -- his way, as part of the American electoral process. Romney must hope China sees and hears his way, with shifting positions more the product of campaign necessity than a forecast of untrustworthy or unpredictable conduct. And China must hope that both candidates, at least occasionally, see things the Chinese way, as insulting, presumptuous, but not a threat to a long-term and mutually valuable partnership. All must conclude that “we can work it out,” or leadership in both countries could move the bilateral relationship in unpredictable directions.
 

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Challenges To Applying CVD Law To China Move Forward In U.S. Court

August 2012 was a busy month for challenges to the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) imposing countervailing duties against China, and other non-market economies, while applying the non-market economy methodology in companion anti-dumping cases. On August 17, three Chinese companies filed briefs in the GPX case at the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”), arguing that the March 13, 2012 legislation requiring Commerce to apply the countervailing duty law against non-market economies is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On August 20, a fourth Chinese company filed two new cases at the CIT, also claiming that the March 13 law is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

As reported previously on this blog, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) ruled on December 19, 2011 that U.S. law forbade the application of countervailing duties to non-market economies. The U.S. Congress reacted to that ruling by enacting new legislation on March 13, 2012, titled “Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions to Nonmarket Economy Countries.” The new law, also discussed in detail in a previous article posted on this blog, provides that “the merchandise on which countervailing duties shall be imposed . . . includes a class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United States from a nonmarket economy country.” It provides in a separate section that the Department of Commerce should try to avoid “double counting” when imposing both countervailing and antidumping duties on the same merchandise from a non-market economy, which means Commerce should not count an alleged subsidy in a countervailing duty determination as a cost of production in the antidumping proceeding, thereby assessing duties on the same alleged program or conduct twice. The first provision of the March 2012 law, that countervailing duties should be applied to merchandise from non-market economies, was made retroactive to November 20, 2006, but the second provision, to avoid double counting, applies only to new cases initiated on or after March 13, 2012, when the new law was enacted.

The CAFC responded on May 9, 2012 by sending the case titled GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States back to the CIT for the lower court to consider the constitutionality of the March 13 legislation. Two Chinese companies, GPX International Tire Corporation and Hebei Starbright Tire Co., Ltd., argue in their August 17 brief that the new law violates the equal protection requirement of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because, they say, the law treats companies differently depending upon when petitions were filed against them. The retroactivity in the law applies penalties for alleged offenses before the law permitted such penalties.

A third Chinese company, Tianjin United Tire & Rubber International Co., Ltd., filed a separate brief in the GPX case, making essentially the same argument, and a fourth Chinese company, Beijing Tianhai Industry Co., Ltd., made the same argument in the complaints it filed on August 20 , challenging the Commerce Department’s final affirmative determinations in the antidumping and countervailing duty investigations of High Pressure Steel Cylinders from China. However, Tianhai challenged the constitutionality of the March 13 law in the antidumping case, as well as in the countervialing duty case because the March 13 law calls for Commerce to make adjustments for double counting in the companion antidumping case, rather than in the countervailing duty case.

All four companies argue the new law violates the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution because the provision applying the countervailing duty law to non-market economies was made retroactive to 2006, whereas the provision requiring Commerce to try to avoid double counting when antidumping and countervailing duties are imposed on the same merchandise applies prospectively only. The law thus discriminates against companies subject to cases initiated before March 13, 2012, exposing them to both antidumping and countervailing duties without any provision to avoid double counting. By contrast, Commerce must at least make an attempt to avoid double counting in cases filed after March 13, 2012.

Should the CIT conclude that the new law is unconstitutional, Commerce can be expected to appeal that decision back to the CAFC. Even were the CAFC to agree that the new law is unconstitutional, that decision might apply only to the GPX case, the Beijing Tianhai case, and the few other cases in which Commerce applied both countervailing and antidumping duties to the same merchandise from non-market economies between November 20, 2006 and March 13, 2012. The argument presented in court has been limited to the unequal treatment afforded to the companies whose investigations were initiated between the two effective dates. A favorable ruling would benefit only those companies.

