China-U.S. Trade Law : International Trade Lawyer & Attorney : Baker Hostetler Law Firm : Trade Remedies, Customs & Export Controls

This blog occasionally posts articles regarding international trade issues with respect to India that are connected to China - US trade issues.  In that spirit we wish to bring to our readers' attention a recent call for papers to be presented at the 3rd Government Law College International Law Summit, organized by the Students for the Promotion of International Law (SPIL), Mumbai, in association with the Indian Merchants Chambers. The Summit is scheduled to take place from the 3rd - 5th February, 2012. SPIL Mumbai is calling for papers across the full spectrum of the Summit's theme, which this year is International Trade Law and Economic Policy. In particular, they are looking for papers on international trade law, international investment law, international taxation, and competition law. Please click here for more information on this call for papers.
 

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President Obama declared in his State of the Union address on January 27, to a standing ovation, that the United States would not take second place to anyone in the world, and specifically to countries such as China and India. The specific reference to China and India highlighted their growing importance on the global stage. India and China increasingly have been presenting a united front against the United States and the rest of the developed world, despite their own on-going political and territorial disputes (as we noted in our articles entitled, India, China, and the Doha Round, and India and China Turn Up the Heat on Climate Change).

We predicted in India and China Turn Up the Heat on Climate Change that an alliance between India and China could present a formidable barrier at the climate change meetings in Copenhagen in December 2009. Indeed, the talks have been regarded by many as a failure, and the resulting Accord as “low-ambition.” Just as India, with the support of China, had been blamed by the United States for the failure of the Doha Round in July 2008, China, with the support of India, has been blamed by many for the failure of Copenhagen.

The Copenhagen Accord, drafted by Brazil, China, India, South Africa (the “BASIC” countries) and the United States, is not legally binding, and was recognized but not approved by the 193 countries represented at Copenhagen. It seeks to limit a rise in temperatures to no more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, and sets a goal that developed countries jointly will deliver $30 billion of aid over the next three years and $100 billion a year by 2020 to help developing countries cope with the impact of climate change.

Developing countries, including China and India, have made clear that they will join other countries to combat climate change, but not at the expense of their own economic interests. They conditioned acting on the receipt of significant concessions from the developed world, which they see as primarily responsible for the problem they are being asked to address.

Both China and India chose Copenhagen as the platform from which to demonstrate that they could not be bullied by the developed world. India’s Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh stated in an address following the meetings in Copenhagen that the alliance of BASIC countries highlighted the growing influence of emerging economies. He further characterized as a significant victory the commitment from developed countries to provide $100 billion/year in climate funding without having to make significant concessions in return. He indicated that close links with China would continue. China also declared that Copenhagen proved China could not be pushed around.

India has been concerned about the binding nature of the Copenhagen Accord. Even though India was among the countries that brokered the deal, sources have said that it announced its support for the Accord only after UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon clarified to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that the Accord was a political statement of intent with no legal force. In the aftermath of the Copenhagen meetings, Minister Ramesh even “pled guilty” for allowing provision for “international consultation and analysis” of domestic mitigation programs, a greater concession than merely informing the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) about domestic mitigation programs. When the environment ministers of the BASIC countries met on January 24, 2010, Minister Ramesh stated that the Copenhagen Accord has “no hope” of becoming a legally binding document.

The Copenhagen Accord did include a January 31, 2010 deadline for countries to outline their climate change plans and declare specific emission reduction targets. More than 50 countries respected the deadline, including India and China. India committed to reduce emissions by 20-25% by 2020 (in comparison to 2005 levels) through domestic mitigation efforts, but stated specifically that “its domestic mitigation actions will be entirely voluntary in nature and will not have a legally binding character.” India further stated that “mitigation actions will also not apply to agriculture sector. The emissions from agriculture sector will be excluded from the assessment of emissions intensity.”

China stated in a January 28 letter that it would endeavor to cut the amount of carbon produced per unit of economic output by 40 to 45 percent below projected growth levels by 2020, also from a 2005 base. However, given China’s projected rate of economic growth, China still would increase substantially its total carbon emissions while expecting the developed countries to decrease their emissions drastically.

