Times Change 风水轮流转

A year ago, American sentiment toward China, at least as expressed by many Members of Congress, was decidedly negative. Pending legislation included denunciations of China’s subsidization of exports and currency manipulation. Some Members of Congress wanted to restrict all Chinese imports. The slow American economic recovery was blamed to a significant degree on China.

Now, with Americans more focused on domestic economic woes than on any other single concern, complaints about China have receded. Illegal immigrants in the United States seem more of a target than anyone outside the country, even though there is no evidence at all that they have contributed to unemployment or economic stagnation. Historically, Americans tend to blame foreigners for economic hardship and there is a spike in trade remedy actions against foreign products. Not this time. Neither China nor anyone else but Americans themselves (and perhaps the aliens within), especially congressional leaders, seem to be blamed.

Still, China remains an available target, or at least a convenient means for collateral attacks on other trade priorities. The Obama Administration recognizes three pending trade agreements, with Korea, Colombia, and Panama, as potential stimuli for an expansion of exports that would create jobs. After three years renegotiating them to satisfy moderate Democrats as well as trade unions, the Administration declared them ready for congressional passage many months ago. Republicans, claiming to be champions of free trade, zealously advocated for their immediate passage until the Administration was satisfied with them. Then, Republicans launched a political campaign to deny workers displaced by trade agreements the Trade Adjustment Assistance (“TAA”) that for many years had enjoyed bipartisan support because the Administration linked TAA to passage of the trade deals.

The Administration may have pacified Democrats with the renegotiations and persuaded them that the trade agreements would bolster the economy, but not enough to prevent the insinuation of China as a barrier to final congressional approval. House of Representatives Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) has demanded a House vote on a bill retaliating against alleged Chinese currency manipulation as a pre-condition for voting on the trade deals. Her gambit, moreover, seems to have some companion support on the other side of Capitol Hill, where a small group of Senators plans to introduce a similar bill to retaliate against alleged Chinese currency manipulation. No such bill currently is pending, and none was passed in the last year, but Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W. Va.) is proposing one, focused as much on a complaint about the WTO’s Appellate Body as on China.

With a crowded legislative agenda, bills on Chinese currency not yet fully conceptualized are not likely ever to become law. The very threat of them, however, could impede other international trade. The attempted linkage to the trade agreements with Korea, Colombia, and Panama is typical of congressional legislative tactics, but also a desperate sabotage of the Administration by its own political party.

The Administration wants and needs the trade deals. Republicans have wanted these trade deals, but have not wanted President Obama to enjoy the satisfaction and potential electoral help from passing them. The President could not pass them relying on his own party. At the moment when he seemed to have struck an agreement with Republicans to pass both TAA and the three free trade agreements, some Democrats seem to be seeking ways to stop him. Their general weapon of choice appears to be China, which Obama has not wanted to antagonize, and more specifically the currency, which his economists generally have advised not to pursue more than diplomacy has been pursuing already.

China, then, is no longer the principal target in bills about currency manipulation. In the Senate, the more fundamental complaint is about the WTO, and in the House the intended target is trade liberalization. In neither case is China likely to be used effectively, but it surely must be to China’s dismay that it is being used in these debates at all.

Other pending legislation regarding China arises more in the context of national security or simple nationalism: a resolution that would ban Chinese manufacture of parts for the President’s helicopter fleet; a ban on technology transfer from NASA. There is more than one “sense of” resolution, which has no legal consequence. Meanwhile, the Administration is promising China more from its export control reform than it can or will deliver, but at least it is actively gesturing in a desired direction.

Unlike a year ago, the legislative spotlight illuminating grievances over the economy and trade is not on China. Indeed, what some call the “Manchurian Candidate” for President, former Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman, has suggested that the United States must look to itself before looking to China for explanations of economic difficulties. The current focus should not be misinterpreted: the bills about China are not about China.

There are many reasons why. The most important is domestic. The summer spectacle of eighty-seven congressional freshmen holding the country’s debt ceiling hostage concentrated minds at home. Imminent possible failure of European banks, and of whole countries, has shifted focus from east to west. Renewed Wall Street bonuses and continuing home foreclosures are reminders of domestic greed, not foreign malevolence. The national conversation is not about China.