While Chinese companies were busy in August in U.S. courts, challenging the simultaneous application of antidumping and countervailing duties and the new U.S. law, the Chinese Government was active at the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), challenging the U.S. application of countervailing duties to Chinese goods. On August 20, the Government of China requested the establishment of a WTO panel to examine its complaint that the United States Department of Commerce violated WTO obligations in twenty-two countervailing duty investigations of products from China. China’s request for a WTO panel challenges the conduct of those cases generally, as well as specific subsidy findings, but does not challenge the application of the countervailing duty law itself to China.

The Commerce Department and the petitioners in the GPX case will be filing their responses to the constitutional challenge by October 1, 2012 and the Chinese companies' replies would then be due by October 16, 2013.  There is no set date by which Judge Restani would need to make her decision, but there is a reasonable change she would do so before the end of the year.  At that point, the losing party is likely to appeal her decision back to the CAFC.  The Tianhai case would be on a later schedule with briefing likely to occur early next year.
 

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The American Government Still Has Three Branches: The Court of Appeals Tells Congress It May Have Acted In Haste

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on May 9, 2012 sent the case titled GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States back to the United States Court of International Trade for the lower court to consider the constitutionality of legislation passed earlier this year overturning the Federal Circuit’s earlier ruling that countervailing duties may not be imposed on non-market economies. The Federal Circuit, as previously reported on this blog, ruled on December 19, 2011 that U.S. law forbids the application of countervailing duties to non-market economies.

Not willing to accept judicial defeat, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and other interests who support imposing countervailing duties on China while treating China as a non-market economy, convinced the United States Congress to rewrite the law and overturn the Federal Circuit’s December ruling.

The new law, also discussed in detail in a previous article posted on this blog, provides that “the merchandise on which countervailing duties shall be imposed . . . includes a class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United States from a nonmarket economy country.” It provides in a separate section that the Department of Commerce should try to avoid double counting when imposing both countervailing and antidumping duties on the same merchandise from a non-market economy, which means Commerce should not count an alleged subsidy in a countervailing duty determination as a cost of production in the antidumping proceeding, thereby assessing duties on the same alleged program or conduct twice. The first provision, that countervailing duties should be applied to merchandise from non-market economies, was made retroactive to November 20, 2006, but the second provision, to avoid double counting, applies only to new cases initiated on or after March 13, 2012.

GPX argued to the Federal Circuit that the new legislation is unconstitutional because (1) the retroactive effect of the first section would change the outcome of the GPX case after the Federal Circuit already had rendered its decision in favor of GPX last December based on the law as it was when GPX had been investigated; and (2) the new law improperly creates a special rule applicable only to GPX and to a few other cases in which Commerce may impose both countervailing and antidumping duties on the same merchandise from a non-market economy without attempting to avoid double counting. In effect, GPX argued that the different treatment it and a few other companies whose cases were initiated between the two effective dates would receive, as compared to all other companies for which investigations will be initiated after March 13, 2012, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution because GPX and those few other companies will be treated differently and for no reason. Although the Equal Protection Clause itself applies only to the states, the courts have long interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as imposing an equal protection obligation on the Federal Government. The Federal Government, which includes Congress as well as the Executive Branch, must treat everyone equally or have a powerful rationale for doing otherwise. That the merchandise happens to be Chinese is not such a powerful rationale for such discrimination.

The Federal Circuit quickly rejected the first argument because the GPX case still was pending when Congress acted and, therefore, the constitutional prohibition on Congress changing the outcome of a decided court case did not apply. The Federal Circuit must have concluded that the second argument might have merit, however, because it sent the case back to the Court of International Trade with instructions to the lower court to make “a determination of the constitutionality of the new legislation and for other appropriate proceedings.”