Whether the Copenhagen meeting was successful cannot be determined strictly from the setting of targets, on the one hand, and the absence of any legally binding agreement, on the other. It may be that “success” will have to be measured by “progress,” with the standard for progress reasonably modest and determined by actual carbon emission reductions worldwide. Nonetheless, unmistakably there will be no global progress without the developing world. Copenhagen confirmed a China-India alliance as the base of a larger group of developing countries resistant to progress at their expense.

China, India, Brazil, and South Africa are now central to progress on climate change. They have asked the UNFCC to hold six meetings through 2010 in preparation for the next climate summit in Mexico City in December. The BASIC ministers themselves will meet once each quarter, first in Cape Town at the end of April 2010. The European Community had entered Copenhagen with even greater ambition than the United States. The BASIC countries proved that Europe, the United States, and other developed countries will make little or no progress without them.
 

        奥巴马总统在1月27日国情咨文演讲中宣布美国在世界事务中不会屈居第二，尤其不会落后于中国和印度。他在演讲中着重指出中国和印度说明这两个国家在世界事务中日益扮演更重要的角色。虽然中印间仍存在政治、领土纠纷，但是两国仍在美国及发达国家前组成共同阵营（见《印度、中国及多哈会谈》、《中印为气候变化加温》）。

        我们在《中印为气候变化加温》一文中预测中印联盟将成为2009年哥本哈根会谈的阻碍。不出所料，这一会谈被许多观察家视为失败，会谈签署的协议也被视为“缺少野心”。正如美国指控中国支持下的印度应为2008年7月多哈会谈失败负责，在哥本哈根会谈中受印度支持的中国面临同样的指责。

        巴西、中国、南非（“基础国家”）与美国联合起草的《哥本哈根协定》不具法律效力，这一协议虽为与会的193国认可，但却没有得到她们的批准。这一协定试图将升温限制在不高于工业化程度前全球气温2摄氏度的范围之内，还要求发达国家在未来三年内提供300亿美金的资金支持，并将每年提供一千亿美金的资金支持发展中国家应对气候变化带来的影响，直至2020年。

        包括中印在内的发展中国家明确表示她们将和其他国家一起应对气候变化，但决不会以牺牲她们的经济利益为代价。她们表示她们的行动将以发达国家的重大让步为基础，因为她们认为发达国家应对气候变暖负主要责任。

        中国和印度都选择哥本哈根作为显示她们不向发达国家屈服的战场。印度环境部长Jairam Ramesh 在会谈结束后的演讲中指出，基础国家联盟标志着发展中国家的影响力日益增强。他还指出发达国家承诺每年提供一千亿美金的资金支持、而发展中国家没有做出重大让步是发展中国家取得的重大胜利。他表示将继续和中国紧密合作。而中国也声称哥本哈根会谈证明中国不会为他国所左右。

        印度一直担心《哥本哈根协定》的法律效力。虽然印度是促成这一协定的国家之一，知情者指出印度直至联合国秘书长向印度总理澄清这一政治声明不具法律效力后，才宣布支持这一协定。在哥本哈根会谈后，印度总理因协议中有就国内减排措施进行“国际磋商和分析”这一条款而向公众“认罪”，因为这一条款比联合国气候变化框架公约有关条款做出更大让步。当基础国家的环境部长于2010年1月24日举行会谈时，Ramesh部长说这一协定“没有希望”成为具有法律效力的文件。

        《哥本哈根协定》设立了2010年1月31日这一最后截止日期让各国列出气候变化方案及减排目标。包括中印在内的50多个国家尊重这一截止日期。印度承诺通过国内减排措施，至2020年减排百分之20至25（与2005年排放量相比），但强调“她的国内减排措施建立在自愿原则上，不受法律效力限制”。印度进一步指出“减排措施不包括农业产业。农业领域的排放将排除在排放限量内”。

        中国在1月28日的信中承诺争取到2020年单位国内生产总值二氧化碳排放比2005年减排百分之40至45。但是根据中国的经济增长预测，中国将持续增加二氧化碳排放总量，但她同时却希望发达国家显著减少排放量。