There is also a powerful explanation in the deliberate foreign policy toward China of the Obama Administration. Much has been done to routinize U.S.-China diplomacy and reduce earlier tensions. Even as there have been few concrete accomplishments, there have been many calming meetings. The Strategic and Economic Dialogue convened successfully. A summit of Presidents in Washington in January helped Obama recover from his doubtful Asian outing last November, and squads of potential Chinese investors have been visiting the United States, nurturing hope that some of the massive foreign reserves accumulated by China may yet find their way back to the United States. Better in the form of investments than loans or purchased bonds. China, at least rhetorically, has recognized that it cannot continue to attract foreign investment without making some foreign investments of its own.

In November, while in Asia, Obama called for resumption of the Doha Round. His Administration now admits that this objective is not likely to be fulfilled. With its failure will be a failure to capitalize on the imagined global trading rewards that might have energized the world’s economy, and diminish even more the instruments thought to be available for economic recovery. In place of multilateralism, bilateralism is a modest but nonetheless significant alternative.

Successful partnership with China becomes more important with every multilateral setback. Diplomacy that routinizes the relationship, that removes it from a critical spotlight, inevitably makes the partnership more attractive to China. The trick, however, must be to avoid appearing weak, or desperate, to China. As much as the United States needs China, China needs the United States. As congressional complaint about China is not about China, friendship with China is not necessarily so much about China either. Both are about solving economic problems felt at home but driven by forces as foreign as domestic.

And so it is for China, too. China needs the United States as much for China as for the United States, for domestic as well as foreign purposes.

Changes in American politics about China from a year ago say more about the United States than about China or U.S.-China relations. It will be important for both countries to recognize and understand the impact of domestic politics on their relations, and on the needs they have for each other.

 

         一年前,美国明显对华不太友好,至少这是许多国会议员的态度。他们提交议案,指责中国对出口品提供不正当补贴以及操纵汇率。一些国会议员提议限制中国产品出口至美国。美国经济复苏缓慢也被认为是中国的错。

          当前,美国民众对国内经济发展的关注程度远远超过其他任何议题,对中国的抱怨声开始消退。虽然没有证据表明在美非法移民导致失业率居高不下或经济停滞,但他们却成为众矢之的,而境外目标开始退出美国公众视野。回顾历史,美国总爱把导致经济困难的责任推在外国人身上,针对外国产品的贸易补偿行动数不胜数。但这次却不同。中国及其他国家并未面临指责,但是美国人从自身查找原因,国会领导人首当其冲。

           但是中国仍可能成为被攻击对象,至少很容易成为其它贸易目标的附带牺牲品。奥巴马政府将尚待国会批准的与韩国、哥伦比亚以及巴拿马签订的双边贸易协定视为促进出口、增加就业的良方。奥巴马政府用了三年时间与三国重新谈判,以满足温和派民主党人以及工会的要求,并于数月前宣布谈判完毕、只待国会批准。然而自称倡导自由贸易的共和党人却坚持要求奥巴马政府满足他们的条件后才能通过这三个自由贸易协定。随后,共和党人又发起运动抵制向因受自由贸易协定冲击的失业工人提供贸易调整补助——这一补助多年来受到两党支持,但仅仅因为奥巴马政府将贸易调整补助和通过自由贸易协定联系在一起,共和党人就转变了立场。
 

           英文全文请点击这里

India, China, and the Doha Round 印度、中国及多哈会谈

中文请点击这里

Senior trade officials are meeting in Geneva the week of September 14, 2009 following a meeting of 35 WTO member countries in New Delhi on September 3 and 4, 2009. The September 3 and 4 meetings demonstrated a willingness of member countries to re-engage in the negotiations that have been at a relative standstill for more than one year and to re-affirm their commitment to a 2010 conclusion to the Doha Round. However, a positive conclusion to the Doha Round would require the key players, and, among them, especially India, China, and the United States, to bridge significant differences. India has emerged as a leader in the Doha Round, and China’s alignment with India during the July 2008 talks as well as during the September 3 and 4 discussions demonstrates an important and possibly formidable alliance between the two countries.