The case now goes back to the Court of International Trade to consider the constitutionality of the new law. Should that court conclude that the new law is unconstitutional, Commerce can be expected to appeal that decision back to the Federal Circuit. However, even were the Federal Circuit to agree that the new law is unconstitutional, based on GPX’s second argument, that decision would apply only to the GPX case and the few other cases in which Commerce applied both countervailing and antidumping duties to the same merchandise from non-market economies between November 20, 2006 and Match 13, 2012. It would apply only to those cases because that argument is limited to the unequal treatment afforded to GPX and the few other companies whose investigations were initiated between the two effective dates.

To win its first argument, that GPX was being treated differently because a judicial decision in its favor was being overturned by legislation, GPX would have needed a judicial decision that would have had to be final before the new law had been passed. But the second argument is not so limited by the facts: GPX would be one of only a small number of companies treated differently from all other companies in non-market economies.

The Federal Circuit’s remand order is broad enough that it might be possible for GPX to argue, and for the Court of International Trade to agree, that the new legislation is unconstitutional on other grounds that would apply more generally. Such broader arguments are unlikely to succeed, however, because Congress has extensive authority under the U.S. Constitution to regulate international trade. Consequently, GPX may prevail, but only on the narrow grounds of unequal treatment with respect to double counting.
 

 

Lessons For China From Canada

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The final part of “Nothing Unites The United States Congress Like China (And Not In A Good Way): Treating China Like Canada (Maybe Even Worse),” we present this week. It is called, “Lessons From Canada.” Part One, entitled “Rewriting Subsidies Law To Fit Chinese Facts,” was posted two weeks ago; Part Two, “The Broken Promise To China,” was posted last week.

China is not the first trade partner of the United States to experience losing by winning, going through the process by the rules only to have Congress change them. Perhaps there is something in the American culture that accepts Lucy enticing Charlie Brown and then snatching the football from him. We cautioned, in an article posted August 2, 2009, about “How The U.S. Treats Its Friends In Trade Disputes.” We did not elaborate there on changing the law, but Canada has experienced exactly what has now happened to China, and it has left a lasting impression on Canadians.

To overcome what it interpreted as an intractable bias against foreign countries and entities in U.S. courts, Canada successfully negotiated an alternative dispute resolution system for trade cases, Chapter 19 of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, that became Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”). Chapter 19 creates binational panels of trade experts from both Canada and the United States to replace the U.S. Court of International Trade for appeals of administrative determinations on countervailing duty and antidumping investigations at the Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission. The binational panel decisions cannot be appealed except for limited “extraordinary challenges” brought by the governments for gross panelist misconduct or ultra vires panel actions that threaten the review process, so the panels replace the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as well as the Court of International Trade.

Chapter 19 came into effect in 1989 and Canada won some of its first appeals to binational panels within the year. The United States promptly began to curtail the authority of Chapter 19 panel decisions. The Department of Commerce refused to recognize panel decisions from one administrative review to another, forcing Canadian entities to appeal every year determinations finding certain programs to be countervailable subsidies after binational panels had found, in the previous year, that they were not. This practice did not deviate radically from the Department of Commerce’s tendency to ignore CIT decisions as well, but Canada had thought that the Free Trade Agreement would mean greater comity.

Canada found the United States continuously ignoring binational panel decisions. When binational panels decided that the United States Customs Service had no legal authority to collect more than $1 billion in duty deposits, the United States refused to return the money to Canadians as the law seemed to require. The United States used the money as leverage to force Canada into a settlement of a case that Canada had won.

Most egregious, perhaps, and most consistent with China’s experience now, Congress used the occasion of implementing trade liberalization – the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 – to enhance protectionism, explicitly changing trade rules in the law to reverse adverse judicial decisions in the ongoing feud with Canada over softwood lumber. A section of the trade law, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(A)(5A)(D)(iii), was scripted by U.S. petitioners expressly to overcome decisions favoring Canada in trade remedy judicial appeals.