        哥本哈根会谈成功与否既不能仅以设定目标为标准，也不能以缺少具有法律效力的文件为标志。“成功”或许应当以“进展”来衡量，而“进展”的衡量标准相对较低、且以全球范围内的实际减排量为标准。然而，没有发展中国家的努力不可能实现全球减排。哥本哈根会谈证明中印联盟是众多发展中国家拒绝以她们的牺牲为代价参与谈判的基础。

        中国、印度、巴西和南非是气候变化谈判进展的核心。她们要求联合国气候变化框架公约在2010年12月前举行六次会谈，为墨西哥峰会作准备。“基础国家”将每一季度会谈一次，第一次会谈将于4月在南非开普敦举行。欧盟在哥本哈根会谈前提出比美国更高的目标。但是“基础国家”证明没有这些发展中国家的支持，欧洲、美国和其他发达国家不可取得进展。
 

         “成功”或许应当以“进展”来衡量，而“进展”的衡量标准相对较低、且以全球范围内的实际减排量为标准。然而，没有发展中国家的努力不可能实现全球减排。哥本哈根会谈证明中印联盟是一大群发展中国家拒绝以她们的牺牲为代价的基础。

        中国、印度、巴西和南非是气候变化谈判进展的核心。她们要求联合国气候变化框架公约在2010年12月前举行六次会谈，为墨西哥峰会作准备。“基础国家”将每一季度会谈一次，第一次会谈将于4月在南非开普敦举行。欧盟在哥本哈根会谈前提出比美国更高的目标。但是“基础国家”证明没有这些发展中国家的支持，欧洲、美国和其他发达国家不可取得进展。

 （翻译：朱晶）

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We noted in our article entitled India, China, and the Doha Round that India and China have forged a formidable alliance in the Doha Round of negotiations. Now the two “Asian giants” have combined forces in an effort to gain leverage in another multilateral dialogue – this time, the dialogue on climate change that will take place in Copenhagen later this year.

India and China signed an agreement (“Agreement”) on October 21, 2009 on climate change, providing further recognition that the two countries have much to gain from cultivating a long-term, economically-driven partnership. An India-China alliance, however, is a relationship that the developed world will regard with some caution. India and China were accused of conspiring to stall the Doha Round of negotiations in July 2008 and, unless the developed world makes some of the concessions they demand, the combined forces of India and China could present a similar barrier in Copenhagen. 

The Agreement was signed at a ceremony in New Delhi by Minister Jairam Ramesh, of India’s Ministry of Environment and Forests, and Vice Minister Xie Zhenhua, of China’s National Development and Reform Commission. The two countries agreed to work together over the next five years on a variety of initiatives, including collaboration in the areas of energy efficiency, renewable energy, clean energy technologies, sustainable agriculture, and reforestation. The Agreement also reaffirmed the “principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, in particular that developed countries should take the lead in and continue to reducing [sic] their greenhouse gas emissions and providing financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building support to developing countries.” China accounts for more than 20 percent of global emissions. India accounts for less than 5 percent, but it is the fourth largest emitter after China, the United States, and Russia. Despite the difference in emission levels, however, Minister Ramesh noted on October 21 that there was virtually no difference between the negotiating positions of India and China. Both countries have agreed to work on slowing the growth of greenhouse emissions, but resist making those limits binding and subject to international monitoring.

The Agreement, and the earlier Doha Round collaboration, suggest a transformation of regional and global relationships, albeit within defined and specific sectors. For students of traditional international relations, it ought to be unexpected and counterintuitive. India and China are demonstrating that global issues may encourage regional alliances even as regional issues, historically, might have made such alliances impossible. One day it might even turn out that regional alliances on global issues can help solve the regional divisions over local and regional issues.