India is a leading voice in the Doha Round negotiations. Some have argued that voice led to the July 2008 stalemate, when then-Commerce Minister Kamal Nath declared that he would not risk the livelihoods of millions of farmers. Although there were a host of reasons for the ultimate failure of the Doha Round in July 2008 (see "New Focus Of International Business: Asia, The Centre Stage - The Future Of International Trade"  for an insightful perspective on the reasons for the breakdown), the final stand-off in July 2008 was triggered by disagreements – primarily among the United States, India, and China - regarding the special safeguard mechanism threshold that would allow developing countries to impose a tariff on imports of heavily subsidized agricultural products from the developed world. China had remained on the sidelines of the discussion until the very last moment, when it sided with India against the United States.

India again has signaled its desire to take a leadership role, this time in resurrecting the Doha Round by hosting the September 3 and 4 discussions. China expressed its full support for the meetings and was an active participant in the discussions. China’s willingness to follow India’s lead during the July 2008 negotiations as well as during the recent meetings in New Delhi is not surprising, even though China’s economic heft is greater than India’s. India was one of the original contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 and was a founding member of the WTO in 1995.  It is a savvy negotiator and frequent complainant in WTO disputes. China’s more recent entry into the WTO makes it perhaps more tentative in the multilateral forum, at least until recently. China has been a complainant in only six disputes since its accession, three of which have been filed in just the past 6 months

The position taken by China in the Doha Round indicates its recognition that it may have more to gain by aligning itself with India than the United States. The relationship between the two “Asian giants” historically has been marked with political disputes and economic rivalry. However, since 2005, there have been frequent exchanges of high-level visits and intensified bilateral meetings, including a visit by India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in early 2008 that culminated in both sides signing "A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of China and India."

China and India have shared challenges on the trade front. The two countries combined account for approximately 35 percent of the world’s population and they each need to feed populations of over a billion people. The majority population of both countries is rural. Thus, they both have an interest in protecting their poor farmers from heavily subsidized agricultural imports. India also presents a huge opportunity for China. Trade between the two countries has been growing by more than 30 percent each year. 70 percent of India’s population is under the age of 35, which makes it an attractive market for Chinese consumer goods. Indeed, during the 2008-2009 fiscal year, China emerged as India’s largest trading partner, a position previously held by the United States.

The meeting in New Delhi was important because it was the first such meeting since July 2008, with ministers from practically all major blocs in attendance, including the G-10, G-33, G-20, NAMA 11, Least Developed Countries, Small and Vulnerable Economies, African Group, Cotton 4 and others. However, despite claims from New Delhi of a breakthrough in the negotiations and by other countries that the negotiations were in the “endgame,” critics have noted that there were no actual developments during the September 3 and 4 meetings. India’s Minister Sharma acknowledged in his opening remarks that “even the unequivocal expression of political resolve has not yet been translated into action.”

Not much changed at the end of the two day discussions, other than a commitment by participants to continue talks the week of September 14. Statements issued by key players also highlighted important differences, including on how the talks should progress. Minister Chen stated on September 4 that China would continue to play a constructive role in working for an early conclusion of Doha, but that the focus should be on multilateral talks rather than bilateral talks as the core channel of the negotiations. This position is in direct contradiction to USTR Kirk’s statement on September 4 that bilateral talks are the best way to continue hard-line negotiations.

An alliance between India and China may mean that a successful conclusion to the Doha Round will require greater compromise by the United States. However, although USTR Kirk has not ruled out making further concessions on agricultural subsidies, a key issue for India and China, critics say there is little indication that the United States will change its approach in the negotiations.

Trade also is likely to be on the backburner while the Obama administration focuses on domestic priorities, particularly health care. President Obama is expected to give a speech regarding his position on trade, but critics say that such a speech on trade likely will focus on the importance of trade for economic growth in general terms, rather than a detailed statement on the framework for trade policy.

The discussions in Geneva this week may shed some light on whether a conclusion to the Doha Round by 2010 is a realistic goal.