During the last war over softwood lumber, the United States forced Canada into extraordinary challenges under NAFTA and into U.S. courts to enforce NAFTA and WTO decisions. The United States turned its defeats at the WTO into opportunities to rehabilitate rejected agency determinations. Matters were prolonged for years while Customs collected deposits on duties that would never be owed. The United States accumulated $5.5 billion while bleeding out the cash flow of Canadian companies.

Canadians became completely discouraged. No matter how many times they won legal decisions, the United States kept collecting and holding onto their money. The dispute dragged on for five years. All the while, Canadians remembered well how the United States was willing and able to change the laws when Canadians had enjoyed legal victories, or to interpret laws in novel and doubtful ways.

Nor was the experience with the Uruguay Round implementation entirely new. The Department of Commerce, invoking Section 304 of the trade law, had imposed “interim measures” against Canadian softwood lumber in October 1991, collecting duty deposits, without a petition, self-initiation, nor a preliminary determination. It took two years for an international panel of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) to find this action “inconsistent with Article 5:1 [of the GATT]. The United States then did nothing to comply with the GATT decision. This experience, too, Canadians remembered many years later.

Eventually, Canadians gave up, entering an agreement in which they handed over $1 billion to the United States, half of which was given to the U.S. industry that had lost the legal battles. It was not the first such cash payment to settle a trade dispute (Mexican cement companies paid $150 million), but it was the first not to result in free trade. The Canadians accepted managed trade at higher duty rates than prevailing at the time of the settlement when the legal process had promised free trade. The United States persuaded Canadians that, in the end, they could not win, no matter how much the law supported them. International rulings could not be enforced, and the domestic law could always be changed.

The United States deployed a powerful combination of actions against Canada, defying adverse legal decisions, collecting and withholding money illegally, changing the law. In the end, the United States got its way, not by celebrating the rule of law, but by bending the law to its will. Nothing impressed Canadians more negatively than completing a cycle of the judicial process only to have the law changed.

China Is Not Canada
In addition to the common lessons for China and Canada from different cases – that participation in the judicial process is no guarantee of a fair outcome – there are lessons, too, from the same cases. To pursue subsidies allegations against a non-market economy, the Department of Commerce adopted a methodology in parallel to its antidumping methodology for NMEs. Eschewing values in an economy with no market, the Department has looked to values in other countries. These surrogate values are meant to substitute for values in China that cannot be relied upon absent market forces.

The caprice in selecting surrogate values is perhaps inescapable, but the Department of Commerce has been aggressive in abusing the virtually unlimited discretion it enjoys with a silent statute. The NME methodology for antidumping has statutory rules concerning the selection of surrogate values. Because no statute ever authorized countervailing duty investigations in NME countries, there are no rules. H.R. 4015’s pithy two pages introduce none.

In the countervailing duty investigation of Laminated Woven Sacks, the Department used land values in Bangkok as surrogates for rural Shandong Province. The Department did not even acknowledge in its final determination the testimony of a land use expert that such comparisons of land values across countries and between urban and rural areas are nonsensical.

The Department of Commerce justified its use of out-of-country benchmarks to evaluate subsidy allegations against products from China by citing its final determination in Softwood Lumber from Canada, the very trade dispute in which the United States kept changing the rules. There, the Department had reasoned that provincial government ownership of Canadian forests meant excessive government control of the market and prices, preventing the Department from measuring alleged subsidies. The Department therefore selected prices from the United States, “cross-border benchmarks,” effectively treating Canada as a non-market economy.

A Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement binational panel had struck down the cross-border benchmarks in a previous iteration of the dispute over softwood lumber, and a NAFTA panel, more than a decade later, rejected them again. The WTO Appellate Body ruled that out-of-country benchmarks might be justified in some cases, but not in this one. Claiming the WTO rejection of the cross-border benchmarks in this case to be an approval of cross-border benchmarks in principle, the Department of Commerce persisted in using them until Canada capitulated more generally for a settlement.