China and India fought a war against each other as recently as 1962. Substantial territorial and sovereignty issues continue today, especially with regard to the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, portions of which China claims as South Tibet. In recent weeks, the Indian press has reported on nighttime boundary incursions and troop buildups, and there has been tension between the two countries about an upcoming visit by the Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh. Just days before the Agreement was signed, the People’s Daily Online accused India of pursuing a “shortsighted and immature” foreign policy of “befriend[ing] the far and attack[ing] the near.” It stated that India’s “dream of superpower is mingled with the thought of hegemony, which places the South Asian giant in an awkward situation and results in repeated failures.” 

Some may view the emerging economic partnership between India and China with skepticism also in light of China’s historical alliance with Pakistan. China has long regarded Pakistan as its “all weather friend,” and has offered it economic assistance in addition to military aid and support for its nuclear program. However, the friendship may be fraying, probably because it was built in significant part on taking sides against India. Some experts have noted that, as India grows in global importance, China appears to be distancing itself from the unconditional friendship it previously offered to Pakistan. For example, in October 2008, China refused a request from Pakistan’s President for a full blown economic bailout. 

China would be wise to court India and to continue improving relations with its historic rival regardless of its relationship with Pakistan, which China is unlikely to abandon completely in the near future. As the saying goes, nations have no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests. A stronger relationship with India is in China’s economic interest. India commands a much larger place on the issues of the day – the global economy, climate change – than Pakistan, and therefore is more important to China. Although China and Pakistan signed a comprehensive free trade agreement in 2006, trade between China and Pakistan was approximately $7 billion in 2008, contrasted to the $51.78 billion in total trade between China and India.

India’s population of over a billion people, and its growing middle class, make India more like China than Pakistan, and make India an attractive market for Chinese products. China’s new capitalism has a greater future alongside a prosperous India. China replaced the United States as India’s largest trading partner in 2008, and India ranked as China’s tenth largest export destination. The growing importance placed on India by the United States – for example, with the signing of the civil nuclear agreement in October 2008 – also means that China cannot afford to overlook or minimize India’s role in the world. 

Climate change is expected to be on the agenda during President Obama’s meetings with China’s president Hu Jintao in Beijing on November 16 and 17 and with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the White House on November 24. It would be surprising if President Obama were not speaking to China about India, and to India about China, which is all the more reason to expect that China and India will be speaking to each other. Notwithstanding emerging references to a “G-2” of China and the United States, India is no more likely to be left out of the equation from Asia than the European Union could be left out of the conversation with the United States. Should there be no reductio to a G-2, the emerging alliance between India and China may turn out to be a major reason. As for Copenhagen, the weight of the new Asian alliance might make all the difference.

在《印度、中国及多哈会谈》一文中我们谈到中国和印度在多哈会谈中建立了坚固联盟。现在，这两个亚洲巨人又齐心协力争取在另一重要多边会谈中拥有更多自主权：这次是即将在哥本哈根举行的气候变化会谈。

中印两国于2009年10月21日签订了《关于应对气候变化合作的协定》，进一步承认两国将获益于从经济利益出发的长期伙伴关系。发达国家对这一中印联盟却有所警觉。中国和印度面临阻挠2008年7月多哈会谈的指责，除非发达国家做出相应让步，中印又将在哥本哈根形成新的阻挠势力。

印度环境与林业部部长Jairam Ramesh 和中国发展和改革委员会副主任解振华在新德里签署了协议。两国同意在未来五年内在多方面共同合作，包括提高能效、可再生能源、清洁能源技术、可持续农业和造林。这一协定重申“共同但有区别的责任”原则，要求“发达国家应率先并继续减少其温室气体排放，并向发展中国家提供资金、技术转让和能力建设支持。”中国占全球排放的百分之二十以上，印度仅占不足百分之五的排放，但是是继中国、美国和俄罗斯之后的第四大排放国。虽然两国的排放量不同，但是Ramesh部长指出两国的谈判立场基本没有差别。两国同意减缓温室气体排放增长速度，但是拒绝接受强制性排放量限制并接受国际监督。

这一协定以及先前的多哈合作说明区域及全球关系的变化。传统国际关系学的学生可能会认为这一新关系不合常理。印度和中国证明全球一体可能会鼓励建立区域联盟，即使回顾历史，地区事务使这一联盟几乎不可能成立。有一天，就全球事务建立的区域联盟可帮助解决因地方或区域事物产生的区域分歧。