          35个世贸组织成员于9月3和4日在印度首都新德里举行小型部长级会议,随即负责贸易的高级官员又将于本周在日内瓦举行会谈。新德里会议显示成员国愿意重新参与在过去一年多里停滞不前的谈判,同时它们再次重申在2010年结束多哈会谈的决心。但是,成功结束多哈会谈要求印度、中国、美国等主要成员国缩小各自立场间的显著差距。印度已经逐渐成为多哈会谈的领袖,中国在2008年7月和本月召开的新德里会议上与印度保持一致立场,充分显示两国已经形成重要、乃至威慑性联盟。

        印度已经逐渐成为多哈会谈中的领导声音。一些专家提出这一声音促成2008年7月的公开声明,当时的印度商务部长卡迈尔•纳斯声明他不会拿百万农民的生计冒险。虽然很多原因导致2008年7月小型部长级会议会谈破裂(参见New Focus of International Business: Asia, the Center Stage – The Future of International Trade 对会谈失败的深入分析),最主要的原因是因为美国、印度和中国在从哪一零界点开始允许发展中国家向享受高额补助的国外农产品征收关税这一特殊保障机制上存在严重分歧。

        印度再次表示愿意扮演领导者角色并主办本月前些时候召开的新德里会谈以推动多哈谈判。中国表示全力支持这一会谈并积极参与讨论。虽然中国的经济实力比印度更为雄厚,但是中国愿意在2008年7月小型部长级会议以及新德里会谈中接受印度领导却并不令人奇怪。印度是1947年签署的《关贸总协定》缔约国之一,同时也是1995年成立的世贸组织发起国之一。多年来,印度逐渐成长为精明的谈判家和充分利用世贸组织争端解决机制的申诉方。相对而言,中国加入世贸组织较晚,使得中国在多边会谈中仍扮演尝试者角色,至少最近还是。迄今为止,中国仅就六项贸易纠纷向世贸组织递交了申诉,其中三份申诉是最近六个月内递交的。

        中国在多哈回合中采取的立场显示中国意识到与印度结盟比与美国结盟更有利。回顾历史,两大“亚洲巨人”间的关系可概括为政治纠纷不断和经济竞争白热化。但是自2005年以来,双方高层互访不断、双边会谈紧锣密鼓,包括2008年初印度总理莫汉•辛格访华并与中方签署《中华人民共和国和印度共和国关于二十一世纪的共同展望》。

        在贸易领域,中国和印度面临相同挑战。两国人口占世界人口总数的百分之三十五,两国都面临解决上亿人温饱的难题。农村人口均占两国人口主体。因此,面对享受高额补助的进口品,两国都需要保护本国贫困农民。同时,印度也为中国带来很多机遇。两国贸易每年以超过百分之三十的速度增长。且印度百分之七十的人口年龄低于35岁,使得印度成为中国消费品的潜在巨大市场。在2008-2009财政年度,中国已取代美国成为印度最大的贸易伙伴。

        新德里会谈非常重要,因为这是2009年7月以来第一次部长级会议,包括G-10、G20、 G-33、 NAMA 11、最不发达国家、弱小经济体、非洲国家联盟和棉花四国在内的主要贸易区域的部长都出席了这一会议。但是,虽然新德里声称实现了重大突破、其他国家声明谈判进入最后阶段,批评者指出9月3日和4日举行的小型部长级会议并未带来实质性突破。印度部长阿南德•沙玛在开幕词中也承认“明确的政治决心还未转化成行动”。

        在会谈即将结束之际,并没有发生很多变化,只有与会国承诺在9月14日这周继续商谈。主要国家发表的声明也显示各自立场间的差别,例如会谈如何进一步进展。中国商务部部长陈德铭于9月4日发表声明,承诺中国将继续推动多哈会谈早日结束,但同时强调多边会谈而非双边会谈应成为谈判的主要渠道。这和美国贸易谈判代表柯克9月4日的声明截然不同,柯克指出双边会谈是推动谈判的最佳渠道。

        中印联盟可能意味着成功结束多哈回合需要美国做出更多让步。但是,虽然美国贸易谈判代表柯克并未排除在农业补贴领域做出更大让步——中印关注的焦点,批评者指出还没有迹象显示美国将改变谈判立场。

        当奥巴马政府忙于国内事务,尤其是医疗改革时,贸易的重要性自然有所降低。奥巴马总统即将就其贸易立场发表演说,评论家指出这一演讲将从宏观角度强调贸易在经济增长中的重要作用,而不是详细陈述新政府的贸易政策。

        本周的日内瓦会谈将预示在2010年结束多哈会谈是否是一个切实际的目标。

(翻译:朱晶)

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