The Softwood Lumber final determination – repudiated by a binational panel and hardly endorsed by the WTO – has been the legal basis for the Department of Commerce’s methodology in applying surrogate values to China in the subsidies cases that the U.S. Congress has now blessed. The legislation never addressed this issue at all, and China has failed to challenge judicially this fundamental infirmity in the legal process. The Chinese countervailing duty cases are, therefore, the direct progeny of the U.S. treatment of Canada, its best friend and leading trade partner.

Although China is experiencing what Canada has experienced, China is not Canada. Four decades have passed since Canada underwent a drastic reappraisal of its relations with the United States and decided it had to diversify, only to conclude in a Royal Commission Report thirteen years later that Canada would always be dependent on the United States and needed to secure access to the American market. The free trade agreements were supposed to provide that security, but once binational panels began ruling in favor of Canada, the United States hastened to change, in fact and in legal interpretation, the terms to which it had agreed.

The United States has always taken Canada for granted. Canada has not always had to accept that relationship, but it has almost always elected to do so.

The United States cannot now, and never will be able, to take China for granted the way it does Canada. China will not bend so easily to the American will. During the last decade it has been chic in Canada to talk about a foreign policy that “punches above its weight,” highlighting the contradiction between Canada’s prosperity and international influence, on the one hand, and its very small population, on the other. China, by contrast, is thought not to punch its weight at all, still presenting itself partially as a developing country not ready for a full international role. Yet, the Chinese economy already surpasses Canada’s in size and is second only to Canada’s in two-way trade with the United States. Canada will never be a regional power in a region with the United States; China is already a regional power and is growing more powerful.

The United States cannot reasonably expect China to accept the kind of international trade treatment it has gotten Canada to accept. China will have no less a memory of what has happened, and may have no less bitterness that, having played by the rules and participated in the process, China had to face the United States simply changing the rules. But unlike Canada, China will not accept merely what the United States will permit it to have.

The Dangers Of What Has Been Done
Notwithstanding the celebration of bipartisanship and the suggestion of national unity against China in legislating H.R. 4015, the United States has embarked on a perilous course. Following the way it has treated Canada, the United States risks a trade war and endless antagonism with China. It risks, too, the whole international trading system now defined by the WTO, which the United States carefully has built over the last sixty-five years.

It is hazardous to exaggerate U.S. dependence on China as the leading creditor and emerging export market for the United States. China, on many dimensions including trade, is dependent on the United States. Nor should one romanticize the role China plays in the international marketplace. China’s economy is largely controlled from the center and the government does try to pick winners and losers. Notwithstanding protest and denial from China’s Minister of Commerce, there are instances when the appropriate question is not whether the state subsidizes, but whether those subsidies are actionable under U.S. and WTO laws and obligations.

The United States will remain for many years to come a greater power than China in virtually every respect. But unlike Canada, whose ambitions have been contained in a desire to be a faithful and trusted friend and ally, China’s ambitions are to be America’s equal. Probably nothing more; certainly nothing less.

China could interpret this most recent experience as a reason to give up on the rules, to bow out of the judicial processes. To a startling degree, that is what has happened with Canada.

China could devise ways to retaliate or, perhaps worse, imitate American conduct. China will not be inclined from the overheated rhetoric in the United States to conciliate, and it surely will not, like Canada, capitulate. The United States does not need a hostile or antagonistic China, and China will not benefit from a trade war with the United States. This latest episode, however, could be a turning point, as it was for Canadians who harbor an eternal resentment about the American willingness to change the rules when the United States does not like an outcome. Crowing about changing the rules after losing a legal proceeding is no way for the United States to avoid alienating the Chinese the way it has alienated many Canadians. To most Americans, it may not matter how Canadians feel. They still bend. But this time, with China, the United States is dealing with a much less forgiving and compliant friend.
 

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