早在1962年，中印展开边境战争。两国间关于边境及主权的争执持续至今，尤其关于印度东北部阿鲁纳恰尔邦。中国认为该邦的一部分属于西藏自治区。最近几周，印度媒体报道双方加强军事部署、及晚间边境侵入，同时双方也因达赖喇嘛将对阿鲁纳恰尔邦访问产生分歧。就在《协定》签署前不久，《人民日报》网络版指责印度推行“目光短浅和幼稚”的、“远交近攻”的外交政策。文章说印度的“超级大国梦想体现霸权主义思想，这使得南亚巨人处于尴尬境地并不断导致失败。”

一些人士可能对印度和中国的经济伙伴关系带有疑虑，因为中国一直以来与巴基斯坦联盟。中国一直以来视巴基斯坦为“患难之交”，并向巴基斯坦提供经济军事支援并支持她的核项目发展。但是，这一友谊可能因为大多建立在反印立场上而有些磨损。一些专家已经注意到随着印度的国际重要性日渐增长，中国已经开始稍稍改变以往给予巴基斯坦的无条件的友谊。例如，2008年十月，中国拒绝了巴基斯坦总统的全方位经济救援要求。

对于中国而言，改善与印度这一传统竞争对手的关系无疑是明智做法，但这并不意味着中国将抛弃巴基斯坦。俗话说，国家间没有永远的朋友也没有永远的敌人，只有永久的利益。和印度保持良好关系符合中国的经济利益。印度在全球经济、气候变化等事务中比巴基斯坦扮演更重要的角色，因此对中国而言更重要。虽然中国和巴基斯坦于2006年签署了全方位自由贸易协定，两国2008年贸易量只有70亿美金，同比中印贸易量为517.8亿美金。

印度人口总数超过10亿，她的中产阶级不断壮大，使得印度越来越像中国而非巴基斯坦，也使得印度成为吸引中国商品的市场。繁荣的印度也给中国新资本主义带来更美好的未来。2008年中国取代美国成为印度首要贸易伙伴，同时印度成为中国第十大出口市场。美国对印度日益重视，如两国于2008年10月签订民用核协议，这也意味着中国不能轻视或减弱印度在世界事务中的影响力。

当奥巴马总统于11月16日、17日在北京和胡景涛主席会晤时，气候变化估计将是议题之一；当印度总理辛格（Manmohan Sign）于11月24日访问白宫时，气候变化也将是议题之一。如果奥巴马总统未与中方谈到印度将非常令人惊讶，反之亦然，所以中印一定会磋商。中印联盟的简称“G-2”正日益成为流行词；就像欧盟是美国重要的对话伙伴，印度也是亚洲不可忽视的力量。G-2，这一成长中的联盟将在哥本哈根扮演重要角色。 

（翻译：朱晶）

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Senior trade officials are meeting in Geneva the week of September 14, 2009 following a meeting of 35 WTO member countries in New Delhi on September 3 and 4, 2009. The September 3 and 4 meetings demonstrated a willingness of member countries to re-engage in the negotiations that have been at a relative standstill for more than one year and to re-affirm their commitment to a 2010 conclusion to the Doha Round. However, a positive conclusion to the Doha Round would require the key players, and, among them, especially India, China, and the United States, to bridge significant differences. India has emerged as a leader in the Doha Round, and China’s alignment with India during the July 2008 talks as well as during the September 3 and 4 discussions demonstrates an important and possibly formidable alliance between the two countries.

India is a leading voice in the Doha Round negotiations. Some have argued that voice led to the July 2008 stalemate, when then-Commerce Minister Kamal Nath declared that he would not risk the livelihoods of millions of farmers. Although there were a host of reasons for the ultimate failure of the Doha Round in July 2008 (see "New Focus Of International Business: Asia, The Centre Stage - The Future Of International Trade"  for an insightful perspective on the reasons for the breakdown), the final stand-off in July 2008 was triggered by disagreements – primarily among the United States, India, and China - regarding the special safeguard mechanism threshold that would allow developing countries to impose a tariff on imports of heavily subsidized agricultural products from the developed world. China had remained on the sidelines of the discussion until the very last moment, when it sided with India against the United States.

India again has signaled its desire to take a leadership role, this time in resurrecting the Doha Round by hosting the September 3 and 4 discussions. China expressed its full support for the meetings and was an active participant in the discussions. China’s willingness to follow India’s lead during the July 2008 negotiations as well as during the recent meetings in New Delhi is not surprising, even though China’s economic heft is greater than India’s. India was one of the original contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 and was a founding member of the WTO in 1995.  It is a savvy negotiator and frequent complainant in WTO disputes. China’s more recent entry into the WTO makes it perhaps more tentative in the multilateral forum, at least until recently. China has been a complainant in only six disputes since its accession, three of which have been filed in just the past 6 months

The position taken by China in the Doha Round indicates its recognition that it may have more to gain by aligning itself with India than the United States. The relationship between the two “Asian giants” historically has been marked with political disputes and economic rivalry. However, since 2005, there have been frequent exchanges of high-level visits and intensified bilateral meetings, including a visit by India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in early 2008 that culminated in both sides signing "A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of China and India."

China and India have shared challenges on the trade front. The two countries combined account for approximately 35 percent of the world’s population and they each need to feed populations of over a billion people. The majority population of both countries is rural. Thus, they both have an interest in protecting their poor farmers from heavily subsidized agricultural imports. India also presents a huge opportunity for China. Trade between the two countries has been growing by more than 30 percent each year. 70 percent of India’s population is under the age of 35, which makes it an attractive market for Chinese consumer goods. Indeed, during the 2008-2009 fiscal year, China emerged as India’s largest trading partner, a position previously held by the United States.

The meeting in New Delhi was important because it was the first such meeting since July 2008, with ministers from practically all major blocs in attendance, including the G-10, G-33, G-20, NAMA 11, Least Developed Countries, Small and Vulnerable Economies, African Group, Cotton 4 and others. However, despite claims from New Delhi of a breakthrough in the negotiations and by other countries that the negotiations were in the “endgame,” critics have noted that there were no actual developments during the September 3 and 4 meetings. India’s Minister Sharma acknowledged in his opening remarks that “even the unequivocal expression of political resolve has not yet been translated into action.”

Not much changed at the end of the two day discussions, other than a commitment by participants to continue talks the week of September 14. Statements issued by key players also highlighted important differences, including on how the talks should progress. Minister Chen stated on September 4 that China would continue to play a constructive role in working for an early conclusion of Doha, but that the focus should be on multilateral talks rather than bilateral talks as the core channel of the negotiations. This position is in direct contradiction to USTR Kirk’s statement on September 4 that bilateral talks are the best way to continue hard-line negotiations.

An alliance between India and China may mean that a successful conclusion to the Doha Round will require greater compromise by the United States. However, although USTR Kirk has not ruled out making further concessions on agricultural subsidies, a key issue for India and China, critics say there is little indication that the United States will change its approach in the negotiations.

Trade also is likely to be on the backburner while the Obama administration focuses on domestic priorities, particularly health care. President Obama is expected to give a speech regarding his position on trade, but critics say that such a speech on trade likely will focus on the importance of trade for economic growth in general terms, rather than a detailed statement on the framework for trade policy.

The discussions in Geneva this week may shed some light on whether a conclusion to the Doha Round by 2010 is a realistic goal.

          35个世贸组织成员于9月3和4日在印度首都新德里举行小型部长级会议，随即负责贸易的高级官员又将于本周在日内瓦举行会谈。新德里会议显示成员国愿意重新参与在过去一年多里停滞不前的谈判，同时它们再次重申在2010年结束多哈会谈的决心。但是，成功结束多哈会谈要求印度、中国、美国等主要成员国缩小各自立场间的显著差距。印度已经逐渐成为多哈会谈的领袖，中国在2008年7月和本月召开的新德里会议上与印度保持一致立场，充分显示两国已经形成重要、乃至威慑性联盟。

        印度已经逐渐成为多哈会谈中的领导声音。一些专家提出这一声音促成2008年7月的公开声明，当时的印度商务部长卡迈尔•纳斯声明他不会拿百万农民的生计冒险。虽然很多原因导致2008年7月小型部长级会议会谈破裂（参见New Focus of International Business: Asia, the Center Stage – The Future of International Trade 对会谈失败的深入分析），最主要的原因是因为美国、印度和中国在从哪一零界点开始允许发展中国家向享受高额补助的国外农产品征收关税这一特殊保障机制上存在严重分歧。

        印度再次表示愿意扮演领导者角色并主办本月前些时候召开的新德里会谈以推动多哈谈判。中国表示全力支持这一会谈并积极参与讨论。虽然中国的经济实力比印度更为雄厚，但是中国愿意在2008年7月小型部长级会议以及新德里会谈中接受印度领导却并不令人奇怪。印度是1947年签署的《关贸总协定》缔约国之一，同时也是1995年成立的世贸组织发起国之一。多年来，印度逐渐成长为精明的谈判家和充分利用世贸组织争端解决机制的申诉方。相对而言，中国加入世贸组织较晚，使得中国在多边会谈中仍扮演尝试者角色，至少最近还是。迄今为止，中国仅就六项贸易纠纷向世贸组织递交了申诉，其中三份申诉是最近六个月内递交的。

        中国在多哈回合中采取的立场显示中国意识到与印度结盟比与美国结盟更有利。回顾历史，两大“亚洲巨人”间的关系可概括为政治纠纷不断和经济竞争白热化。但是自2005年以来，双方高层互访不断、双边会谈紧锣密鼓，包括2008年初印度总理莫汉•辛格访华并与中方签署《中华人民共和国和印度共和国关于二十一世纪的共同展望》。

        在贸易领域，中国和印度面临相同挑战。两国人口占世界人口总数的百分之三十五，两国都面临解决上亿人温饱的难题。农村人口均占两国人口主体。因此，面对享受高额补助的进口品，两国都需要保护本国贫困农民。同时，印度也为中国带来很多机遇。两国贸易每年以超过百分之三十的速度增长。且印度百分之七十的人口年龄低于35岁，使得印度成为中国消费品的潜在巨大市场。在2008-2009财政年度，中国已取代美国成为印度最大的贸易伙伴。

        新德里会谈非常重要，因为这是2009年7月以来第一次部长级会议，包括G-10、G20、 G-33、 NAMA 11、最不发达国家、弱小经济体、非洲国家联盟和棉花四国在内的主要贸易区域的部长都出席了这一会议。但是，虽然新德里声称实现了重大突破、其他国家声明谈判进入最后阶段，批评者指出9月3日和4日举行的小型部长级会议并未带来实质性突破。印度部长阿南德•沙玛在开幕词中也承认“明确的政治决心还未转化成行动”。

        在会谈即将结束之际，并没有发生很多变化，只有与会国承诺在9月14日这周继续商谈。主要国家发表的声明也显示各自立场间的差别，例如会谈如何进一步进展。中国商务部部长陈德铭于9月4日发表声明，承诺中国将继续推动多哈会谈早日结束，但同时强调多边会谈而非双边会谈应成为谈判的主要渠道。这和美国贸易谈判代表柯克9月4日的声明截然不同，柯克指出双边会谈是推动谈判的最佳渠道。

        中印联盟可能意味着成功结束多哈回合需要美国做出更多让步。但是，虽然美国贸易谈判代表柯克并未排除在农业补贴领域做出更大让步——中印关注的焦点，批评者指出还没有迹象显示美国将改变谈判立场。

        当奥巴马政府忙于国内事务，尤其是医疗改革时，贸易的重要性自然有所降低。奥巴马总统即将就其贸易立场发表演说，评论家指出这一演讲将从宏观角度强调贸易在经济增长中的重要作用，而不是详细陈述新政府的贸易政策。

        本周的日内瓦会谈将预示在2010年结束多哈会谈是否是一个切实际的目标。

（翻译：朱晶）

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